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Drawing on insights from the corporate finance and entrepreneurial finance 
literatures, this thesis combines different empirical strategies and econometric 
techniques to study the role of capital-market imperfections on the financial and 
operational activities of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). The findings of 
the thesis can be summarized as follow: (1) credit-rationing effects are persistent 
and continue to impact the chances of failure later in the firm’s history, but its 
effects are mitigated by greater profitability over time, human capital of the 
entrepreneur and lower financial risk, (2) the determinants of rationing are also 
investigated and the result shows those firms with more collateralisable assets, 
greater profitability, and more human (better projects) are less likely to be 
rationed, (3) collateral and human capital both have effect on demand and supply 
of bank debt, thus collateral and good human capital indicator may alleviate the 
problem caused by the asymmetric information problem, (4) by using switching 
regression biases, the result reaffirm that that financially constrained firms’ 
investment is more sensitive to measures of internal financing, (5) by using data 
from 14 European countries, the result  suggest that there is a positive and 
significant effect of cash flow on investment and  a positive  relationship between 
cash holding and cash flow, however the degree of financial development does 
not have any effect on cash-flow investment sensitivity, and lastly (6) the 
decreasing trend of the effect of cash flow on investment cannot be found then I 




The general contribution of the thesis is to provide distinctive complement to the 
existing literature by suggesting new ways to study the impact of market 
imperfections on SMEs by using different empirical strategies and econometric 
techniques. Previous empirical studies predominantly focus on large public 
companies and the application to small firms has not been exhaustive. The 
specific characteristics of small companies allow me to highlight a large number 
of interesting issues relating to how the financing constraint affects the SMEs and 
how human capital can lessen the constraints.  Moreover, the thesis also 
investigate the investment cash-flow sensitivity across countries which, to the 
best of my knowledge, is still limited study assessing the effect of cash flow on 
investment using SMEs data from several countries. On the methodology issued, 
the thesis contributes by applying some econometric techniques that may reduce 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation 
The financing problems of SMEs have been an interesting issue both for policy makers and 
researchers because of SMEs’ role in economic growth and the perception that financial 
constraints at this level affect economic growth. Such constraints have been shown 
empirically to present one of the obstacles to growth (Ayyagari et al., 2007). Asymmetric 
information and adverse selection problems are considered to be factors contributing to the 
difficulties SMEs experience in obtaining external financing. This is due to their special 
characteristics, such as a lack of collateral and opaqueness of information about them.  
 
How important are financing constraints empirically for SMEs? What are the the detailed 
factors to explain why some firms appear to be more constrained than others? Whilst attempts 
have been made in a number of countries over the last two decades to answer these questions, 
the availability of good data and the failure to use appropriate econometric techniques have 
made conclusions questionable. Therefore, financial constraints for SMEs remains one of the 
most interesting areas of research in corporate finance, particularly in emerging markets 
where imperfections are likely to be most marked (D'Espalier & Guariglia, 2012; Guariglia, 
2008; Silva & Carreira, 2010). If data is available to provide definitive tests of the various 
theories proposed in the literature and the right methodology is applied in this process, I can 
expect to offer more reliable advice to governments around the world that are trying to 
stimulate economic growth. 
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Taking insights from corporate finance and human capital theories, this thesis attempts to 
present empirical studies in order to offer a greater understanding of how economists might 
measure the degree of financing constraints faced by SMEs. Moreover, it also explores the 
role of firm-specific and human capital factors that affect firm performance and how they 
may in turn alleviate the financing constraints for SMEs.  
1.2 Background  
Theoretical and empirical research both suggest that finance market imperfections and 
asymmetric information are the main causes of the financial constraints on firms, since 
borrowers allegedly hold more information about the firm than the lender (Stiglitz and Weiss, 
1981). Information asymmetry theories identify two different issues to be contended with, 
namely adverse selection and moral hazard. Both of these would seem to have greater effects 
on SMEs than larger and older firms (Hyytinen & Väänänen, 2006). Adverse selection is 
based on the idea that and lender cannot distinguish between a good borrower (low chance of 
default) and a bad one (high chance of default). This enables the borrower either to conceal 
his type (good or bad) and exploit his superior knowledge over the bank to gain more 
favourable terms than are justified economically. 
 
 Moral hazard exists when the bank cannot observe the borrower’s effort and he may choose 
after getting a loan to ‘put his feet up’. These problems are likely to occur particularly at the 
start-up stage of the business, when information is least available to the bank.  There will of 
course be a lender response to the borrower’s behaviour. Since the lender does not know the 
type of the borrower, the lender will charge a higher interest rate to compensate for giving the 
loan to a bad borrower. Likewise, to deal with moral hazard, the bank may require collateral 
from the borrower so that he has something to lose from putting in minimal effort.  
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The potential borrower, then, knows the risk of his own project. Assuming, however, that the 
bank cannot judge whether a given applicant is more or less risky, it might charge all 
borrowers the same interest rate based on average risk. In the extreme case, this may mean 
that some businesses get no credit at all despite having viable projects. As a result, the market 
may not deliver the optimal amount of finance to firms and growth will suffer.   
 
The moral hazard arguments can also lead to credit rationing because of the borrower’s 
willingness to divert to more risky projects (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), engage in asset 
substitution and apply an inappropriate degree of effort on the project (Aghion and Bolton, 
1997). Collateral may help alleviate this problem, but again, it has nothing to do with the 
viability of the project. In the extreme case, some firms with viable projects may have no 
collateral. Hence again, viable projects will be refused financing and lower economic growth 
will be the outcome. 
 
If banks are able to build into their pricing mechanism, the need more monitoring to address 
the asymmetric information issue, and this will make external (i.e. bank) financing more 
expensive than internal (i.e. retained profits). If the effect of this pricing mechanism on 
interest rates is big enough, this may limit their investment to be based simply on internally 
generated funds. This is another indication of the existence of financial constraints (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Fazzari et al., 1988). 
 
By definition, financing constraints consist of the inability of firms to finance economically 
appropriate levels of funding for a viable (positive NPV) project. Such a project would be 
offered funds in a perfect capital market. When I limit financing constraints to only bank 
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debt, I use the term credit constraints (scaled down offer) and in particular credit 
rationing (loan refusal).  
 
Empirical research that has been conducted regarding the financing constraints can be 
classified into two different approaches based on how I measure the financing constraint. 
Firstly, I have direct measurement, when I classify the financing constrained firms based on 
directly asking firms about these constraints. By applying a priori classification of the firm to 
differentiate financially constrained firms and unconstrained firms, I focus on assessing how 
successful these priori classifications are in distinguishing between financially constrained 
firms and unconstrained firms. Moreover, I also try to investigate the determinants of 
financing obstacles of firms. The findings of this study showed that priori classifications are 
quite effective in classifying financially constrained firms and that financial and economic 
development helps alleviate the financing obstacles of the firms that report to be most 
constrained. Hashi and Toci (2010) investigate if the priori classification of firms in 
Southeastern Europe has any influence on the various dimensions of firms’ perceived 
financing constraints. By using both the logic and ordered logit model, several dimensions of 
firm perception general financing obstacle, such as high interest rates or high collateral 
requirements, access to long-term and short-term loans are used to assess the determinants of 
the likelihood of firms applying for a loan and being denied credit (i.e., direct credit 
rationing).  
 
The second approach is the indirect approach, when I use a link between cash flow and 
investment to measure the financing constraint. Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) first 
adopted an empirical methodology to study the investment cash flow sensitivity (hereafter 
ICFS) by grouping the sample firms into financially constrained firms and unconstrained 
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firms. The methodology involves splitting the sample into sub-samples, according to suitable 
theoretical priors that characterize constrained and unconstrained firms (i.e., criteria that 
serve as proxies for capital market imperfections such as dividend policy, net worth and firm 
size), and then estimating reduced-form investment equations. Besides ICFS, there is another 
approach in measuring the financing constraints by using the cash-cash flow sensitivity 
(henceforth CCFS) (see Almeida, Campello & Weisbach, 2004).  
 
When using ICFS and CCFS, I only have to carefully select the priori classification to 
classify firms as either constrained or unconstrained. Previous existing empirical studies have 
been used several priori classifications, such as the size of the firm, dividend pay-out ratio, 
coverage ratio, leverage and age of the firm. Cleary (1999) extended his classification scheme 
based on a firm’s ability to raise funds externally and construct an index of a firm’s financial 
strength using multiple discriminant analysis. Another work that uses an index to measure 
financing constraints is conducted by Whited and Wu (2006), with their WW Index and the 
SA index, proposed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010).   While to address the potential problem 
using priori classification, Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) offers a switching regression model of 
investment to endogenously classify firms into constrained and unconstrained (see also 
Almeida & Campello, 2007).  
 
In order to empirically test financial constraint and investment behavior, it is also very 
important to accurately measure a firm’s investment opportunities so that the significance of 
cash flow in the investment equation does not reflect future profitability, but rather the effect 
of informational asymmetry. Most of the studies of investment cash flow sensitivity are based 
on panels of listed firms. A few studies focus on small and medium firms (Guariglia, 2008; 
Bechetti et al., 2009).  SMEs have unique characteristics because they are subject to more 
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severe asymmetric information problems than large firms, particularly large quoted 
companies. This results in greater difficulties in getting external financing. Moreover, SMEs 
also have lower borrowing capacity because of poor track record system and (being more 
frequently in the service industries) also have lower collateral values.  However, the focus on 
SMEs to assess the investment cash flow sensitivity could be challenging because I need to 
find a suitable control variable for a firm’s investment opportunities. Since market 
information is not available, this makes it impossible to compute traditional proxies of 
investment opportunities, such as the market-to book value, fundamental Q or analyst’s 
earning forecast for these unlisted firms. One of the first empirical models is the accelerator 
model, which explains investment using current and lag changes of sales growth. However, a 
convincing theoretical background is lacking. In this thesis, I use the sales to capital ratio to 
capture a firm’s investment opportunity. 
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1.2.1 Research Framework 
 
Figure 1.1 Research framework 
 
 
The diagram above presents the research framework for analyzing financial constraint and 
market imperfections for SMEs financing. As can be seen from Figure 1.1, the asymmetric 
information problem (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), entrepreneur wealth model (Evan & 
Jovanovic, 1989) and dynamic human capital (Cressy, 1996) will be used in analysing the 




1.3 Objectives and Research Questions 
This thesis, which takes the form of four empirical papers, presents an analysis of the 
financial market imperfections and financial constraints for SMEs. The objectives of the 
thesis are as follows: 
1. To measure the degree financial constraints faced by SMEs using direct and indirect 
measurement.  
2. To find out the effect of financial constraint, firm-specific and human capital factors 
on SMEs Performance 
3. To identify the factors that may in turn alleviate the financing constraints for SMEs  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Apart from the introduction and conclusion chapter, the thesis is divided into four empirical 
chapters. Due to the aims and nature of the thesis, all the estimation, analysis and discussion 
are based on three different datasets that are extracted form three different data sources. The 
first dataset is a longitudinal dataset from some French start-ups, the second one is a panel 
dataset of UK SMEs that are extracted from FAME Database and the last one, is a panel 
dataset of 14 European Countries that are a extracted from Amadeus database. The summary 
of data used in each chapter can be found in section 1.6. Each chapter consists of several 
sections, namely introduction, literature review, methodology, data and descriptive statistics, 
empirical results and conclusion. 
 
In chapter 2, I develop and estimate a model of SME survival under debt rationing by using 
panel data on some 9,000 French startups over the period 1994-2000. Our analysis of the 
determinants of rationing show those firms with more collateralisable assets, greater 
profitability, and more human (better projects) are less likely to be rationed. I also Consistent 
with Cressy (2006), I confirm that debt-rationing effects are persistent and continue to impact 
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the chances of failure later in the firm’s history, but its effects are mitigated by greater 
profitability over time, human capital of the entrepreneur and lower financial risk, 
consistently with Cressy (2006).  
 
In chapter 3, I estimate two different models to measure the disequilibrium loan market for 
short-term and long-term bank loans for panel data set consisting of 9417 French start-up 
SMEs. I recognize not only firm-specific variable but also human capital indicator into main 
disequilibrium model. The result suggests that collateral and human capital both have effect 
on demand and supply of bank debt, thus collateral and good human capital indicator may 
alleviate the problem caused by the asymmetric information problem. The results of  this 
study also find that, over the entire period, over 45.84% of the samples are credit rationed for 
long-term bank credit, and 45.77% for short-term bank credit.   
 
In chapter 4, by using unbalanced panel data that consisted of 7,185 SMEs in the UK over 
period 2003–2011, I use the method described in Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) and Almeida 
and Campello (2007) to estimate a model by using switching regression approach that 
incorporates the factors that reflect the severity of financial constraints in the main equation. I 
consider leverage to be the factor that reflects the severity of financial constraint. Iconsider 
firms with a high level of leverage to be constrained firms. The results show that financially 
constrained firms’ investment is more sensitive to measures of internal financing. Meanwhile, 
leverage has a more significant effect for constrained firms. Our results also suggest a non-
monotonic effect of leverage on cash flow sensitivity, as can be seen by the decreasing level 
of leverage for constrained firms and the increasing level for unconstrained firms. 
 
In chapter 5, I present the investment cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) and the cash-cash flow 
sensitivity (CCFS) estimation for 14 European countries. The result suggests that there is a 
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positive and significant effect of cash flow on investment after controlling for the industry-
year and country dummies which indicating that there is some friction in the financial market 
in EU area. I also find that that there is positive and significance relationship between cash 
holding and cash flow. The decreasing trend of the effect of cash flow on investment cannot 
be found then I may suggest that investment cash flow sensitivity still can be used as a 
measure of financial constraint 
 
1.5 Summary of Data 
Based on the aims and objectives of this thesis, the availability of good data is necessary in 
order to answer all the aims and objectives. Failures to get a good data have made the 
conclusion regarding the financial constraint and its impact on SMEs performance still 
questionable. If the good data is available to provide definitive tests of the various theories 
proposed in the literature and the right methodology is applied in this process, I can expect to 
offer more reliable result.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, FAME is a database that is reliable enough to provide the data 
for UK and EU SMEs. While since this thesis also investigate the firm dynamic, in particular 
the determinant of survival rate of SMEs, a good longitudinal dataset with the same cohort is 
needed, therefore I use a survey of French start-up firms conducted by the French National 
Institute of Statistical and Economic Studies. The survey section used is the 1994 cohort. 
Since the focus of this particular thesis is the financial constraints for SMEs by using data of 
European SMEs, therefore SMEs are defined according to the definition shown as follows1: 
                                                        





Table 1.1 EU Definition of SMEs 
 
Category Employees Turnover Balance Sheet 
Micro <10 < €2 million < €2 million 
Small <50 < €10 million < €10 million 
Medium <250 < €50 million < €43 million 
 
 
Table 1.2 Summary of data used 
 
Chapter            Title Data Used 
2 Asset- and human 
capital-based 
credit rationing 





capital: A panel 
study of a French 
start-up 
 
A survey of French start-up onducted by the French 
National Institute of Statistical and Economic Studies. The 
survey section used is the 1994 cohort. It consists of 9,417 
start-up firms.  
3 Collateral and 
human capital as a 
remedy to solve 
credit rationing: 
Evidence from a 
French start-up 
 



















Balance sheets and income statements were extracted from 
the FAME dataset published for a large sample of UK 
small and medium firms (SMEs) over the period of 2003-
20112. The sampling strategy is  as follows: 
1. Select only UK active firms from 2003-2011 
2. Select only firms that categorized into SMEs 
according to EU Definition 
3. Exclude some firms from financial and services 
sector 
                                                        
2 Note that this is much smaller than Guariglia (2008). I only include firms that are considered SMEs according 
to the OECD definition. (see : http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-
definition/index_en.htm ) 
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4. Outliers were removed from dataset by trimming 
the highest and lowest 1% distribution of key 
variables 
5. The final dataset consists of 7185 firms over the 
years 2003-2011, consisting of   35136 
observations of firms.  
5 Investment cash 
flow sensitivity 
and Cash-cash 




Balance sheets and income statement were extracted from 
Amadeus dataset published for a large sample of EU Small 
Medium firms (SMEs) over the period 2004-2013.  
1. Select only EU active firms from 2004-2013 
2. Select only firms that categorized into SMEs 
according to EU Definition 
3. Exclude some firms from financial and services 
sector 
4. Outliers were removed from dataset by trimming 
the highest and lowest 1% distribution of key 
variables 
5. Exclude a country with less than 100 observations 
6. The final dataset consists of 8687 firms over the 




Although a large number of studies have analyzed theoretically and empirically the 
investment cash flow sensitivity, the issue has still remain debatable. Previous empirical 
studies predominantly focus on large public companies and the application for small firms 
has not been exhaustive. The specific characteristics of the small companies allow me to 
highlight a large number of interesting issues relating to how the financing constraint affects 
the SMEs.  
 
This thesis makes the first contribution by selecting a large panel of SMEs and a long period 
of time that I consider. I also use cross-country dataset to see the effect the magnitude of cash 
of investment. To the best of my knowledge, there is still limited study assessing the effect of 
cash flow on investment using SMEs data from several countries. Moreover, the thesis also 
contributes to the literature by presenting an empirical work that adding human capital 
indicator as determinant of loan refusal and firm survival. Hence, I may say that both firm-
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specific financial indicators and human capital indicators may alleviate the problem caused 
by the asymmetric information problem. 
 
The thesis also contributes to the new alternative methodology to classify firms based on non-
priori classification by using switching regression model. Overall, our composition of 
different empirical strategies and econometric techniques provides a distinctive complement 




CHAPTER 2 ASSET AND HUMAN CAPITAL-BASED CREDIT RATIONING 
EXISTS BUT IS MITIGATED BY GREATER PROFITABILITY AND BETTER 
HUMAN CAPITAL: A PANEL STUDY OF FRENCH START-UP 
   
2.1 Introduction 
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) play a significant role in both developed and 
developing countries. For example, SMEs contribute significantly to employment and gross 
domestic product (GDP) around the world (IFC, 2010), and SMEs in developed countries 
account for an average of 67 percent of formal employment in manufacturing. By 
comparison, in developing countries, this is around 45 % (Ayyagari et al., 2007). In terms of 
the share of GDP, SMEs constitute 49 % on average in developed countries and 29 % in 
developing countries (Ayyagari et al., 2007). Several empirical studies have found that SMEs 
create more jobs than large firms, which is especially the case for new companies (see 
Klapper and Richmond, 2009; Aterido, et al., 2011). 
 
Despite important role of SMEs in the economy and in economic and social development, 
numerous studies suggest that they continue to face financial and non-financial constraints. 
Moreover, due to the nature of small firms, the effects appear to be more severe for SMEs 
than for large firms (Binks and Ennew, 1996; Fagiolo and Luzzi, 2006) for reasons that are 
well documented. New small businesses are often undercapitalised and considered to be 
particularly susceptible to failure in early life (Cressy, 2006). New firms tend to have a higher 
information asymmetry with respect to potential lenders than established firms. This may 
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result in a credit-rationing3 problem faced by new firms (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Cressy, 
2002, 2006).   
 
Related to new business survival, credit constraints and a lack of finances in general should 
limit the chance of business survival and the growth rate of start-up businesses (Xu, 1998; 
Beccheti and Trovato, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). However, some of the recent 
empirical studies argue that credit rationing has been overemphasized, and the entrepreneur’s 
strategy, prior knowledge and saving plans may be able to overcome the credit rationing 
problem (Cressy, 1996, 2000; Parker, 2000, 2002; Hurst and Lussardi, 2004).  
 
Over the past two decades, theoretical and empirical research has concentrated on the post-
entry performance of firms and it has investigated their survival, growth and credit rationing 
effects (Arrighetti and Vivarelli, 1999; Audretcsh and Mahmood, 1995; Mata and Portugal, 
1994; Xu, 1998; Beccheti and Trovato, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Piabuo et al., 
2015).  Yet, there is still a shortage of work on the post-entry performance of new small 
business start-up, primarily due to the lack of suitable datasets to investigate the issues. To 
assess the post-entry performance of new businesses, a longitudinal database is needed to 
enable the researcher to track small firms subsequent to their entry (Mata, et al., 1995).   
 
Relevant with the objectives of this thesis, this first empirical chapter measure the degree of 
financing constraints faced by SMEs using direct measurement based on the survey from new 
French start-up SMEs over the years of 1994-2000. The main reason why I use a longitudinal 
dataset from French SMEs is because I need a longitudinal dataset to find out the effect of 
financial constraint, firm-specific and human capital factors on SMEs Survival. The only free 
                                                        
3 By definition, when a firm cannot borrow the optimal amount of money needed to finance  the  positive net 
present value projects.  
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and available data is from this particular survey. Specifically, by using this dataset, this 
chapter analyses the survival rate of new small firms and explores the impact of credit 
rationing and other firm-specific variables on small firm survival. This chapter substantially 
helps our understanding of the post-entry performance of start-up businesses and provides 
important consequences for government policy to promote the survival of new small 
businesses, in particular how to reduce the financial constraints that may have an effect to the 
survival rate of SMEs.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains an overview of the empirical 
literature on post-entry performance of new small businesses and credit rationing; it also sets 
up the hypotheses to be tested. Section 2.3 presents the methodology used, and section 2.4 
provides the data used and the data description. Section 2.5 provides the empirical findings. 
While, the last section concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis development 
An analysis of firm failure must provide an exact definition of the term ‘failure’. The closure 
of a firm may be either solvent or insolvent. Many small businesses close without owing 
debts because, apart from trade credits, they do not borrow. For example, Cressy (1996) 
found that only 1/3 of UK start-ups borrowed on overdraft at early stage of the business 
rising to 1/2   after three years. On a closure, the entrepreneur will generally move into an 
alternative activity, either employment in another company or another business start-up. 
However, not all closures are failed businesses. For example, an entrepreneur may decide to 
retire or may even die, resulting in the business ceasing to trade. Likewise, a successful 
business may close (lose its name) as a result of a trade sale. Most authors choose not to 
define a firm that is being sold or has a different owner as a failed firm.   
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2.2.1 Capital Structure Theory and Financial Search Theory 
Firms’ capital structure issues have been the subject of research since the late 1950s, starting 
with the work by Modigliani and Miller (1958), which gives basis to later research in the area 
of capital structure. Since debt has a prior claim on the firm’s assets, a company may have an 
incentive to replace extensive equity with debt, but the agency problem of equity will 
probably arise.  
 
The trade-off defines that the optimal capital structure is the proportion of debt to total assets 
that balances the tax benefit of using additional debt against financial distress/bankruptcy 
costs. The optimal debt ratio is firm dependent and also contingent on the business cycles. 
Besides the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers 
(1984) also emphasizes information asymmetries between company insiders (managers and 
incumbent shareholders) and outside investors.  The pecking order theory illustrates why 
firms usually rely more on debt financing and why leverage tends to increase with 
profitability. Information asymmetries have the strongest effect for equity issuances because 
equity holders have a residual claim on the firm’s assets and earnings. Due to adverse 
selection processes, uninformed investors may worry that managers and current firm owners 
(i.e. equity holders) will wish to issue overvalued shares. Therefore, they are only willing to 
invest if the share price is sufficiently low or undervalued. Thus, in turn, issuing equity will 
be more costly for the firm and it will increase the attractiveness of issuing debt.   
 
Regarding the role of search in finance, Cressy (2010) mentioned that the theoretical 
literature in the area of finance gaps in fact ignores the question of optimal search for finance. 
The empirical literature on the role of search in finance is equally scarce, some of th recent 
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studies have been conducted by Cosh, Cumming and Hughes (2009) and Cressy (2010) in 
reference to the UK biotech start-up.  
 
Figure 2.1 Finance search strategy 
 (source : Cressy, 2010) 
 
Cressy (2010) presented the structure of finance, as seen in figure 2.1. Assuming there is 
asymmetric information in the market, entrepreneurs have no information advantages over 
other entrepreneurs in the market.  The detailed explanations from Cressy (2010) are as 
follows: 
“There are N possible sources of funding for a project ( ). An entrepreneur 
can choose to search n such sources ( ). The benefits of search consist 
of the expected return to using any funds obtained in investment (the NPV of the 
investment project, say); the costs are the (known) time and effort involved in 
researching and approaching the various sources. Searching is assumed 
sequential. A firm may either initiate search or not search depending on whether 
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the marginal costs of the first search are less or greater than the benefits. If she 
searches (n*>0) she applies to source 1 (say) first. Her request is either accepted 
or rejected. If accepted, it may be scaled down (more generally, altered 
significantly) or not. If scaled down it may be acceptable or not. If acceptable she 
invests in the project; if unacceptable, or if the request is rejected, she has the 
option of searching another source ( ) for which another cost-benefit 
calculation is required. This goes on until the marginal benefit of further search 
is less than or equal to the marginal cost.  On the other hand, the entrepreneur 
may decide not to search at all (n*=0) if the marginal benefits of search are 
initially less than the costs. This may be called the discouraged borrower effect, 
although often the term is used for a situation in which the borrower wrongly 
believes that search would not yield funds, or, would yield them only at 
unacceptable costs. The interesting thing about this structure is that although the 
firm may in the end get no funds, it is never as a result of market failure: the 




2.2.2 Financial Constraint, Wealth and Human Capital 
2.2.2.1 Static Model 
EJ Model 
There are two points of view on an entrepreneur’s function and a capitalist’s function in 
modern economies, namely the views by Knight and Schumpeter. The first point of view 
mentioned that capital markets provide little capital to entrepreneurs and wealth is needed to 
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start up a business. Meanwhile, the second view stated that the role of entrepreneurs and 
capitalists are separate.  
 
Evans and Jovanovic’s (1989) model (subsequently EJ) describes the role of liquidity 
constraint in an individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur. The main idea of the EJ 
model is estimating the model of entrepreneur choice decision, in which the tension of a 
liquidity constraint is a parameter and banks lend a proportion to the firm’s assets rather than 
to its expected cash flow profits.  
 
According to the EJ model, individuals can choose to work as wage employees or as 
entrepreneurs.  Wage workers will get wages as their salaries, whereas the entrepreneur will 
only get  y as his or her earnings, and it truly depends on the entrepreneur’s skill Φ and y 
produced, according to the production function: y = Φkα   , Where k is the initial wealth and 
<α<1 is a technology parameter.  The net income of an entrepreneur is given by: 
I = y +r (z-k)                                                                (2.1)  
where z is the initial wealth and r represents the interest rate. I suppose credit constraints on 
the entrepreneur, such that k≤ λz, where λ≥1 is a financial constraint measurement.  To 
analyse the choice to be an entrepreneur or wageworker, first consider the choice of k for the 
entrepreneur: 
Max Φkα + y +r (z-k)       (2.2)  
F.O.C  : 01  rk      (2.3) 
 















       (2.4)                 
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. The entrepreneur will be unconstrained if the k< λz, i.e.: 








                    (2.5) 
Then the person has an option to become an entrepreneur, and when he chooses to become an 
entrepreneur, he will compare earning under self-employment to wage earnings (in both 
cases, the entrepreneur will receive an interest rate in his earning), i.e.: 
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What can be concluded from the EJ model is that in the unconstrained situation, whether or 
not the individual chooses to become entrepreneur depends solely on the value of  , not the 
initial wealth. An individual will become an entrepreneur whenever   exceeds a cut-off 
value. Figure 2.2 showed that if I draw this case diagrammatically in ( z , ).  
 
Equation 2.6 describes the edge between constrained and unconstrained entrepreneurs, where 
individual below the boundary will be unconstrained and above the edge will be constrained. 
In an unconstrained region, there is some cut-off value of   above, in which people become 
entrepreneurs, and this not dependent on the value of z . In this region, the capital invested is 







Figure 2.2 Credit rationing (EJ Model, 1989)  
 
 
By assuming that z  and   are uncorrelated, a correlation between the probability of starting a 
business and assets will exist if there are liquidity constraints. Moreover, there will be a 
positive association between entrepreneurial earnings and initial assets, since wealthier 
people have started businesses at more efficient capital levels. Smaller firms will grow faster 
than larger firms that started at the same time, and this happens because smaller firms will be 
initially credit constrained and will have more incentives to invest profits back into the 
business then generate growth. Another possible policy recommendation that might increase 
the level of individual skill is by offering a policy to increase the level of skill that will 
increase entrepreneurship. 
 
2.2.2.2 Dynamic Model (Human Capital and Entrepreneur Ability) 
Cressy (1996) used large random samples of UK start-up businesses to outline a human 
capital model of survival. Cressy (1996b) defined human capital as the entrepreneur age, 
industry specific work experience, managerial human capital and whether the start-up 
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business was a business purchase or not. He mentioned that the reasonable assumptions why 
human capital determines the survival of businesses are as follows: 
1. Assuming that positive utility is associated with the exercise of work and a business 
skill means better-skilled individuals have more satisfaction both from wages and / or 
entrepreneurship. 
2. Human capital is a function of age (concave function). 
3. The expected utility return for an individual as an entrepreneur is higher than that of 
the wage worker. 
4. Entrepreneurship is a learning experiment. 
5. The utility of human capital in wage employment is assumed certain; an older 
entrepreneur has a lower reservation utility than a younger entrepreneur, and 
therefore, the older entrepreneur will stay in business longer. 
 
Later, empirical research discussed issues of endogeneity of capital constraints, such as the 
study from Astebro and Bernhardt (2003) and Parker and Van Praag (2003). Astebro and 
Bernhardt (2003) employed two-stage estimation procedures. At the first stage, they 
estimated the relationship between human capital, entrepreneur ability and financial wealth. 
At the second stage, they analysed the relationship between a firm’s start-up capital, 
entrepreneur ability, human capital and financial wealth (the predicted values obtained from 
the first stage).  The general finding of the study is that a wealth and capital requirement is 
found to increase with human capital and entrepreneur ability. The marginal effect of wealth 
on capital demand decreases when adding a human capital variable. Whereas, adding the 
entrepreneur’s ability may increase the marginal effect of wealth.  
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A different approach was used by Parker and Van Praag (2003) by defining capital constraint 
as loan-down scaling rather than loan denial. They found that credit constraints are 
endogenous and being reduced by human capital. In other words, more educated people will 
be less constrained. In relation to the firm performance, they also found that credit constraints 
will slow down the firm performance, and human capital influences the business performance 
directly (via entrepreneur ability) and indirectly (via relaxation of capital constraint). 
 
2.2.3 Hypothesis Development of Loan Refusal 
Following the seminal paper of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) (henceforth, SW), new and small 
firms are likely facing difficulties in raising loans from external sources, principally banks. 
Loan downscaling is a less extreme version in which the loan is not refused but a smaller 
amount is offered. In addition to these two constraints, there is the so-called discouraged 
borrower effect, in which the potential borrower with a viable project does not apply for a 
loan for fear of refusal. I focus on start-up variables in order to get the biased parameters of 
start-up loan refusal. 
 
From the lender’s side, they must define and observe borrower characteristics in order to 
decide which borrowers will be granted loans (Diamond, 1991). Lenders may base the 
lending decision on the price and the non-price elements. However, sometimes price is not an 
effective credit allocation mechanism. Therefore, lenders have to focus on some observed 
non-price elements, such as experiences, collateral, level of education of the owner and any 
forms of borrower self-insurance. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) argued that banks ration credit 
by applying a lending rule. For a commercially viable project, the bank will lend a proportion 
of the firm’s assets. This constitutes credit rationing if the bank, on this basis, offers less than 
the viable project requires.  
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One of the most important aspects that may be affecting the likelihood of loan refusal, hence 
credit rationing, is the availability of collateral. Collateral pledged by a borrower may help to 
reduce the adverse selection problem4 faced by the lender (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Besanko 
and Thakor, 1987). Lower risk borrowers may offer more collateral in order to differentiate 
themselves from their higher risk counterparts. Therefore, collateral acts as a signal to 
alleviate informational asymmetries and thus solve the credit-rationing problem.  
 
In most studies, it can be concluded that collateral has an important role in this regard, and it 
also appears to play a corrective or motivational role for the borrower (See Cressy and 
Toivanen, 2001 Steijver and Voordecker (2009) provide an extensive literature survey of 
collateral as a remedy for the informational asymmetries problem).  
 
Another variable that is considered the most important factor affecting loan refusal is the firm 
size.  Small firms are thought to have disadvantages in getting loans, because of the higher 
probability of failure, higher monitoring costs associated with them, and because they can 
provide lower collateral compared to the larger firms5. On the other hand, empirical research 
also find  that  a unit of bankruptcy costs is likely to decrease with size (Audretsch and 
Elston, 2002). 
 
Other financial indicators that may be important determinants of loan refusal are as follows: 
(1) firm profitability, measured as the return on an asset. This might be thought of as a proxy 
for the firm’s investment opportunity set and future prospect of the firm. A higher 
                                                        
4 Adverse selection occurs when the borrower knows his risk better than the lender. It occurs because 
of information asymmetries between the lender and borrower. 
5 This is partly a function of the fact that smaller firms tend to be located in service industries where 
collateral in the form of fixed assets is less available. 
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profitability level of the firm can indicate the firm as a good future prospect and conveys 
information of having a high quality project; (2) the capital structure of the firm, a proxy for 
financial risk, and measured by the debt ratio. Debt ratio is computed as the ratio of debt to 
total assets (total asset is measured as the sum of debt and equity). The leverage has 
ambiguous effect on the probability of loan refusal because by it can increase the probability 
of default. However, it also reveals that in general, prior lenders have found that the 
borrowers are reliable enough and this prior access to debt conveys positive information to a 
new potential lender. I assume this effect would be neutralized for excessive use of debt.  
 
Moving to owner-specific variables, the human capital of the entrepreneur may be relevant to 
the issue of the presence and severity of financial constraints (Cressy, 1996). For example, 
characteristics such as education and experience may be indicative of the quality of a firm’s 
project. The founder’s education level and experiences may be good signals for a high-
quality project because having a skilled and experienced owner can be a guarantee that the 
owner will select the profitable project and manage the project better, compared to an 
unskilled owner. Experiences can be placed into different categories, namely previous job 
experiences and prior experiences in the same or different field of business.  
 
Finally, from the review of the literature above, the hypotheses were propounded in 
alternative hypotheses forms and I expect not to reject this alternative hypothesis. The 
hypothesis statements are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1a : Firms that provide more collateral during the start-up year are likely to have 
a lower likelihood of loan refusal.  
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Hypothesis 1b : Larger firms during the start-up year are likely to have a a lower likelihood 
of loan refusal.  
Hypothesis 1c : Firms with higher opportunities of investment during the start-up year are 
likely to have a lower likelihood of loan refusal.  
Hypothesis 1d: Firms with higher leverage during the start-up year are likely to have a 
higher likelihood of loan refusal.  
Hypothesis 1e: The higher the education level of the entrepreneur is, the lower the 
probability of loan refusal. 
Hypothesis 1f: Having experience in the same or different entrepreneurial business will 
decrease the probability of loan refusal. 
Hypothesis 1g: Having previous job experiences will decrease the probability of loan refusal. 
 
 
2.2.3.1 Firm Financial Factors 
Some of the studies analysing the effect of size on firm survival found that larger firms are 
expected to have higher probabilities of survival rather than their smaller counterparts 
(Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Mata et al., 1995; Mata & Portugal, 2002; Liu & Li, 2015). 
The convincing argument that supports these general findings is that smaller entrants may not 
have a minimum efficient scale required to operate efficiently in the market and will face cost 
disadvantages compared to the larger firms. Asymmetric information in credit markets also 
provides an explanation on why larger firms survive longer, because an entrepreneur starting 
larger ventures that can signal his or her ability by committing more capital to the business 
may increase the probability of success. Another explanation for the low survival rate of 
small start-ups is because new small firms have liquidity constraints or initial 
underinvestment that would negatively impact the probability of survival.  
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Jovanovic (1982) argued that current firm size is an important factor in predicting the 
probability of firm survival. As all firms start without any prior knowledge about their 
efficiency, they will gradually learn about their efficiency, which may increase the 
probability of surviving and growing. However inefficient firms will fail. The current size of 
the firm is also already incorporated in all firm histories, which means nothing more is 
required to predict firm survival (Geroski, et.al., 2010), or it means that a firm that has grown 
in the past give a signal that those firms has been performing well and therefore the 
probability of failure is low. However, using the current size of the firm as a predictor of firm 
survival may lead to an endogeneity problem because firms that are about to exit tend to 
shrink and vice versa. 
 
Existing research uses the log of the number of employees, log of total assets and log of the 
firm’s revenue as measures of the firm’s size (See Geroski et al., 1997 and Mata & Portugal, 
1994).  Geroski et al. (2007) found that firms with larger sizes during the birth year will 
survive longer and that any subsequent increases of firm size will also improve the 
probability of survival. Audrestch et al. (1999) found that the start-up size was positively 
related to survival. However, it is barely significant, since the study only found that the initial 
size was significant in three out of 13 sectors.  
 
Some of the empirical studies on a firm’s survival also consider the financial condition of the 
firms as a critical part in determining firm survival. Profitability and leverage have been 
extensively researched as two main financial factors that may have an effect on firm survival.  
The growing firm may indicate that this particular firm has a positive prospect in the future. 
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The profitability ratio is seldom used as a measure of a firm’s performance. Having a higher 
level of profit may result in a higher probability of survival.  
 
Regarding the effect of financial structure on firm survival, (Huynh et al., 2010) find that 
survival rate has a negative relationship with leverage. However, Astebro and Bernhardt 
(2003) argued that the probability of survival is increasing with external debt if the firm is not 
too indebted.   
 
Since small firms also claimed that they face greater credit rationed conditions compare to 
larger firms, it can be inferred that this credit rationing problem can also be a problem to a 
number of many small business that have a higher probability of failure. New firms start the 
business with limited funds and less capital than needed (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989). The 
credit and financial constraints may reduce the likelihood of survival and firm’s growth (Xu, 
1998; Beccheti and Trovato, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002).  Musso and Schiavo 
(2008) found that for the French firms over the period 1996-2004, there was a higher 
probability of failure for firms having difficulty in getting finances. Finally, it may be 
reasonable to argue that loan refusal also has a negative impact on firm survival.  
 
Finally, from the review of the literature regarding the firm-specific factors impact on firm 
survival, the hypotheses were propounded in alternative hypothesis forms as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2a : Firms with a larger initial size have a lower probability of failure. 
Hypothesis 2b : Firms that have higher profitability ratios have lower probabilities    
of failure 
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Hypothesis 2c : Firms that have higher leverage ratios increase the probability of 
failure.  
Hypothesis 2d : Firms that are refused loans have a higher probability of failure. 
 
2.2.3.2 Human Capital Factors 
Related to the entrepreneur specific determinant of survival, the literature of entrepreneurship 
has long emphasized the importance of human capital as one of the important determinants of 
firm survival. Some existing empirical research found that human capital could be a good 
predictor for a firm’s survival (Preisendörfer and Voss, 1990; Cooper et al., 1994; Gimeno et 
al., 1997; Mata and Portugal, 2002;).  
 
Human capital can be defined as a possession of valuable knowledge and skills by the owner, 
which is very valuable in improving the survival chances of firms. Becker (1993) created a 
distinction between general and specific human capital; general human capital is defined in 
the context of years of education and work experience. Whereas, specific human capital is 
described with factors associated with the specific domain, such as the managerial and 
industry specific experience (Bosma et al., 2004). 
 
Human capital may influence a firm’s survival in several ways. Firstly, human capital may 
increase the entrepreneur’s ability to select the most profitable opportunities for the business. 
which may result in higher profits, thus increasing business survival chances (Cressy, 1996).  
Secondly, greater human capital can also increase the productivity of the entrepreneur, which 
means the business owner is more efficient in consolidating and dealing with operations or is 
able to attract more customers and raise more capital from investor (Brüderl et al., 1992). It 
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can then be argued that entrepreneurial human capital may increase efficiency and plays an 
important role in the market selection process (See, Evan and Jovanovic, 1982).  
 
The entrepreneurs with greater human capital will be able to learn faster about market 
conditions but still uncertain with their efficiency level. However they will adjust the 
capacity level and therefore reduce the probability of failure.  People with human capital 
resources are rarely forced into self–employment by the desperate need for income; they start 
the business by finding a promising business opportunity (Vinogradov & Isaksen, 2008). On 
the contrary, people who start their business as a “refuge” from unemployment start a new 
business in order achieve conditions for subsistence or because of necessity-based 
entrepreneurial activity.  
 
In this chapter, I consider both generic and specific human capital. Generic human capital is 
measured by level of education attained by the business owner.  I try to capture the effect of 
education on firm’s survival by adding dummy variables that that represent business owners 
who do and do not have a diploma. Additionally, I also take into account general start-up 
experience by including the entrepreneur’s prior work experience. I distinguish the 
entrepreneur’s prior work experience as a manager, worker or executive. 
 
To assess specific human capital owned by the business, I consider the entrepreneur’s prior 
start-up experience in the same industry as the focal business or in the different industry.  The 
variable is binary and it takes ‘1’ if the entrepreneur has experience in the same industry or 
different industry and ‘0’ otherwise. Since prior entrepreneur experience both in the same of 
different industry will provide them with the absorptive capacity to make business planning, I 
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hypothesize that the overall effect of prior entrepreneurial experience will be negative to the 
probability of failure. 
 
Finally, from the review of the literature above, the hypotheses were propounded in 
alternative hypotheses forms and I expect not to reject this alternative hypothesis. The 
hypothesis statements are as follows: 
Hypothesis 2e : Higher educational levels of the entrepreneur will be connected with 
a lower likelihood of failure 
Hypothesis 2f : Prior job experience will be negatively related to the likelihood of 
failure   
Hypothesis 2g : prior entrepreneurial experiences will be negatively related to the 
likelihood of failure 
 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Logistic Regression 
In this methodology section, I present the methods used in the analysis for determinants of 
loan refusal at the birth year followed by the analysis of firm survival. The causes of start-up 
loan refusal are identified and related to rationing via bank lending practices (collateral, 
profitability and risk) and project quality (human capital of the entrepreneur); this enables us 
to separate loan refusal for economic reasons (poor project quality) from refusal due to credit 
market imperfections (bank lending practices based on collateral and firm financial 
condition). Since The credit rationing condition here is defined as a respondent statement or 
answer that applies for a bank loan and did not get the desirable loan (loan refusal). A 
dummy variable is used to describe loan refusal as follows: Refuse = 1 if on application the 
firm is refused a loan at startup; = 0 otherwise.  Since the dependent variable is dummy 
 43 
variable, I may choose to use logistic regression or probit regression. However, since the data 
has slightly flatter tails (the skewness), then logit has better interpretation than probit 
regression. The logit also has better interpretation than probit and it can be interpered as 
modeling log odds.  
 
)'()1Pr( itit XFY         (2.7) 
 
Where itY  is the dummy variable for loan refusal, 1 if a firm asks for a loan and did not get it, 
0 otherwise.  itX '   is the vector for explanatory variables, which can be classified into two 
factors, firm-specific and human capital factors. Firm-specific variables are Size, Collateral, 
ROA and Lev. Human-specific factors that are also included in the estimation are Diploma, 
Exp and Prev. Since I focus on analysing the determinant of loan refusal, hence credit 
rationing, the observation will be equal to the number of samples surveyed in the year 1994.  
 
Logistic regression uses a maximum likelihood estimation where the initial values of the 
estimated parameters are used and those values of the estimated parameters are adjusted until 
the maximum likelihood value of the estimated parameters is obtained. By implementing the 
logistic regression, one of the main outputs is the odds ratio, which can be interpreted as the 
effect of one unit of change in independent variables in the predicted odds ratio by assuming 





2.3.2 Survival Analysis 
2.3.1.1 Non-Parametric Methods 
In general, a survivor function shows the cumulative survival probabilities throughout the 
observation time or measurement window. It may be stated as describing how long the 
subjects of observation are “alive” than how quickly they “die” (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
1999). The survival function is then defined as: 
 
)()(1)( tTprobtFtS         (2.8) 
 
Where )(tS  is the proportion of surviving the firm beyond time t, and F(t)  represents the 
cumulative distribution function of the variable time T. Therefore, the survivorship function 
is defined as the unconditional probability that an event of failure has not yet occurred at time 
t. The survival function is a monotone non-increasing function where at time t=0 then S(t) =1, 
and at t =  , S(t) =0. The most widely used non-parametric estimation of survival is by using 
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where 
in  is the number of firms under the  risk at time it , meanwhile id  denotes the number 
of failures at 
it . The product is overall observed failure ages that are less than or equal to t. 
The hazard rate function measures the rate in which the risk is being accumulated, or in other 
words, it gives the rate of failure conditional upon the subject of observation having survived 
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To show the differences in the duration of survival between firms, I divide the full sample 
into subsamples and examine whether the survival functions differ according to firm-specific 
characteristics. I also test the equality of survival functions between subsamples by using the 
log-rank test and Wilcoxon test. 
 
I describe the duration of survival t as the period from the year of the firm’s establishment to 
the year 2000, the last year of observation. To investigate factors affecting the firm survival, 
it is very crucial to look at the data in terms of duration of life. In this paper, censored data 
refers to those firms who still exist in the year 2000.   
 
 
2.3.1.2 Semi Parametric Methods 
Using a proportional hazards model proposed by Cox (1972), I try to identify whether the 
covariates affect the hazards of the firms. The proportional hazards model is famous as a 
parametric approach for survival data, and it is very useful to explain the effects of covariates 
on the hazards of individuals. Geroski et al. (2007) stated that the Cox-proportional hazard 
model allows one to define the failure more rigorously than is possible with conventional 
approaches such as probit and logit models.  The hazard function for the Cox proportional 
hazards model is represented by: 
 
),()()( 0  Xthth j         (2.12) 
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which can be read as the hazard subject j faces is part of some function of the hazard 
everybody faces (the baseline hazard 0h ) that is modified by some function of the explanatory 
variables. In this case, the shape of the baseline hazard function (a function of time) is the 
same for all firms, and some variations in the explanatory variables will translate into parallel 
movement of this function. This means that it will only affect the hazard function’s shape. 
The hazard function is written in equation (7) in order to have a positive hazard function. 





j ethth          (2.14) 
 
 is estimated by using maximum likelihood, while )(0 th  denotes the baseline hazard 
function. In this model, the baseline function involves the time dimension, but not the X 
variables.  )(0 th  represents how the hazard rates change as a function of survival time, while 
X’   represents how the hazard changes a function of covariates (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
1999).    
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The database used for this paper is a single cohort from the French SINE database.  This data 
is taken from a survey of French start-ups conducted by the French National Institute of 
Statistical and Economic Studies. The survey section used is the 1994 cohort. It consists of 
9417 start-ups that had been set up or taken over during the first half of 1994 and had 
survived for at least one month. New firms that were surveyed are classified based on of their 
registration in the “Systèmed'Informationset de Répertoire des Entreprises et des 
Etablissements” (SIRENE repertory).  A range of human and financial capital variables are 
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recorded at start up, along with failure information in the years following. The data is thus an 
unbalanced panel with number of observation for each individual firms varies between 1 and 
6 years, depending on if and when the firm fails. Since this chapter also investigates the 
effect of financial constraint on SMEs Survival, therefore I use a longitudinal dataset and the 
only longitudinal dataset that can be used is coming from the SIRENE repertory. 
 
In France, since the eighties, SMEs can be considered as important sector in regards to job 
creation. The growth in the number of start-up in France results not only from the greater 
possibilities to start-up up, but also a greater supply of entrepreneurship. Regardless the 
importance of the France SMEs, as can be inferred from the survey, major obstacle faced by 
the SMEs is about the difficulties to get banking financing. Since the sample are start-up 
businesses, so that they are very much rely on band/debt financing instead of going to the 
capital market to get external financing. However, nowadays, the opportunity of getting fund 
from capital market is getting larger especially for the Growth-stage SMEs.  
Table 2.1. Survival and failure of the 1994 cohort  
 
Year Number of Firms Fail % of Survived /Active 
SMEs 
% Closed Operations 
1995 8,174 824 91.25% 8.75% 
1996 7,177 804 82.72% 17.28% 
1997 7,132 466 77.78% 22.22% 
1998 6,539 657 70.80% 29.20% 
1999 5,993 607 64.36% 35.64% 
2000 5,508 551 58.50% 41.50% 
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In 1994, I had 9417 firms6, and this number slowly decreases as firms close solvently or 
bankruptcy. On average, there are 7.82% failures in a single failure per subject data, and 25% 
of 9417 firms at year 1994 survived up to 4 years. The average period of survival was 5.3 
years. Table 2.1 shows cohort survival and failure rates over time. 
 
Referring back to our discussion of the term ‘failure’, in the empirical analysis I examine 
only the determinants of the closure of firms and leave open the issues of whether this is 
failure in the sense of bankruptcy.  I define a binary variable, close, for firm closure as 
follows: 
Close=1: if the firm permanently stops trading activity in any year from 1995-2000 
             Close=0: if the firm remains actively trading in year 2  
 
The credit rationing condition here is defined as a respondent statement or answer that 
applies for a bank loan and did not get the desirable loan (loan refusal). A dummy variable is 
used to describe loan refusal as follows:  
Refuse = 1 if on application the firm is refused a loan at startup; = 0 otherwise 
However, some of the respondents who claim they do not apply for a loan for various 
reasons, those respondents could be categorized as discouraged borrower when they claim 
they do not have problem of obtaining finance or when they did not enter the application 
process due to fear of rejection. Those respondents should be excluded from the sample to 
avoid self-selection bias. 
                                                        
6From the 9,422 sample firms in 1994, 5 firms were dropped from the sample because these firms are seen as 
reappearing after failing in a certain year. 
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I also used several variables that may be good predictors for the firm’s survival. I decided to 
limit the variables into two different categories, firm-specific variables and human capital 
specific variables. For firm-specific variables, I computed a measure of size, a profitability 
ratio and a leverage ratio.  Firm size (Size) is measured here by the logarithm of total assets. 
As a proxy for profitability, I computed the return on asset (ROA), which is derived from 
profit over a firm’s gross assets. Meanwhile, I use the debt to total equity ratio as a measure 
of a firm’s leverage (Leverage).  I drop some observation with the leverage ratio is larger 
than 1, then the final number of firms are 8,485, with 42,157 observation during the period of 
1994-2000.  
The human capital proxies are coming from the survey and all of them are dummy variables. 
I recognize the proxies of level of education (Diploma), prior entrepreneurial experience in 
the same and different fields of business (Exp) and prior job experiences either as a manager, 
as an executive or as a worker (Prev). I also use some control variables that define the 
demographic criteria of sample, age of the entrepreneur (Age), gender (Gender) and 
nationality (Nationality), legal form of business (Form); seven industrial dummies are also 
used.  
Table 2.3 provides general descriptive statistics and correlation for the variables used in the 
analysis.  As predicted, the loan refusal variable has a negative correlation with a majority of 
firm specific and human capital factors. It can be seen that loan refusal has a negative 
correlation with firm size, leverage, investment opportunity, and collateral, the level of 
education and previous jobs of the owner. Meanwhile, having prior experiences in the same 
or different business has a positive correlation with the loan refusal variables. Collateral and 
leverage has a positive relationship with the size of the firm, 0.405 and 0.73 respectively.  
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Table 2.2 Variable definition 




Credit Rationing (Loan Refusal) Loan refusal condition, hence it will be used as 
a proxy for credit rationing; 1 for having a 
loan refusal and 0 otherwise 
  
Size  Log of gross total asset 
7
   
   
Collateral (Col) Total fixed asset/Assets 
   
Return on Asset (Npm) Profit after tax/ Total gross assets 
   
Leverage (Lev) Total debt/ total gross assets 
   
Diploma (Dip) 1 if having diploma, 0 otherwise 
   
Experiences (Exp) 1 if having prior experiences in the same or 
different business, 0 otherwise 
   
Previous Jobs (Prev) 1 if having previous job, 0 otherwise 
   
Business form (BusForm) 1 for limited liability firms, 0 otherwise 
   
Age of owner less than 40  (Age) 1 if age less than 40, 0 otherwise 
   
Gender 1 for male, 0 for female 
   
Nationality 1 if French citizen, 0 otherwise 
   
 
 
                                                        
7 Reasons to use logged variables fall into two categories: Statistical and substantive. Statistically, if your 
variables are right skew. Then, the regression can be influenced a lot by one or a few cases at the high end on 
one or both variables. Taking the log can help this by reducing or eliminating skew. Substantively, some 
variable are better thought of in terms of ratios than differences.  
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
No Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 
Loan Refusal 42,157 0.0320 0.1760 1.000             
2 
Size at Birth 
Year 
7,771 5.6000 1.2240 -0.065 1.000            
3 
Size 42,157 6.0070 1.2080 -0.065 1.000 1.000           
4 
Collateral 40,180 5.1890 1.4380 -0.032 0.405 0.405 1.000          
5 




42,157 0.2590 1.4030 0.002 -0.297 -0.297 -0.232 -0.236 1.000        
7 
Diploma 42,157 0.8020 0.3980 -0.021 0.046 0.046 0.069 0.031 -0.051 1.000       
8 
Experiences 42,157 0.9600 0.1950 0.016 -0.048 -0.048 -0.061 -0.036 0.062 -0.013 1.000      
9 
Previous Jobs 42,157 0.9660 0.1820 -0.029 0.071 0.071 0.036 0.034 0.011 0.018 0.042 1.000     
10 
Legal Form 42,157 0.3320 0.4710 -0.006 0.327 0.327 0.336 0.045 -0.271 0.062 -0.122 0.048 1.000    
11 
Age 42,157 0.6490 0.4770 0.032 -0.144 -0.144 -0.001 -0.060 0.076 0.153 -0.004 -0.074 -0.142 1.000   
12 
Gender 42,157 0.7610 0.4270 0.039 0.014 0.014 0.021 -0.064 0.124 0.039 0.093 0.078 0.082 0.060 1.000  
13 
Nationality 42,157 1.0820 0.3610 0.020 -0.082 -0.082 -0.066 -0.062 0.053 -0.181 -0.001 -0.015 -0.008 0.015 0.083 1.000 
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2.5 Empirical Results 
2.5.1 Logistic Regression of Loan Refusal 
The result of estimating equation (1) is presented in Table 2.4.  The probability of loan 
refusal is assumed depending on firm-specific factors and entrepreneur/human-specific 
factors. In model (1), I present the probability of loan refusal during the start-up year as a 
function of Size, Leverage, Collateral, and ROA in the start-up year. In model (2), I also add 
some human-specific factor into the model as a function of probability of loan refusal: 
namely dummy for diploma, experiences and previous jobs. In the last column (model 3), 
some industrial dummies are added for a robustness check of the model.  
 
As can be seen from model 1-3 at columns 1,3 and 5, the results suggest that Size and 
Collateral have a significant and negative impact on the probability of loan refusal 
(Hypotheses 1a & 1b are supported).  This is consistent with the idea that small firms have 
higher information costs and that size of the firm could be a signal for a firm’s ability to 
repay the loan. As can be seen from column 6 in Table 2.4, the odd ratio of start-up size is 
0.851, which means that for one – a unit increase in the firm’s start-up size, and the expected 
change is 0.851. Firms with more collateral experience the sizeable decline in the probability 
of loan refusal. The finding is consistent with the idea that collateral pledged by the borrower 
may help to reduce the asymmetric information problem and collateral can act as a signal to 
mitigate this problem.  
 
The collateral can convey information when lenders/banks consider the creditworthiness of 
the firm. Pledging collateral also can be a solution to the moral hazard problem because after 
obtaining and pledging the collateral, the borrower will repay the loan in a timely basis in 
order to avoid losing collateral. The collateral then can be a solution to the moral hazard 
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problem by reducing the possibility to switch to a more risky project or do less effort to 
realize the proposed project (Hypothesis 1a).  As expected, the collateral also has a positive 
significance odd ratio that indicates that a one-unit increase of the collateral value will 
decrease the probability of loan refusal by 0.851. 
 
I also find that the likelihood of loan refusal is lower for a firm with higher investment 
opportunity; however, the result is not significant (Hypothesis 1c is not supported). The 
profitability level may also be used as a screening tool by lenders, and therefore firms who 
have higher profitability levels will provide a signal as good borrowers with the ability to 
repay the loan through operating outcome. When a firm has profit, it also can be seen that the 
firm has the ability to finance its positive NPV investment by using internal financing before 
going to the market to obtain more funds.  
 
Interestingly, I find  the insignificant and negative effect of leverage on loan refusal 
(hypothesis 1d is not supported).  The results suggest that a firm with higher leverage at start-
up will be less likely to get rationed.  Firms with higher leverage level mean that the firms 
undertake the profitable project by issuing new debt rather than equity. The investor may 
have seen this debt issuance a strong signal that those firms are undertaking the profitable 
projects and have a good prospect in the future. It can also be said that in general, prior 
lenders may have found that the borrowers are reliable enough, and this prior access to debt 
conveys positive information to a new potential lender. 
 
In reference to human capital as a predictor of probability of loan refusal, which can be seen 
from column 3 in Table 2.4, I found that education (Dip) has a significant and negative effect 
on the probability of loan refusal (hypothesis 1e is supported). However, when industrial 
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dummies are added into model, the result becomes insignificant but still has a negative sign.  
The positive odd ratio of this variable indicates that if an individual switches from someone 
who does not have a diploma to someone who does (by assuming other explanatory variables 
are constant), then the odd ratio of not experiencing loan refusal will be 77.9% of what it was 
before.  
 
The human capital variables can be considered as a signal for project quality: firms with good 
project quality are more likely to receive loans and firms with bad quality projects are more 
likely to have loans refused (hypothesis 1e is supported). Interestingly, I find that having 
experiences in the same or different entrepreneurial field (Exp) has a positive but 
insignificant effect on loan refusal. This finding is in contrast with the idea that by having the 
previous entrepreneurial experience, either in the same field or in different firms, 
entrepreneurs will have accumulated learning and knowledge to survive in the business 
(hypothesis 1g  is  not supported). 
 
Regarding the size and gender effect on probability of getting loan. The result suggests that 
man will have higher probability of loan refusal, therefore more male entrepreneurs are 
rejected when they apply for a loan. While for age variable, the older the entrepreneur the 
lower probability of getting loan refusal. I may suggest that the age and maturity of the owner 







Table 2.4 Logistic Regression for start-up loan refusal (pr(refusal=1)) 
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Industry dummy  No No No No Yes Yes 
Number of firm  7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232 
Log likelihood  -1,099 -1,099 -1,095 -1,095 -5,896 -5,896 
DF  4 4 7 7 11 11 
This table gives the logistic regression result of the logistic investment model (See Equation 2.7). The logistic 
regression equation determines the probability of loan refusal. The dependent variable in the model is coded as 1 if a 
firm asked for a loan and did not get the loan, 0 otherwise.  In model 1, I only include all firm-specific risk and in 
model 2, I also add some human factors. In the last model, 7 industry dummies and individual demographic variables 
are also added into equation. ***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels respectively. 






Hence, I can say that credit rationing exists due to market imperfection conditions and project 
quality conditions since lenders still used some specific financial indicator to reduce the 
asymmetric information problem between the borrower and lender. The borrower should 
signal that they are reliable by pledging collateral and having more assets. Moreover, the 
result also suggests that lenders may see the observed characteristic of the borrower as a 
signal of a good quality project and the ability to provide internal funds. An owner with a 
diploma and previous job experience is more likely to have lower probability of loan 
 57 
2.5.2 Survival Analysis 
2.5.2.1 Kaplan - Meier Estimates 
 
In this section, I provide the estimation results using the nonparametric and semi-parametric 
methods.  First, I estimate the survival function by using Kaplan Meier (KM) Methods for the 
entire sample. The Kaplan-Meier survival estimation for the full sample is shown in figure 




















Figure 2.3   Kaplan meier estimation –Full sample 
 
 
In survival analysis, it is also highly recommended to look at the Kaplan-Meier curves for all 
the categorical predictors before going through more detail and advanced models. It will 
provide a pattern of survival function and/or failure function for each group. It also gives 
insight of whether the groups are proportional and whether I need to include this categorical 
variable in the final model. The Kaplan-Meier (KM) graphs from different subsamples can be 





Log-rank test for equality of survivor 
functions 
Wald chi2(1) =      34.30 
Pr>chi2 =     0.0000 
 
(b) 
Log-rank test for equality of survivor 
functions 
Wald chi2(1) =      17.75 
Pr>chi2 =     0.0000 
 
( c ) 
Log-rank test for equality of survivor 
functions 
Wald chi2(1) =      10.29 
Pr>chi2 =     0.0013 
 
(d) 
Log-rank test for equality of survivor 
functions 
Wald chi2(1) =      12.09 
Pr>chi2 =     0.0005 
Figure 2.4  Kaplan meier estimation –Different sub-sample 
 
 
I provide four different sub-samples based on categorical variables that may be used as 
predictors for a firm’s survival. In Figure 2.4a, I provide a KM graph based on the loan 
refusal variable. As can be seen from the estimation, unrationed firms or firms who do not get 
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loan refusal have higher probabilities of survival and have a p-value of 0.0000. From the 
graph I see that the survival function for each group of rationed are not perfectly parallel but 
are separate, except at the very beginning.  From figure 2.4b-2.4d, I also can observe that the 
firm whose  owner has a diploma, experiences and prior jobs also has a lower probability of 
failure (see figure 2.4b-2.4d).  The p-value of log rank test of KM estimates in Figures 2.4b-
2.4d is also less than 5%, thus these three categorical variables can be included in the final 
model. 
2.5.2.2 Cox Proportional Hazard Estimates 
The Cox proportional hazards (CPH) model is estimated to see the effects of covariates on 
business survival. Because the sample is stratified, longitudinal weights, which are the final 
weight provided by the dataset, are used to eliminate sample selection bias from this source8.  
Table 4 shows the main results obtained from estimating the cox proportional hazard model. 
As already mentioned in previous literature, using the current size of firms as a predictor of 
business survival may lead to endogeneity issues. In order to check the endogeneity issue, I 
do the Hausman test9. The result suggests that the current size may be considered an 
endogenous variable since I found that the difference in the coefficient is systematic. From 
this result, I then include not only the size on the start-up year, but also the current size as the 




                                                        
8The longitudinal weight is provided in the database. These strata are classified according to the origin of the 
business (start-up or takeover: 2 modalities), the branch of the business (8 modalities) and the localization (22 
French regions plus 4 overseas departments). The databases must then be used with the correction of a weight 
variable (the reverse of the draw rate per branch, per region and per origin). 
9 The procedures are as follows:  (1) first,I do the first estimation with all covariates and (2) redo the work by 
including the lagged value of non-categorical variables and (3) test whether there is no systematic difference of 
coefficients under both model. If there is a systematic difference of coefficients,I  may conclude that current size 
is an exogenous variable and it may not lead to unbiased estimation. 
 60 
Table 2.5 Cox proportional hazard estimates 
 
VARIABLES Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
       
       
Loan refusal 0.651*** 0.626*** 0.564*** 0.281*** 0.263*** 0.218** 
 (0.176) (0.176) (0.177) (0.0997) (0.0997) (0.100) 
       
Size at start-up -0.447*** -0.446*** -0.466***    
 (0.0380) (0.0384) (0.0399)    
       
Size    -0.510*** -0.509*** -0.546*** 
    (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0172) 
       
       
Leverage 0.371** 0.350** 0.326* 0.299*** 0.298*** 0.291*** 
 (0.173) (0.173) (0.175) (0.0837) (0.0836) (0.0840) 
       
Return on Assets (Roa) -0.0282 -0.0294 -0.0197 -0.0146*** -0.0151*** -0.0134** 
 (0.0240) (0.0250) (0.0227) (0.00498) (0.00510) (0.00535) 
       
Diploma (Dip)  -0.334*** -0.248**  -0.224*** -0.152*** 
  (0.104) (0.109)  (0.0496) (0.0518) 
       
Experience (Exp)  -0.693*** -0.562***  -0.486*** -0.325*** 
  (0.174) (0.179)  (0.0932) (0.0951) 
       
Previous jobs (Prev)  -0.433** -0.370**  -0.354*** -0.234*** 
  (0.177) (0.178)  (0.0894) (0.0905) 
       
Business form  
(BusForm) 
  0.162   0.171*** 
   (0.118)   (0.0539) 
       
Age less than 40 (Age)   0.0390   -0.0416 
   (0.104)   (0.0464) 
       
Gender   -0.172   -0.245*** 
   (0.111)   (0.0510) 
       
Nationality   0.344***   0.236*** 
   (0.0844)   (0.0452) 
       
Observations 7,771 7,771 7,771 42,157 42,157 42,157 
Log likelihood -4093 -4079 -4058 -18809 -18779 -18669 
DF 4 7 17 4 7 17 
Chi2 145.5 174 214.7 863.4 922.4 1143 
This table provides the cox proportional hazard estimates (See Equation 2.13). Loan refusal is coded as 1 if a firm asked 
for a loan and did not get the loans, 0 otherwise.  In models 1-3, start-up size is considered as the determinant of firm 
survival; however, in models 4-6, I use current size as the predictor of firm survival. I only include all firm-specific risk, 
and in model 2, I also add some human-specific factors. The explanation will be based on model 3 and model 6.  ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10 % levels respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 







As seen from models 1- 3 in Table 2.5, rationed firms or firms who experienced loan refusal 
in the first year have a positive and significant effect on the probability of failure (hypothesis 
2d is supported). Since firms had experienced loan refusal at early stage of the business, it 
may affect the growth of the firms in the future, hence decreasing the chance of survival.  In 
respect to the firm size, I find that it does have an important effect on firm survival 
(hypothesis 2a is supported). The larger the start-up size is in terms of assets, the lower 
chance of failure. The result is consistent with previous empirical research (See Geroski et 
al., 1997, 2007 and Mata & Portugal, 1994).  
 
The firm profitability also has a negative but not significant effect on a chance of failure 
(hypothesis 2c is not supported). Firm’s profitability can be seen as an ability to grow, 
therefore by having internal sources of retained earnings, then firms will be able to invest and 
run a positive project that are expected to have a good return.  The level of a firm’s leverage 
indeed has a positive but also not significant effect on a firm’s failure (hypothesis 2d is not 
supported). This finding strengthens the idea that firms should be aware that the excessive 
use of debt may increase the probability of not being able to repay the debt, hence it will 
increase the probability of failure. The leverage used also conveys the risk that has been 
taken by the firm by its financing structure decision.  
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 From the human capital variables, having previous entrepreneurial experience and having a 
prior job have negative and significant effects on the chance of firm failure (hypothesis 2f-2g 
are supported).  However, the result found the insignificant but negative effect of having a 
diploma on business survival (hypothesis 2e is not supported). The result suggests that 
various types of prior entrepreneur experience and better levels of human capital are 
important in determining the firm’s survival. New entrants with a high level of human capital 
and higher quality information on business opportunities may significantly increase the new 
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If the current size is used as a covariate in the cox proportional hazard model, the result is not 
much different from the estimation result that uses the start-up size as the covariate of the cox 
proportional hazard model. Experiencing a loan refusal and having a higher level of leverage 
positively affect the chance of firm failure. On the other hand, as a firm becomes larger and 
has a good investment opportunity, the chance of failure will decrease significantly. From the 
human-specific factors, having a diploma, having experience and having a previous job 
before starting the business will decrease the chance of failure. 
 
Turning to the hazard rate graph model, it can be shown from Figure 2.5 that the failure 
hazard clearly has two peaks, one at 3.2 years into the firm’s life, and another at about 4.2 
years. After this local maximum, the curve appears to decline significantly. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that ‘most firms die young’ but suggests a somewhat longer time span for 
the failure curve to peak and afterwards decline to a low long-run value.  
 
2.5.2.3 Testing the PH Assumption  
 
The cox proportional hazards model assumes that the hazard ratio is that the ratio is the same 
for the whole sample period or at any point on the time scale provided. As can be seen in 
figure 2.6, the plotted lines are reasonably parallel, and it indicates that the Cox proportional 
hazard assumption has not been violated, and this would be suitable as a foundation to 
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Figure 2.6 Testing the PH assumption: Graphical methods (1) 
 
Another graphical method of evaluating the Cox proportional hazard assumption is to 
compare the plotted lines between the Kaplan-Meier observed survival curves and the Cox 
predicted curves for the same variable. When the predicted and observed plotted lines are 
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Figure 2.7 Testing the PH Assumption: Graphical Methods (2) 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The post entry performance of a new firm has been extensively discussed in many empirical 
studies. By using 9, 417 small to medium firms born in year 1994, I try to investigate the 
effect of firm-specific factors and human specific factors on firm survival. Before 
investigating the survival rate of the new firm, I implement the logistic regression to find out 
the determinant of loan refusal. I have the dummy variable of rationed, which is defined as 1 
if the firm asked for a loan and did not receive the loan and 0 otherwise.   
 
The result suggests that the probability of being rationed indeed is influenced by the firm-
specific factors and human capital factors. Larger firms are more likely to have the higher 
probability of loan acceptance rather than the small firms. A firm with more pledging 
collateral also has a decreasing probability of loan refusal.  The result strengthens the idea 
that loan refusal is determined by market imperfections conditions; therefore the borrower 








information between the lender and borrower. Regarding human capital, I find that prior 
entrepreneurial experience and the level of education will increase the probability of getting a 
loan. The project quality and management indeed affects the probability of loan refusal..  
 
From the sample, almost 50 percent of firms are closed at year 2000, with an average of 4.3 
years, which is quite consistent with the previous empirical findings. The chance of firm 
survival is also influenced by both firm-specific factors and human specific factors.  The 
initial size, levels of profitability, leverage and accessibility in getting a loan have significant 
and positive effects of the firm’s survival. The education level of the owner and prior 
entrepreneurial experiences both and jobs also have positive impacts on a firm’s survival. 
Various entrepreneur experiences may be seen as the accumulated learning ability that can be 
useful in running the business.  
 
SMEs often fail to grow due to a lack of the supporting environment that is needed to expand 
the business. Improving management skill can be done through human development and 
increase access to finance, whereas Improving the business environment can be done by 
improving the investment climate, for example, by ensuring that the policy makers find ways 
to support not only large firms but also SMEs.  
 
In relation to the human capital of the entrepreneur, a lack of management is often seen as the 
primary cause of the firm failure.  The management team, which consists of more than one 
individual, may offer a wider range set of skills instead of a single individual. An increase in 
human capital quality will also be associated with the increase in a firm’s output and 
performance. Moreover, the development of human capital may lead to endogenous growth 








efficient use of resources, from the development of accumulation of human capital, and it 
also leads to greater innovation through the process of research and development. Enhancing 
human capital capacity can be achieved through training, linkage, knowledge transfer and 
networks.  
 
There is no doubt that defining the credit rationing existence and its determinant is very 
complex. However, as this result finds, I can say that asset and human capital based credit-
rationing does exists, but the probability of loan refusal will mitigate by having greater assets, 
having more pledged collateral and better human capital, consistently with Evan and 
Jovanovic (1989) and Cressy (1996, 2006). Moreover, credit rationing has indeed an impact 
to the chances of failure, but its effects are reduced by greater profitability, better human 


















CHAPTER 3 COLLATERAL AND HUMAN CAPITAL AS A REMEDY TO 
SOLVE CREDIT RATIONING: EVIDENCE FROM FRENCH START-UP 
3.1 Introduction 
The neoclassical theory of investment provided a foundation for the imperfect substitution 
between internal and external finance (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). Since then, a number of 
studies have been done to justify the effect of financial factors on a firm’s investment 
decisions. When internal finances are insufficient to finance a positive NPV project, firms 
need to obtain funds in order to ensure the life of the business.   
 
The SMEs have been recognized as a key element in the economy, so it needs a way to obtain 
the necessary financial sources. However, due to special characteristic of SMEs, their opaque 
information and the fact that most of them are unquoted businesses, SMEs still have a severe 
problem of financial constraints. Most of them still rely on bank loans, since getting funds 
from the capital market is often difficult and costly (Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993: Berger 
and Udel, 2002).  The problem is more severe when banks are reluctant to lend to small firms 
because of the tendency of banks to make SMEs lending more profitable and the 
consolidation of banks regulation including the application of Basel II Capital Accord; 
therefore, banks tend to reduce the credit supply to the SMEs (Berger, 2006). 
 
There is a well-established literature focused on the imperfections in the capital market 
related to the information asymmetries, transaction costs and agency issues. Such market 
imperfections may give rise to the existence of credit rationing, where credit rationing can be 








these loans at the commercial loan rate quoted by the bank (Jaffee and Modigliani, 1969). 
Information asymmetries may result in credit rationing where bankers cannot differentiate 
among borrowers. Therefore, the banks will deny lending to some borrowers who are 
observationally identical from those who receive loans. The moral hazard arguments can also 
lead to credit rationing because the borrower’s willingness to divert the project to more risky 
projects (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), engage in asset substitution and apply an inappropriate 
degree of effort on the project (Aghion and Bolton, 1997).  
 
Although there are many theoretical and empirical studies concerning credit rationing, this 
study is an attempt to empirically investigate the existence of credit rationing for SMEs in the 
French corporate bank loan market, by estimating the demand-supply disequilibrium model 
for bank credit and predicting the proportion of credit -rationed firms during the sample 
period.  The model is estimated on the basis of a panel data set of small and medium-sized 
French firms for the period of 1994-2000. All samples were start-up businesses that were 
born at year 1994.  The database used for this paper is a single cohort from the French SINE 
database. This data is taken from a survey of French start-ups conducted by the French 
National Institute of Statistical and Economic Studies.  
 
Relevant with the objectives of this thesis, this second empirical chapter tries to investigate 
some factors that may have an effect to alleviate financing constraints faced by SMEs. By 
applying the disequilibrium model, this chapter has main contribution in a way providing 
alternative way to measure the financial constraint measurement. I estimate two different 
models to measure the disequilibrium loan market for short-term and long-term bank loans. 
Short-term bank loans are defined as bank loans with a maturity of less than two (2) years, 








years. Regarding the debt maturity and agency theory, it is generally found that SMEs would 
have a higher being long-term bank debt rationed rather than the short-term bank debt 
rationed. Another novelty of this study is the addition of a human capital indicator into the 
disequilibrium model. Based on the data availability, I recognize some human-specific 
variables that would decrease the number of credit-rationed firms.  
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 3.2, I provide a brief 
overview of the theoretical credit rationing literature, which is the foundation of the empirical 
research.  Section 3.3 provides the empirical methodology with a focus on the equilibrium 
model of bank lending. Section 3.4 describes the model specification is presented. Section 3.5 
reports the data used and the data description, while section 3.6 provides the empirical results 
and interprets the results, including the proportion of credit constrained SMEs.  Finally, 
section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Early Theoretical Work of Credit Rationing 
Referring back to the study by Rosa (1951), which provides the explanation of disequilibrium 
credit rationing by presenting the availability theory, according to this theory, credit 
availability is determined by the supply condition and real economic activity. It does not 
consider the demand-side characteristics. Therefore, the changes in monetary policy would 
have a direct effect on the credit supply, for example, the changes in money supply may have 
a direct effect on credit availability.   
 
Later work by Keeton (1979) presents a clearer explanation about the definition of 








which indicates that an increased level in the lending rate may increase the lender’s 
probability of not being able to repay debt.  Credit rationing may occur when the price or the 
quoted interest rate is rigid and some borrowers will still be rationed, even if they are willing 
to pay not only the price but also the non-price element of the loan contract.  
 
Subsequent credit rationing models have emphasized the importance of the non-price element 
that may affect the credit rationing problem, and most of them consider the problem created 
by asymmetric information into model estimation. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) were the first to 
include asymmetrical information in the analysis of the credit decision in their Stiglitz-Weiss-
model (Henceforth SW model). 
 
The idea of the SW model is that in a competitive equilibrium market, bank debt may be 
characterized by credit rationing. Banks will rather ration credit than increase the interest 
rates due to adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) and moral hazard problems (Arrow, 1963). 
The SW model stated that lenders opt to reject some credit applicants on account of adverse 
selection and incentive effects. The adverse selection effect may occur when high interest 
rates only attract higher risk borrowers and the lower risk borrower will drop out. In the same 
way, the borrower will prefer a higher risk project by expecting the higher return but the 
bankruptcy risk increases.  This is what I refer to as a moral hazard problem.  
 
From the SW model, many theoretical models also try to explain credit rationing, for 
example, by taking into account the existence of information asymmetry (e. g., Besanko and 
Thakor, 1987). The contract between borrower and lender may be characterized by the 
presence of asymmetric information that may give rise to credit rationing (Steijvers and 








probabilities of repaying the bank loans; however, the banks cannot distinguish the good 
borrowers from the bad ones. Hence, the price will be used as a screening device and the 
bank’s expected return increases non-monotonously when the interest rate increases.  
 
From the lender side, a higher interest rate charge also means there is a costly monitoring 
cost. A monitoring system is needed to ensure that the borrower has sufficient funds to repay 
its debt. If the asymmetric information problem remains unsolved, then it will cause the credit 
rationing condition, since the lender’s expected return will decrease when offering a high 
interest rate (Leland and Pyle, 1977). 
 
Until now, large amounts of literature have discussed the effect of asymmetric information on 
credit rationing. However, the theoretical foundation of their work has been questioned (see 
De Meza and Webb, 1987, 1989 and 1990).  
 
3.2.2 Credit Rationing Typology 
Two research papers that proposed the typology of credit rationing come from Keeton (1979) 
and Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) Keeton (1997) proposed two types of credit rationing, Type I 
and Type II. Meanwhile Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) classified four main categories of credit 
rationing, Type I through Type IV.  Those classifications are made based on the level of 
asymmetric information between the borrower and lender.  Keeton (1979) assumed that 
lenders are not able to observe the probability of default but they can observe the return of the 
investment project that is made by the borrower. Type I credit rationing by Keeton (1979) is 
also known as size credit rationing because the borrower only receives loans that are smaller 








Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990), is also known as pure credit rationing, where some random 
borrowers are fully funded, and some are credit rationed.  
 
Type II credit rationing by Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) is also called divergent views rationing 
credit rationing, where some borrowers perceive that the quoted interest rate is too high 
compared to their probability of default. Some good borrowers may not apply for loans 
because they perceive the quoted interest rate to be too high. By assuming that the probability 
of default for the borrower can be observed by the lender, Type III supposes that credit 
rationing occurs when asymmetric information between the borrower and lender is rather 
weak. Table 3. 1 presents a summary of credit rationing typology. 
 
The existing empirical literature used two different measures for the credit rationing, namely 
the indirect approach and direct approach. Indirect measures are provided by the 
disequilibrium CR approach and the use of proxy, while a direct measure is provided by 
primary data collection addressing the demand size point of view. The disequilibrium credit 
market was first developed by Fair & Jaffee (1972). Many empirical studies have used this 
















Table 3.1 Credit rationing typology 
 
Author Credit Rationing 
Classification 
Definition based on the result of the study 
Keeton (1979) 
 
Type 1 (Size credit 
rationing) 
 Credit rationing occurs when borrowers 
get a smaller amount than they desire at 
the quoted interest rate. 
 The quoted price is rigid. 
 
Type II (Pure credit 
rationing) 
 Credit rationing happens when some 
random borrowers are rationed, but 
identical borrowers are receiving the 
loan.  
 The rationed borrowers are willing to 
pay higher interest rates and accept the 
loan contract requirement 
Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) 
Pure Credit rationing  Credit rationing happens when some 
random borrowers are rationed, but 
identical borrowers are receiving the 
loan.  
 The rationed borrowers are willing to 
pay higher interest rates and accept the 
loan contract requirement 
Jaffe and Stiglitz 
(1990) 
Type 1 (Size credit 
rationing) 
 Credit rationing occurs when borrowers 
get a smaller amount than they desire at 
the quoted interest rate. 
 The quoted price is rigid. 
 The credit rationed borrowers may 
obtain the loan if they willing to pay a 
higher price. 
Type II (Divergent views)  Some borrowers perceive that the 
quoted interest rate is too high compared 
to their probability of default. 
 
Type III (Redlining)  Credit rationing is based on the 
observation of risk and return. 
 Credit rationing happens when the 
lender does not get the required rate of 
return at any price. 
 The lender knows the probability of 
default of the borrowers. 
 Lenders also know the return of the 
borrower’s investment. 
 
Type IV (Pure credit 
rationing) 
 Credit rationing happens when some 
random borrowers are rationed, but 
identical borrowers are receiving the 
loan.  
 The rationed borrowers are willing to 
pay higher interest rates and accept the 













Another indirect measure of credit rationing used in the empirical literature is a proxy. Trade 
credit is the first proxy of credit rationing to be proposed by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and 
Harhoff and Korting (1998).  Petersen and Rajan (1994) investigate credit rationing for 3404 
SMEs in the United States by using data 1987 NSSBF. An SMEs are classified as a credit 
rationed firm if it has more than 50 % of delayed payment of trade credit. The use of trade 
credit as a proxy for credit rationing is supported by the pecking order theory (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984), where firms that are credit rationed by banks will switch to alternative external 
sources of financing, such as trade credit, even if they are more costly (Elliehausen and 
Wolken, 1993). In such a framework, trade credit acts as a substitute for bank credit, and the 
volume of trade credit will be positively correlated with credit rationing.  
 
An extensive use of trade credit suggests that the firm is potentially credit rationed. However, 
the use of trade credit as a proxy for credit rationing remains controversial, and many firms 
that have easy access to bank loans use trade credit to reduce transaction costs (Elliehausen 
and Wolken, 1993; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1997). In this context, an extensive use of trade 
credit does not mean that the firm is credit rationed. Cosci and Meliciani (2002) proposed the 
utilization ratio of a credit line as another proxy for credit rationing. The utilization ratio is 
defined as the relationship between the amount of credit offered by banks and the amount 
used. The higher the ratio, the more an SMEs are rationed.  
 
3.2.3 Collateral, Loan Contract and Credit Rationing 
Bester (1985) shows that no credit rationing will occur in equilibrium if lenders compete by 
choosing collateral requirements and interest margins in a way designed to differentiate the 
risk levels of credit applicants.  The ability of borrowers to self-select into their risk types 








bank makes a lending decision by simultaneously taking into account the interest rate and 
collateral requirement. Therefore, borrowers with a low probability of bankruptcy are more 
willing to accept an increase in collateral requirements in return for a lower interest margin. 
 
Besanko and Thakor (1987) propose a model that presents an inverse relationship between 
collateral and the interest rate. According to the model, the high-risk borrower tends to 
choose a loan contract with  a high lending rate and low collateral, and vice versa.  The 
pledging collateral by the borrower may gives a signal of creditworthiness of the borrower. 
Then, credit rationing only occurs when the pledging collateral is greater than the borrower’s 
assets. Coco (2000), in his recent review of the SW model and the de Meza and Webb (1987) 
models, argues that consideration of interest margins alone leaves theorists open to the 
challenge that if interest margins fail to achieve a separation equilibrium, collateral can then 
be deployed in order to achieve separation between good and bad borrowers and thus solve 
the credit rationing problem.   
 
Some empirical studies on collateral as a tool for reducing the asymmetric information 
problem show mixed results (see : Steijvers and Voordeckers (2009) for a comprehensive 
survey).  In some studies, collateral seems to have an important role in reducing the moral 
hazard problem of the borrower (e.g. Brick and Palia, 2007). However, other empirical 
studies found that the signalling value of collateral will solve the adverse selection problem 
(e.g. Jimenez et al., 2007). 
 
In the case of collateral having an important role in reducing the asymmetric information 








risk firm from switching from a low-risk project to high-risk project after the loan is granted. 
However, a study from Lehman and Neuberger (2001) found that borrower with a high-risk 
project will pledge less collateral. Collateral can be used as a signaling tool that solves the 
adverse selection problem where low-risk borrowers will pledge more collateral to signal 
themselves as good borrowers.  However, Cressy and Toivanen (2001), using individual 
loans from a large UK bank, found that only the loan duration seems to have positive impact 
on the probability of pledging collateral, and there is no relationship between the risk and 
collateral. 
 
One important factor, which underpins the ability of collateral to induce borrower effort or 
risk aversion, is the underlying level of borrower wealth.  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out 
that individuals with no wealth to offer as collateral may also pose a comparatively high risk 
of failure if their projects are under budget. Wealthy entrepreneurs, all things equal, should 
place a comparatively low value on their collateral bond and accordingly, the role of 
collateral is considerably weakened.  The wealthiest entrepreneurs are also those who engage 
in risky behaviour, and borrower risk is expected to rise with increases in wealth. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 A Demand-Supply Disequilibrium Model 
I use the simultaneous equation model to assess the existence of disequilibrium in the market.  
From an econometric point of view, the main challenge associated with estimating the market 
model in disequilibrium is that one has to obtain estimators for the parameters of loan supply 
and demand functions using only observed variables in the loan market.  Maddala and Nelson 








models, which has been used for empirical analysis of credit markets in different countries 
(see e.g. Sealey (1979), Perez (1998), Atanasova and Wilson (2004) and Steijvers (2008)). 
A disequilibrium model with unknown sample separation, as described by Maddala (1980), is 
employed. The basic structure of the model consists of two reduced-form equations: a desired 
demand equation for bank loans and an availability equation that reflects the maximum 
amount of loans that banks are willing to lend (bank supply). While, the third equation is a 
transaction equation.  
Ldt = 1 X1t + u1t 
Lst = 2X2t + u2t   
Lt = min (Ldt , Lst)                       (3.1) 
 
Where Ldt, is the demand equation, L
s
t is a supply equation and Lt is the nominal transaction 
of loan. X1t and X2t reflect the exogenous, independent variables that are predicted that may 
have an influence on credit demand and supply. u1t and u2t are the disturbances.   
 
 Lt is the only the amount of bank credit that was actually received, and the data can be found 
in the firm balance sheet.   Ldt and L
s
t are the quantities of bank credit demanded and 
supplied, but not detected by any external party.  I estimate not only market disequilibrium 
model for long-term bank debt, but also for short- term bank debt. Short-term bank debt is as 
credit with a duration of less than 2 years, while long-term bank credit is defined as credit 
with a duration of more than 2 years.  
 
By estimating the disequilibrium model using this simultaneous model, I do not know ex ante 








separation’ (Maddala, 1987; Perez 1998).  The detailed explanation of X1t and X2t as 
exogenous independent variables will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3.2 The Formulation of Hypotheses  
Our empirical study can be split in two stages. First, I estimate the disequilibrium model of 
demand and supply for long-term bank debt and short-term bank debt for new  start-up SMEs 
in France.  Then, the estimated models are used to estimate the proportion of credit rationed 
firms, for long- and short-term bank credit, for each year between 1995 and 2000.  Before 
estimating the model, I formulate the hypotheses concerning the demand and supply of long-
term and short-term bank credit. Various explanatory variables were selected and combined 
according to previous research (Ogawa and Suzuki, 2000; Atanasova and Wilson, 2004).  
3.3.2.1 Hypotheses Concerning the Demand for Bank Debt 
1.  Level of activity 
The desired demand for bank credit is affected by the level of activity or production 
level of a firm (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004). A firm with a higher activity level has 
to be supported by investment in working capital and production assets to support the 
business activity 
2.  Internal funds 
The pecking order theory was claimed by numerous empirical studies as the most fit 
theory to explain the capital structure choices of SMEs (Chittenden et al., 1996). 
According to this theory, SMEs tend to use internal finances first before raising some 
funds from external sources.   
The availability of internal funds also may increase the demand for bank loans 








loans will increase as banks often see the profitability of the borrower through 
creditworthiness.  This phenomenon can be explained by static trade-off theory, 
which posits that every firm has an optimal debt ratio, which is determined by the 
trade-off between the cost and benefit of using debt. Obtaining external funds may be 
beneficial when the advantages of a tax shield will reduce the cost of using debt. 
3. Trade credit 
As an alternative to bank debt, SMEs often use trade credit as a sources of short-term 
financing (Atanasova and Wilson, 2004).  SMEs also have a lower probability of 
being credit rationed and appear to appeal less to trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 
1994, 1995). Market imperfections can also bring about the use of trade credit without 
necessarily being credit rationed (Lewellen et al., 1980). Due to the lower evaluation 
and transaction costs, a firm can get less costly financing by having trade credit rather 
than borrowing some money from financial institutions. The use of trade credit can 
also be a good signal to the bank that the firm is a good borrower.  
4. Human capital  
Human capital can be defined as a possession of valuable knowledge and skills by the 
owner. Becker (1993) created a distinction between general and specific human 
capital, where general human capital is defined in the context of years of education 
and work experience. Whereas, specific human capital is described with factors 
associated with the specific domain, such as managerial and industry specific 
experience (Bosma et al., 2004). Human capital can have various effects on the 
desired demand for bank loans. Someone who has a diploma and has newly graduated 
from university may have better knowledge; however, they may not have wealth or 








Jovanovic, 1989). A different case is someone who had a previous job and experience 
in other businesses.  
 
Finally, from the review of the literature above, the hypotheses were propounded in 
alternative hypotheses forms and I expect not to reject this alternative hypothesis. The 
hypothesis statements are as follows: 
 
H1A : The demand for long-term bank debt increases if the activity level of the firm 
is higher. 
H1B : The demand for short-term bank debt increases if the activity level of the firm 
is higher. 
H2A : The demand for long-term bank debt decreases if a firm has more internal 
funds. 
H2B : The demand for short-term bank debt increases if a firm has more internal 
funds. 
H3A : The demand for long-term bank debt increases if the use of trade credit 
increases. 
H3B : The demand for short- term bank debt increases if the use of trade credit 
increases 
H4A : The demand for long-term bank debt increases if the owner has a diploma 
degree. 
H4B : The demand for short-term bank debt increases if the owner has a diploma 
degree. 









H5B : The demand for short-term bank debt decreases if the owner has previous 
experience.  
H6A : The demand for long-term bank debt decreases if the owner has previous job 
experience. 
H6B : The demand for short-term bank credit decreases if the owner has previous 
job experience 
 
3.3.2.2 Hypotheses Concerning the Supply of Bank Debt 
1. Firm risk 
Firms characterized by a higher level of lending or interest costs may represent a bad 
risk for financial institutions.  The more uncertain the repayment of the loan is, the 
more risky it is for a bank to offer a loan. The risk for the bank suggests the default 
risk. The main cause for default of a firm is mismanagement (Ooghe et al., 1995).  
However, when using the financial ratio as a measure of firm risk, it can also have a 
signaling effect of borrower quality; then the banks are willing to offer more debt.  
Following the work from Atanasova and Wilson (2004), I use the loan cost over total 
assets as the proxy for firm risk. 
2. Pledging collateral 
Collateral may reduce the information asymmetry between the SMEs and the 
financial institution. Collateral could have a signaling value for the bank when 
considering the creditworthiness of the firm (Bester, 1985) and can also prevent a firm 
from switching from a low-risk project to the high-risk one. Thus, collateral can solve 









Related to collateral being a tool to reduce the moral hazard problem, Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) also studied if a higher demand for collateral could reduce the risk and 
increase the returns for the bank. Meanwhile, there is also a negative adverse selection 
effect working when an increasing demand for collateral makes the average and 
marginal borrower become more risky. The SW model shows that the negative 
adverse selection affects more than compensates for the positive moral hazard effect. 
Therefore, the SW model predicts that offering more collateral will not increase the 
supply of credit to firms. Generally, there is no consensus on the effect of collateral 
on the supply of credit.  Atanasova and Wilson (2004) mainly confirmed the signaling 
theory mentioned above.   
3. Trade credit as a signaling tool  
Trade credit can have a signaling value for the bank, reducing the adverse selection 
problem. Banks perceive a firm with trade credit as a good borrower because the firm 
is being trusted by the supplier. However, relying heavily on trade credit could also 
provide a negative signal to the bank, indicating that the firm cannot get enough 
(cheaper) bank credit at any bank in the market.  
 
4. Lending rate loan premium 
As a proxy for the bank interest rate, I used the lending rate in the supply equation. 
The higher the level of the lending rate is, the bank tends to offer more credit due to 
the possible profit. The limitation on data availability forces us to only use the lending 









Finally, from the review of the literature above, the hypotheses were propounded in 
alternative hypotheses forms and I expect not to reject this alternative hypothesis. The 
hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H7A : The supply of long-term bank debt decreases if a firm is characterized by a 
higher risk degree. 
H7B : The supply of short-term bank debt decreases if a firm is characterized by a 
higher risk degree. 
H8A : The supply of long-term bank debt increases if a firm can pledge more assets 
as collateral. 
H8B : The supply of short-term bank debt increases if a firm can pledge more assets 
as collateral. 
H9A : The supply of long-term bank debt increases if a firm uses more trade credit. 
H9B : The supply of short-term bank debt increases if a firm uses more trade credit 
H10A : The supply of long-term bank debt increases if the lending rate increases.   
H10B : The supply of short-term bank debt increases if the lending rate increases.  
 
 3.3.3 Model Specification 
Based on the hypothesis development mentioned above, I construct the model for banks loans 
as functions of firm activity, internal funds, trade credit and human capital indicators. The 
supply of bank loans is modeled as a function of the value of collateral trade credit received 
and the lending rate. I estimate two disequilibrium models for short-term bank debt and long-








into the model. The human capital variables will be introduced in model 2, both for short-
term debt and long-term bank debt. 
Model 1 
Demand equation 
                        (3.2)     
Supply equation 
        (3.3) 
 
                  (3.4)
                       
Model 2 
Demand equation 
     















The model cannot be estimated by an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression since it would 
produce biased and inconsistent estimates (simultaneous equation bias). One of the 
fundamental assumptions of OLS is violated: for each equation, When the OLS assumptions 
are violated, a simultaneous equation model can be estimated by an instrumental variable 
technique, namely 3-stage least squares (3SLS).  3SLS is a system method where all the 
equations in the system are estimated simultaneously.  An advantage of using 3SLS is that it 
may allow the estimation of one equation at a time and does not allow for correlations 
between the disturbances of the different equations.   
 






Total short-term bank debt over lagged total assets. All 




Total long-term bank debt over lagged total assets.  
Cash flow/lagged total 
assets 
Total cash flow over lagged total assets.  
Sales/lagged total 
assets 
Total sales over lagged total assets.  
Trade credit/lagged 
total assets 
Total trade credit over lagged total assets.   
Fixed assets/lagged 
total assets 
Total gross fixed assets over lagged total assets.   
Lending cost/ total 
assets 
Total lending cost over total assets.  
Lending rate  Average lending rate offered. The data is taken from 
http://www1.unece.org/stat/platform/display/Statgloss/ 
Diploma 1 if one has a diploma, 0 otherwise 
Experience  1 if one has prior experience in the same or different 
business, 0 otherwise 








3.4 Data Description 
The database used for this paper is a single cohort from the French SINE database.  This data 
is taken from a survey of French start-ups conducted by the French National Institute of 
Statistical and Economic Studies. The survey section used is the 1994 cohort. New firms that 
were surveyed are known based on of their registration in the ‘Systèmed'Information set de 
Répertoire des Entreprises et des Etablissements’ (SIRENE repertory).  The data used is 
similar to the data used in chapter 2.   Conducting research concerning the existence of credit 
rationing by using micro survey based data is still very rare; therefore, it may give a different 
point of view of assessing the credit rationing based on the market disequilibrium model. 
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics of key variables 
 
NO Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
1 Short-term bank debt/lagged total assets 0.0387 0.1181 
2 Long-term bank debt/lagged total assets 0.1242 0.1951 
3 Cash flow/lagged total assets 0.0194 0.0311 
4 Sales/lagged total assets 2.2772 1.8851 
5 Trade credit/lagged total assets 0.2502 0.2527 
6 Fixed assets/lagged total assets 0.4387 0.3278 
7 Lending cost/ total assets 0.0178 0.0318 























Table 3.4 Correlation across the key variables 
 
NO Variable Correlation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Short-term bank debt/lagged total assets 1        
2 Long-term bank debt/lagged total assets -0.0691 1       
3 Cash flow/lagged total assets 0.1704 0.3195 1      
4 Sales/lagged total assets 0.1276 -0.1166 0.0407 1     
5 Trade credit/lagged total assets 0.0598 -0.1337 0.0226 0.4312 1    
6 Fixed asset/lagged total assets 0.0727 0.5637 0.2135 -0.1808 -0.2625 1   
7 Lending cost/ total assets 0.1533 0.3542 0.9013 -0.0399 -0.0776 0.2113 1  
8 Lending rate 0.0502 0.0609 0.0676 0.1219 0.0744 -0.0084 0.0563 1 
 
As can be seen from Table 3.3, the mean of long-term bank loans over lagged total assets is 
higher than mean of short-term bank loans. More interestingly, most firms have higher trade 
credit rather than bank loans. It can be said that most of the firms rely on trade credit as an 
alternative to the short- and/or long-term bank debt.  Long-term bank debt and short-term 
bank debt have a negative relationship; as the long-term bank debt increases, the short-term 
bank loans will decrease. Both short-term bank debt and long-term debt have a positive 










3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Disequilibrium Model Estimation  
The estimation result for the disequilibrium model for short-term bank debt and long-term 
debt without human capital is presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6.  From the estimation results of 
the equations of the supply of long- and short-term bank debt, as predicted, I find  that the 
level of activity, sales over lagged total assets, has a significant positive effect, but it is not 
significant on the demand for short-term bank credit. However, the sales variable has a 
negative and significant effect on long-term bank debt. This indicates that a firm relies on the 
retained earnings coming from the operation output to support the business. The result may 
confirm that SMEs follow the pecking order theory.  
 
Cash flow and trade credit have a positive and significant effect on desired demand for both 
short- and long-term bank debt. The result indicates that a bank or lender believes that by 
having enough cash, it will increase the probability to repay the debt. By having trade credit, 
a firm is perceived as a good borrower and gives the signal to the bank to offer more debt.  
The positive sign of cash flow to the short-term bank debt supports the static trade off theory. 
As hypothesized, this indicates that the more trade credit a firm uses, the more long-term 
bank credit they would actually desire.  This could indicate that the firms that are rationed by 
banks rely on heavily on suppliers to get additional long-term financing. In that case, trade 
credit may play a role in mitigating the credit-rationing problem, as firms can appeal to trade 
credit when faced with borrowing constraints. Interestingly, trade credit uses a negative effect 
and is significant on long-term debt, indicating that banks often view that the excessive use of 









In reference to the time dummies, I find significant negative effects for the model for short-
term bank credit for all year dummies, and the results suggest that the desired demand for 
short-term bank debt and long-term bank debt decreases throughout time. The estimation 
results of the equations of the supply of long- and short-term bank credit are consistent with 
our hypotheses. The results indicate that fixed assets as a proxy for collateral has a significant 
positive effect on the amount of bank credit supplied to a firm. Collateral can be used as risk 
mitigation towards the bank.  The availability of collateral is positively related to the amount 
of long-term credit offered by banks. However, it is not significant for short-term bank loans. 
For both short- and long-term bank debt, the lending cost has a significant and positive effect 
on supply fund. This indicates that banks view the ability of a borrower to repay the bank 
debt and the borrower’s debt level has not reach to the point that the bankruptcy risk 




















Table 3.5 Disequilibrium model for short-term bank debt 
 
This table gives the estimation result of disequilibrium model for short term bank debt (See Equation 3.2-3.4).. ***, **, and 































  1997 -0.0146*** Industry dummy 
 
 















(0.0034) Transport 0.00349 
Industry dummy   
 
(0.0063) 






















  Catering 0.00263 
   (0.0068)   











Table 3.6 Disequilibrium model for long-term bank debt 
 
 
This table gives the estimation result of disequilibrium model for short term bank debt (See Equation 3.2-3.4).. ***, **, and * 






























  1997 -0.0316*** Industry dummy 
 
 















(0.0061) Transport 0.00584 
Industry dummy   
 
(0.0082) 






















  Catering 0.0655*** 









3.5.2 Disequilibrium Model for Short-Term & Long-Term Bank Debt with Human 
Capital 


















































  Year Dummy    Industry dummy 



























Industry dummy   Catering 0.00316 





















  Catering 0.00338 
    (0.0068)     













The estimation result for the disequilibrium model for short-term bank debt and long-term 
debt with human capital is presented in Table 3.7 and 3.9.  From the estimation results of the 
equations of the supply of long- and short-term banks, I see that the level of activity has a 
significant and positive effect but is not significant on the demand for short-term bank credit. 
It may be said that the result confirms that SMEs still rely on internal financing or any other 
types of fund to finance the activities. Hence, again Pecking order hypothesis does hold for 
SMEs choice for financing. However, the sales variable has a negative and significant effect 
on long-term bank debt. The effect of cash flow, sales and trade credit slightly decrease when 
adding the human specific variable. Interestingly, a diploma has a positive and significant 
effect on bank loans, while having previous jobs and experience does not significantly affect 
the demand for short- and long-term bank debt. Someone who are university or college 
graduated may be perceived as a good borrower in a way he can manage the business well by 
having knowledge from school. As robustness check, I also estimate a different 
disequilibrium model by assuming that only the demand equation is influenced by the human 
capital of the entrepreneur. The results support and are consistent with the main model. The 




















Table 3.8 Disequilibrium model for long-term bank debt with human capital 
 
Independent variables 
Desired demand for 





Cash flow/lagged total assets 1.384*** Fixed cost/lagged total assets 0.0968*** 
 -0.0621  (0.0035) 
Sales/lagged total assets -0.00299*** Lending cost/ total assets 1.737*** 
 (0.0007)  (0.0711) 
Trade debt/lagged total assets -0.103*** Trade debt/lagged total assets -0.0660*** 
 (0.0095)  (0.008) 
Diploma 0.0369*** Lending rate 0.0173*** 
 (0.0065)  (0.0031) 
Experience 0.0369*** Diploma 0.0347*** 
 (0.0102)  (0.0055) 
Previous jobs 0.0114 Experience 0.0305*** 
 (0.0181)  (0.0086) 
   Previous jobs 0.0152 
    (0.0153) 
     
Year Dummy    Industry dummy  
1996 -0.0226*** Food industry 0.0735*** 
 (0.0059)  (0.0109) 
1997 -0.0323*** Construction 0.00124 
 (0.0069)  (0.0065) 
1998 -0.0286*** Commerce 0.0589*** 
 (0.0064)  (0.0051) 
1999 -0.0309*** Transport 0.00852 
 (0.0068)  (0.0082) 
2000 -0.0267*** Services for entrepreneurs -0.0106 
 (0.0061)  (0.0071) 
Industry dummy   Catering 0.0383*** 
Food industry 0.0947***  (0.0089) 
 (0.0128)   
Construction -0.00599   
 (0.0076)   
Commerce 0.0638***   
 (0.0060)   
Transport 0.0123   
 (0.0097)   
Services for entrepreneurs -0.0214**   
 (0.0083)   
Catering 0.0703***   
  (0.0105)     
This table gives the estimation result of disequilibrium model for long term bank debt (See Equation 3.5-














3.5.3 Proportion of Credit Rationed Firms  
Table 3.9 Proportion of credit rationed firms 
 
Year 
Proportion of credit rationed firms (Short-
term bank debt) 
Proportion of credit rationed firms (Long-
term bank debt) 
1995 62.43% 48.79% 
1996 64.61% 47.43% 
1997 44.59% 43.24% 
1998 47.88% 45.03% 
1999 31.90% 46.29% 
2000 23.20% 44.27% 
   
Average 45.77% 45.84% 
 
After estimating our simultaneous equation models consisting of the demand and supply 
functions for short- and long-term bank credit, I can obtain the fitted values for our model 
concerning the quantity of bank credit demanded and supplied.  When the demand for long 
(or short) term bank credit exceeds the supply of long (or short) term credit in a certain year t 
for a firm i, firm i copes with credit rationing for long (or short) term bank debt in that 
particular year t.  Table 3.9 presents the results of this calculation. 
 
Over the entire period, the results of our study suggest that 45.84% of the French SMEs are 
credit rationed for long-term bank credit and 45.77% for short-term bank credit. Meanwhile, 
Atanasova and Wilson (2004) estimated that 42.7% of SMEs in the UK in the period of 1989-









3.6 Conclusion  
A large panel data set consisting of 9417 French SMEs was used to estimate the 
disequilibrium models of demand and supply of long-term and short-term corporate bank 
loans.  No previous study was found to estimate the existence of credit rationing in a bank-
based economic system.  The contribution of this study is that the model estimated is a 
disequilibrium model, allowing for the existence of credit rationing. Moreover, firms are 
endogenously classified as credit rationed or non-rationed. No ex ante separation in two 
groups has to be made, and thus firms can switch between both groups from one year to 
another.  The results of our study indicate that, over the entire period, over 45.84% of the 
French SMEs are credit rationed for long-term bank credit, and 45.77%for short-term bank 
credit.   
 
As predicted, I see that the level of activity, sales over lagged total assets, has a significant 
positive effect but is not significant on the demand for short-term bank credit. However, the 
sales variable has a negative and significant effect on long-term bank debt. This indicates that 
a firm relies on the retained earnings coming from the operation output to support the 
business. The result may confirm that SMEs follow the pecking order theory (e.g., Mateev et 
al., 2013; Rossi et al., 2015; Palacin-Sanchez et al., 2012) The effects of cash flow, sales and 
trade credit slightly decrease when adding the human specific variable. Interestingly, a 
diploma has a positive and significant effect on bank loans, while having previous jobs and 
experience does not significantly affect the demand for short- and long-term bank debt. I can 
conclude from both analyses that in France, especially for start-up and small SMEs with little 
internal resources and a lack of assets to guarantee the repayment of debt are most likely to 








study, especially in enhancing the level of education and knowledge of the entrepreneur or 
new-start up business by providing the training or any specific education, formal and 
informal, which can increase the knowledge. Other sources of alternative financing besides of 
bank financing may be more needed for the new start-up business, such as crowd-funding, 



























CHAPTER 4 FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS, LEVERAGE, AND FIRM 
INVESTMENT: A SWITCHING REGRESSION APPROACH 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The classic theorem from Modigliani and Miller (1958) states that the financial structure of a 
firm is irrelevant to its investment decisions. In assuming a perfect capital market exists, there 
would be no differential cost between external and internal financing. The model assumes 
that there is symmetric information and no agency or transaction costs associated with the 
debt-equity mix. However, once capital market imperfections are introduced, the cost of 
external financing will be higher than internally generated funds. Thus, financially 
constrained firms will rely first on internal funds to invest in profitable projects. 
 
The pioneering work from by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen in 1988 (hereafter FHP) argued 
that if internal and external funds were perfect substitutes (as would be the case in a perfect 
capital market), there would be no association between cash flow and investment. However, 
under the assumption that the cost of external financing surpasses the cost of internal 
financing, changes in internal financing could be important factors that determine a firm’s 
capital spending. FHP’s empirical work used firm-level data to investigate the relationship 
between firms’ investment behaviour and cash flow. Firms are priori classified as constrained 
and unconstrained by using dividend payout ratios. Firms with a low dividend payout ratio 
are classified as financially constrained because these firms mostly use their internal finances 
to fund investment. To interpret their findings as indicating Financial constraints, FHP needs 
to control for another factor that might make investment positively correlated with cash flow, 








is a correlation between cash flow and investment, but also that the investment decisions of 
firms that are priori classified as constrained firms are more sensitive to the availability of 
internal cash flow. They claimed this result as evidence for the degree of financial constraint 
and conclude that investment cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) could be a convenient measure of 
financial constraint. Since then, a large body of literature has developed using similar 
methodologies that have confirmed the findings in the FHP’s paper (Allayanis and 
Mozundar, 2004; Aggarwal and Zong, 2006; Almedia and Campello, 2007; Cleary et al., 
2007; Agca and Mozundar, 2007; Guariglia, 2007; Silva and Carreira, 2012). 
 
Another point underlying the issue of investment cash flow sensitivity issue is that firms 
grouped into constrained and unconstrained types by using a priori classification. Cleary et al. 
(2007) argued that it is rather difficult to find a good variable as a measure of financial 
constraint. Therefore, empirical research has provided a set of alternative variables that can 
be used as a priori classification for firms; these range from a single variable to multiple 
variables and finally, to an index. FHP (1988) classified firms as financially constrained on 
the basis of one single quantitative factor, namely the dividend payout ratio. In some studies, 
however, two or more qualitative and quantitative indicators are used for a priori 
classification. For example, Rauh (2006) used five different variables to measure financial 
constraints: age, S&P credit rating, dividend payout ratio, cash, and capital expenditure. 
Meanwhile, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) used size, 
age, and pattern of insider trading of the company’s shares. 
 
Another debate associated with the investment cash flow model is related to the issue of 
investment opportunity biases. Some researchers argued that within the reduced form of Q 








opportunity that is not covered by the investment opportunity variables such as Tobin’s Q 
variable (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Erickson and Whited, 2000; Bond et al., 2004; 
Cummins et al., 2006). The problem associated with Tobin’s Q variable may be related to its 
priori classification to identify financially constrained firms. In general, firms that are 
classified as financially constrained are smaller and newer than other firms in the sample. 
Therefore, Tobin’s Q may have less information about these firms.  
 
To resolve this issue, alternative proxies have been proposed, including the so-called 
fundamental Q model, Tobin’s Q corrected for measurement error (Erickson and Whited, 
2000), earning forecasts for financial analysts (Cummins et al., 2006), and contracted capital 
expenditures (Guagrilia and Carpenter, 2008). However, for unlisted firms, the object of this 
study, it is impossible to use proxies based on stock market value data. Therefore, I propose 
using a sales accelerator model to capture investment opportunities for unlisted firms. The 
sales accelerator model, which will be described later, relies on accounting information only 
and can thus be calculated for unquoted firms (Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Konings et al., 
2003; Scellato, 2007; Guagrilia, 2008; Bakucs et al., 2009).  
 
To solve the problem associated with the investment opportunity biases, the previous 
literature has offered alternative approaches. For example, it has been suggested that the 
interaction terms be used between cash flow and variables that measure the severity of market 
imperfections. The basic idea is that investment cash flow sensitivity should change with the 
degree of market imperfections. Then by adding the interaction variable, I would expect that 










Almeida and Campello (2007) developed a model to identify whether financial imperfections 
affect firm investment behaviour by exploring the idea that those variables that increase a 
firm’s ability to obtain external funding may also increase its investment when the firm is 
having difficulty obtaining external financing. Asset tangibility can be used to pledge 
collateral because this is likely to play an important role in investment decisions. Tangible 
assets may support a firm’s borrowing capability and thus allow for further investments to be 
made. Tangible assets serve to pledge collateral by mitigating the contractibility problem,10 
and they can also be used as screening devices to separate good from bad borrowers in an 
environment with asymmetric information. They found that ICFS decreases with a 
constrained firm’s degree of tangibility. Another main contribution of Almeida and Campello 
(2007) is that they endogenously classified firms according to their financial constraint status 
using a switching regression approach rather than an a priori classification variable (as in 
most studies) to distinguish between constrained and unconstrained firms.  
  
Accordance with the main objectives of the thesis, this chapter basically analyzes the degree 
of financial constraint by using indirect measurement, namely investment cash flow 
sensitivity. The main novelty of this empirical research is by applying the switching 
regression model that can be used as alternative to priori classification scheme that 
commonly used in the previous study.  
 
The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows: Section 2 provides a brief literature review of 
financial constraints and investment, with a specific emphasis on unlisted firms. 
Methodology is presented in section 3. Section 4 presents the estimation framework and the 
                                                        
10 The contractibility problem is defined as problem associated with the lack of contractibility between 








empirical model to be tested. Section 5 describes the data and provides the descriptive 
statistics of the sample. The main empirical results are shown and discussed in section 6. 
Section 5 presents the conclusions of the paper and suggests some possible future research 
directions. 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Theory of Capital Structure 
To identify financially constrained and unconstrained firms, I assume that financial constraint 
is endogenously related to the capital structure of a firm; hence, in this section of the chapter, 
I present the most relevant theories of capital firm structure, starting from the work from 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), then proceeding to static trade-off theory, pecking order 
theory, agency cost, and asymmetric information cost theories.  
4.2.1.1 Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) Irrelevance Proposition 
The modern theory of capital structure was primarily developed by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). The MM theory is based on the assumption that the probability distribution of a 
firm’s cash flow does not depend on capital structure decisions, so all investors have the same 
expectations regarding cash flows. It also assumes that there is a perfect capital market where 
information is available freely to all market participants and that the investor will behave 
rationally. Another important assumption is that there are no transaction costs or corporate 
taxes. Modigliani and Miller (1958, p. 268) explicitly state as their Proposition I that “The 
market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and is given by capitalizing its 
expected return at the rate appropriate to its class” (p. 268). The underlying logic of this 










This theory has been widely criticized for its limitations. For example, Myers (1984) 
questioned the credibility of this theory and argues that the value of a firm actually depends 
on its capital structure because some investors are willing to pay more for shares rather than 
the equivalent whole. The theory only holds in the synthetic world of M&M if I assume that 
the capital market is perfect, i.e., no taxes or transaction costs. “The irrelevance proposition” 
in this theory has provoked a wave of new theoretical and empirical research to support or 
deny this proposition.  
4.2.1.2 The Static Trade-off Theory and Agency Cost 
The objective of trade-off theory is to explain why firms are financed partly by debt and 
partly by equity. The idea of an optimal capital structure for a firm is often explained as a 
trade-off between the cost and benefit of debt. The cost of using debt is represented by the 
agency cost among creditors and equity holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1984) 
and the cost of financial distress (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973), and the benefit of using 











Figure 4.1 The Trade-off theory: Optimum capital structures 
Source: Myers (1984) 
 
 
The optimal capital structure may differ from one firm to another due to the characteristics of 
each firm. Thus, according to the static trade-off theory of corporate capital structure, the 
firm chooses the firm’s leverage by comparing the present value of interest tax shields and 
present value of financial distress or bankruptcy costs. And when there are no adjustment 
costs for a new leverage ratio, the chosen firm leverage is considered to be optimal if it 
maximizes the firm’s value (Myers, 1984) and minimizes cost of capital. Aside from the 
“fiscally deductible” benefit from the firm’s taxes as a result of paying interest, another 
advantage of using debt is to lessen the free cash flow problem (Jensen and Meckling,1976; 
Stulz, 1990).  
 
The agency cost theory is concerned with the relationship between the agent (e.g., the 








the separation of ownership and management creates conflict among principals and agents 
and will create the agency cost.  
 
The socially efficient objective of the firm is to maximize stockholder’s wealth, but agents 
(managers who are not major shareholders) may have other objectives. The main argument 
behind agency theory is that corporate manager’s act in their own best interests. They are 
looking for job security, prerequisites, and in the worst cases, to get their hands on assets and 
cash flow. Managers may therefore have incentives to decrease a firm’s value unless the free 
cash flow is distributed among stakeholders.  
 
Related to agency theory for small–medium firms, Jensen and Meckling (1976) claimed that 
there is less conflict between principals and agents in small–medium enterprises. The reason 
is that in SMEs, the owner and the manager is one person. In general, family and small 
businesses create fewer agency conflicts between agents and principals. However, when the 
principal and agent are separate, small–medium firms may experience agency problems. 
Moreover, problems such as entrenched ownership and asymmetric altruism within SMEs 
may create other difficulties. 
4.2.1.3 Pecking Order Theory 
Pecking order theory can be applied by financial managers in comparison to the trade-off 
theory. The underlying assumption of this theory is there is asymmetric information among 
the managers of a firm and its outside stakeholders. I assume that managers have better 
information than the firm’s stockholders and other stakeholder, who in turn have better 
information about the future prospect of the company than outside potential investors. A 








that the goal of management is to maximize the value to existing shareholders. The rational 
hypothesis of outside investors is that a firm issues shares because management thinks that 
the shares of the firm are overvalued. Hence, this perceived information only makes an equity 
issue possible at a lower price. By assuming that debt issuance is not possible, when a firm 
needs fund to finance a positive NPV-project, the firm will only consider issuing undervalued 
shares. This also means that even if a company has significant growth opportunities; these 
will not be reflected in its stock prices.  
 
The main cause of this undervaluation phenomenon is the signaling effect. Several studies 
have confirmed this by finding that the announcement of stock issue has a consequent 
negative impact on stock prices. Moreover, it has been shown that the extent of the price drop 
is related to the degree of information asymmetry between inside management and outside 
investors. The fact that debt has a senior claim on assets and earnings of the firm implies that 
creditors face less risk compared to equity holders. It can be said that only pessimistic 
managers will issue new equity if debt is available at fair value. 
 
This theory explains the preference of financial managers for raising new funds. According to 
this theory, a manager’s first choice is to use internal fund  in the form of retained earnings. 
The second option will be external finance. . External Finance is divided into issuing debt and 
equity, and there is a preference for the issuance of debt and equity. External debt will be 
used as the first option of external financing. Debt financing is safer security and less risky 
than equity. The pecking order allows for issuing equity when the capacity of the debt is fully 
used (Myers and Majluf, 1984). In this framework, there is no optimal debt ratio, but the 









Compared to the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory can explain why profitable firms 
have less debt compared to less profitable firms. The main explanation behind this fact is that 
profitable firms can generate enough internal financing to finance investment (Myers, 2001). 
The development of pecking order theory was mostly based on empirical results from large 
listed companies in the US. However, empirical tests on SMEs financing show that pecking 
order theory can explain the behaviour of SMEs regarding capital structure decisions as well. 
One of the possible reasons is because SMEs are often owned by a single shareholder who is 
also the owner of the firm. Issuing new equity will reduce the owner’s share. To avoid this, 
the most natural response is to choose debt financing instead equity financing11. Another 
possible explanation is that SMEs’ cost of external equity is higher compared to large firms 
(Chittenden et al., 1996). The fact that small firms rely more on short-term financing than 
large firms also strengthens the argument that the size of a firm has an impact on the 
availability of debt financing. Related to the issue of the financing gap for SMEs, the pecking 
order theory for SMEs can be extended to explain why they have a propensity toward short-
term over long-term financing. 
4.2.1.4 Determinant of Capital Structure and Hypothesis 
As Harris and Raviv (1991) mentioned, “Several studies shed light on the specific 
characteristic of firms and industries that determine leverage ratio. These studies generally 
agree that leverage increases with fixed assets, growth opportunities, and firm size and 
decreases with volatility, advertising costs, research and development costs, bankruptcy 
probability, profitability, growth opportunity and uniqueness of the product.” Since then, 
many empirical and theoretical studies have been done to analyze the determinant of capital 
                                                        
11 Cressy (1995), however, explains the use of debt in terms of entrepreneurial control aversion. This was 








structure for firms. However, the result of these studies is always ambiguous and it is still an 
interesting subject to be explored. 
 
The following determinants of capital structure are used in this paper: size, age, profitability, 
tangibility, and growth opportunities.  
1. Size 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that larger firms are more likely to be more diversified 
and successful than smaller firms, so size may be an inverse proxy for bankruptcy 
probability, and they also assumed that large firms have a greater debt capacity. 
Moreover, large listed companies might be able to incur lower transaction costs 
associated with debt, and the cost of information asymmetric in large firms is lower than 
in small firms due to accuracy and transparency (Daskalakis and Psollaki, 2008). 
 
However, size may also be used as a proxy for the information of outside investors, which 
should increase their preference for equity over debt. Some studies found a positive 
relationship between size and leverage (see Huang and Song, 2002; Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). However, some authors also found a negative relationship (see Kim-Sorensen, 
1986; Titman and Wessels, 1988). Then, the hypothesis is propounded in alternative 
hypothesis forms as follows :  
H4.1: There is a positive relationship between size and leverage 
2. Age 
Firm age can be considered as a proxy for creditworthiness for SMEs (Hyytinen and 
Pajarinen, 2008). Regarding the issue of creditworthiness, Diamond (1984) suggests that 








reputation will be recognized by the market, which has observed the firm's ability to meet 
its obligations.  
 
The trade-off theory would predict a positive association between age and leverage, 
because financial distress costs are lower for older firms. However, according to pecking 
order theory, the relationship lending between older firms and banks reduce adverse 
selection costs. Hence, I would expect a positive relationship between firm age and 
leverage. As a firm survives and grows over time, it becomes more established and 
capable of using more debt. Then, the hypothesis is propounded in alternative hypothesis 
forms as follows: 
H4.2: There is a positive relationship between age and leverage. 
 
3. Profitability 
From the perspective of trade-off theory, more profitable firms should have higher 
leverage to get the tax shield benefits of using debt. Moreover, profitable firms also are 
encouraged to use more external financing to discipline managers not to spend money on 
unprofitable projects. 
 
However, Myers (1984) mentioned that firms with the ability to produce acceptable 
amounts of profit and earnings tend to use their internal capital rather than look for 
external funds. More profitable firms will have less need for external financing and 
therefore may have lower leverage. This way of financing could be easily applied to the 
SMEs because the SMEs managers are also the owners or shareholder, and such 
managers do not like to lose control over their firms. Agency costs and the problem of 








Pettit and Singer (1985) believe that small firms have a higher level of information 
asymmetry than large firms, due to the quality of their financial statements. Moreover, the 
cost of external funds is higher for them than for large firms. SMEs tend to choose 
retained earnings as the first choice of financing, then debt, and finally, equity. Thus, it is 
also can be said that the pecking order hypothesis is very relevant for SMEs. Because of 
this, the most rational response for SMEs is to avoid the use of external financing. Then, 
the hypothesis is propounded in alternative hypothesis forms as follows: 
H4.3: There is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
 
4. Tangibility 
Tangible assets can be used as collateral. Higher tangibility decreases the risk of creditors 
and increases the value of the firms in case of the bankruptcy. Storey (1994) argued that, 
in many cases, banks choose to lend money to firms with more tangible assets. It is also 
claimed that firms with a high level of tangible fixed assets are considered as  mature 
firms; hence, they come with less risk. It is therefore believed that tangibility is positively 
correlated with leverage. 
 
Barnea et al. (1981) stated that there is a positive relationship between the agency 
problem and the level of asymmetric information. Barnea et al. (1981) argued that the 
agency cost is higher in SMEs because the owner of tends to follow his interests prior to 
those of other stakeholders. Monitoring is even more difficult and expensive for SMEs 
because small firms are not required to disclose much information regarding their 
financial statements. Therefore, providing audited financial information poses a 
significant cost for SMEs. Adverse selection and moral hazard problems are also more 









As Booth et al. (2001, p.101) said, “the more tangible the firm’s assets, the greater its 
ability to issue secured debt and the less information revealed about the future profit.” 
Some empirical studies that also support this idea are Rajan and Zingales (1995) and 
Titman and Wessel (1988). Thus, the hypothesis is propounded in alternative hypothesis 
forms as follows : 
H4.4: There is a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. 
5. Firm Growth 
Empirically, previous studies found ambiguous results in the relationship between growth 
and leverage. Conferring to Jensen and Meckling (1976), bankruptcy cost and agency cost 
are the main determinant of a firm’s leverage. The agency cost may increase significantly 
from the conflict between shareholders and debt holders. Shareholders will take on a 
project with high risk because of a higher expected level of return, and in some cases, this 
might not always maximize the firm’s value. However, this action is at the expense of the 
debt holders, and to protect themselves, debt holders use different types of covenant and 
monitoring devices.  Firms with high-growth opportunities should use more equity 
financing and will decline investment in profitable projects. This type of investment will 
effectively transfer wealth from the stockholder to the debt holder. Therefore, I expect to 
find a negative relation between growth opportunities and leverage. Some empirical 
studies also confirm this finding, including Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Titman and 
Wessel (1988). 
 
However, according to the pecking order theory, there may be a positive relationship 
between growth and leverage due to the existence of information asymmetry. The newly 








Present Value (NPV). In this case, even a project with a positive NPV will be rejected. 
Managers prefer to use less risky sources of finance to fund their expansionary 
investment projects. Past firm growth has typically been found to be positively related 
with leverage in previous SMEs studies. Some empirical studies confirm this finding, 
including Cassar and Holmes (2003). Thus, the hypothesis is propounded in alternative 
hypothesis forms as follows: 
H4.5: Firm growth is positively related to leverage. 
 
4.2.2 Stylized Approach to the Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity Model 
FHP (1988) were the first researchers to adopt an empirical methodology to study the 
relationship between investment, cash flow, and financial constraints using sample of quoted 
US manufacturing firms. The study suggests that the investment decisions of firms that are 
more financially constrained are more sensitive to internal cash flows. They found that if 
firms were not financially constrained, the investment decision would depend on its 
investment opportunity. Their methodology involved splitting the sample into sub-samples 
according to the degree of financial constraint; they used the dividend payout ratio as the 
variable to measure this. Low-dividend paying firms are more likely to have more severe 
financial constraints, whereas high-dividend paying firms are considered unconstrained as the 
level of investment in such firms are not affected by the relative availability of cash flow. 
 
FHP derived the following reduced-form investment equation for empirical implementation 
of their model. 
 










where  is the level of investment of the firm i at time t; is the value of invested assets 
for firm i at the end of time t; 
 
is the vector variable that captures investment opportunities, 
and  is the independently and identically distributed noise term.  
 
4.2.3 Classification of Firms into More or Less Financially Constrained Groups 
One of the most influential criticisms of the FHP model was provided Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997). This study used a formal framework to account for firm type (by using an 
exogenously determined indicator for the cost of internal capital) and argued that an 
investment cash flow sensitivity measure of the degree of financial constraints is imperfect. 
They used size and earning retention policy as priori classifications to split the sample 
according to the degree of financial constraint. They use the data from FHP on 49 low-
dividend paying firms that were grouped as the most financially constrained firms. They also 
collected more detailed financial information of these companies and further classified them 
into five categories: 1) definitely not financially constrained; 2) likely not financially 
constrained; 3) possibly financially constrained; 4) likely financially constrained; 5) 
definitely financially constrained. They confirm that an investment of low dividend firms is 
less sensitive to cash flow. KZ suggests that if the relationship between investment and 
internal finance is not present, then the observed sensitivity may be due to non-optimizing 
management behaviour or excessive managerial conservatism.  
 
KZ confirms the theoretical model to show that any sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
does not have to be interpreted as evidence of financial constraint. This finding clearly 
presents a result that conflict with FHP and other previous studies. KZ argues that certain 








by risk adverse management and/or precautionary savings behaviour rather than by financial 
constraint (Lins et al., 2010). They also found that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
is non-monotonic, and it is likely lowest for financially constrained firms. This contradicts 
the assumptions of FHP. Moyen (2004), however, proposes an explanation for the conflicting 
findings on investment cash flow sensitivity. She presents two different models based on the 
ability of a firm to raise external funds. The unconstrained model is a model in which the firm 
can get external funds; while the constrained model is one in which the firm cannot raise 
external funds to finance its investment. She found evidence to support both FHP (1988) and 
KZ (1997) using both models. 
 
Later on, Fazzari et al. (2000) criticized that non-optimizing management behavior may not 
be reliable evidence of the absence of financial constraint in most situations. Moreover, they 
also stated that the classification criteria used in KZ (1997) might be unreliable measures of 
the relative degree of financial constraint as KZ make their classification from a static 
perspective only. Moreover, FHP (1988) also claimed that the KZ theoretical model and 
classification approach in determining the degree of financial constraint across firm are non-
informative, subjective, and ineffective. A later response by KZ (2000) added to the 
discussion of the usefulness of investment and cash flow sensitivities. 
 
However, the research by KZ (1997) is followed by a number of studies that support their 
findings. Cleary (1999) extended their classification scheme based on a firm’s ability to raise 
external funds and constructed an index of a firm’s financial strength using multiple 
discriminant analysis that which transformed the characteristics shared by firms into a 
univariate analysis. The number of variables that were chosen was firm liquidity, leverage, 








sales growth. Using multiple discriminant analysis (MDS), which variables are likely to 
influence the characterization of the firm as either financially constrained or non-financially 
constrained. This requires two novel processes. First, I have to use a segmenting variable that 
enables the division of firms into two or more groups. I then use MDA to assess the ability of 
each independent variable to distinguish firms between the groups. In the end, I can use the 
segmenting variable to distinguish two or more groups and estimate a probit or logit on 
determinants of financial constraint. I also need to have a superior segmenting variable that 
correctly discriminates between constrained and unconstrained firms. Other works that used 
an index to measure Financial constraint were conducted by Whited and Wu (2006), who 
proposed the WW index and Hadlock and Pierce (2010), who proposed the SA index. 
 
The WW index by Whited and Wu (2006) is constructed by using generalized methods of 
moments (GMM). The WW index is a linear combination of cash ratio, a dummy firm for 
paying dividends, debt ratio, size, industry sales growth, and a firm’s sales growth. They use 
a structural parameter model by Whited (1992), which clearly presented the shadow cost of 
equity financing. The model was set to be a function of observable firm characteristics, i.e., 
the financial health of a firm. The major concern, when using this index, is the fact that this 
index comes from a high parameter involved in the underlying model. It is more complex 
compared to other index models. The SA index by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) used firm size 
and age to measure financial constraint. Firm size is calculated as the natural log of deflated 
total assets, whereas age is the number of years the firm has been in the Compustat database 
or the number of years since the date of incorporation. 
 
The single or multiple factors and indexes used in previous studies may not successfully 








first address this potential problem be using a priori classification and offering a switching 
regression model of investment. The switching regression model assumes that there is 
unknown sample separation in which the probability of a firm being in a constrained or an 
unconstrained regime is determined by a switching function of a vector of firm-specific 
variables that measure the severity of informational and agency problems.  
 
Therefore, I can directly test the effect of various factors on a firm’s likelihood of facing 
financial constraint. Other studies that also apply switching regression methods are 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006), Almeida and Campello (2007), and Hobdari et al (2009).  
This chapter basically follows the work from Hobdari et al. (2009) by using the accelerator 
model of investment.  
4.2.4 Proxies for Investment Opportunities for Unlisted Firms 
To empirically test financial constraint and investment behavior, it is crucially important to 
measure firms’ investment opportunities accurately so that the significance of cash flow in 
the investment equation does not reflect future profitability but rather the effect of 
informational asymmetry. Most of the studies of investment cash flow sensitivity are based 
on panels of listed firms. A smaller number of studies focus on small to medium firms 
(Guariglia, 2008; Bechetti et al., 2009).  SMEs have unique characteristics because they are 
subject to more severe asymmetric information problems than large firms, particularly large 
quoted companies. This results in greater difficulties in getting external financing. Moreover, 
SMEs also have a lower borrowing capacity because of a poor track record (being more 
frequently in the service industries) and lower collateral value. Thus, focusing on SMEs to 
assess investment cash flow sensitivity could be challenging in that I need to find a suitable 








available, it is impossible to compute traditional proxies of investment opportunities such as 
the book-to-market ratio, fundamental Q, or forecasted analyst earnings for these unlisted 
firms.  
 
Studies of investment cash flow sensitivity that use data from unquoted UK firms have 
appeared recently. In particular, Guariglia (2008) analyzes data from 24,184 unquoted UK 
firms over the period 1993–2003. Firms were classified a priori as being financially 
constrained according to the size of internal funds; firms with more internal funds will be less 
constrained compared to those without internal funds.  Using priori classification certainly 
has flaw in a way that it may creates biases and it need more than one proxy to strengthen the 
results 
 
4.2.5 Alternative Ways to Verify Investment Flow Sensitivity  
Guariglia and Carpenter (2008) found that when calculating contracted capital expenditures, 
the effect of cash flow on investment is reduced for large firms, but still has a significant 
effect for small firms. The contracted capital expenditures variable is used to capture 
information about available internal opportunities, it is not included in the Q, and it also 
reflects insider evaluation of investment opportunities. They used size, which is calculated by 
the number of employees, as a proxy to classify firms into financially constrained or 
unconstrained firms. By using panel data of UK firms over the 1982–2000 period, they 
estimate investment regression by applying IV regression and first difference GMM 
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The findings of this study explains that cash flow 
may still play a significant role in capturing the effect of market imperfections, especially for 









Another paper by Guariglia (2008) found that investment cash flow responds differently 
according to the type of constraint. Using a panel of unquoted firms in the UK, she estimated 
investment cash flow sensitivity by using error-correction specification instead of the Q 
model. The result suggested that there is a U shaped relationship between investment and 
cash flow when firms are grouped according to the severity of financial constraint. Another 
important result from this study was that it presented evidence that the controversy around 
using investment cash flow sensitivity to measure financial constraint is probably due to a 
priori classification schemes, and it may not be because of the improper measurement of Q.  
 
Another study by Agca and Mozundar (2008) studied the investment cash flow sensitivity of 
some US manufacturing firms by looking at factors associated with capital market 
imperfections, namely fund flows, institutional ownership, analyst following, bond rating, 
and index of antitakeover amendments. By using the Erickson-Whited error correction 
estimation, they found that in US manufacturing firms, cash flow has a significant effect on 
investment, and the level of investment cash flow sensitivity may be reduced with increasing 
cash flows, institutional ownership, analyst following, antitakeover amendment, and the 
availability of bond ratings.  
 
Because financial constraint is endogenously related to factors that reflect the severity of 
financial constraint, Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) suggested that the cash flow coefficient for 
constrained firms is relatively higher than that of unconstrained firms. As an alternative to the 
Tobin’s Q, they also use the sales-to-capital ratio as an additional independent variable in the 
investment equation to control for investment opportunity. Hovakimian and Titman (2006) 
also used a similar endogenous switching regression mode to examine the importance of 








asset sales had a greater influence on investment expenditure for financially constrained firms 
and revealed that the cash obtained from asset sales has a significant effect on firm 
investment. Financially constrained firms are more likely to invest when they have cash from 
asset sales.  
 
The work of Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), Hovakimian and Titman (2006), and Almeida and 
Campello (2007) showed that investment cash flow sensitivity for constrained firms increases 
with the tangibility of their assets (a proxy for pledgeable assets). They claimed that their 
studies did not rely on a single comparison of the level of estimated cash flow coefficients for 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Therefore, it is not subject to KZ’s (1997) critique but 
focuses instead on the marginal effect of pledgeable assets on income shocks and spending 
under credit constraint. Moreover, they also found that asset tangibility supports more 
borrowing, and the investment cash flow sensitivities of those firms are not monotonically 
related to the degree of financial constraint. A study from Ascioglu et al. (2008) claimed that 
financial constraint only matters when firms have a high level of informational friction. They 
found that firms with information asymmetry may have higher investment cash flow 
sensitivity. As an a priori classification of constrained and unconstrained firms, they use the 
probability of informed trade (PIN), which is also considered to be a more direct measure of 
financial constraint.  
 
This chapter basically will follow the work from Almeida and Campello (2007), but rather 
than use tangibility as the factor that indicates the severity of financial constraint, this study 
will use leverage and assume that financial constraint status is endogenously related to a 
firm’s leverage level. The firms with relatively high leverage are expected to face more 








constrained than those firms with low leverage. As suggested by Whited (1992), debt policies 
may play an important role a proxy for market imperfection. High leverage increases the 
firm’s probability of default and also induces a restricted access to external funds (Cleary, 
2002). Thus, there is a possibility that firm leverage may affect a firm’s investment cash flow 
sensitivity. The interpretation of constrained and unconstrained firms is mainly based on the 
different coefficients for cash flow and interaction terms. 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Endogenous Switching Regression 
I use the endogenous switching regression model (ESRM) with unknown separation (see 
Maddala, 1986) to provide estimates of separate investment regressions without a priori 
classification of firms as constrained or unconstrained firms. This approach addresses the 
criticisms of the FHP approach discussed above, namely, that FHP rely on questionable 
classification criteria. The ESRM is based on the assumption that the number of different 
regimes in which firms operate is known, but the point of structural change (regime switch) is 
not observable. The advantage of this approach is that it shows (a) the extent that investment 
behavior differs across groups of firms and (b) the characteristics that make firms more likely 
to demonstrate higher or lower sensitivity are determined simultaneously by the data. I 
assume I have two different regimes.  Available regimes may reflect the severity of financial 
constraint faced by firms depending on the severity of liquidity constrains in either of the two 
unobservable investment regimes.  
  
Following the work by Almeida and Campello (2007), Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), and 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006), I use the switching regression approach to determine the 








as a predictor of financial constraint, I use leverage. The method used defined various 
characteristics on the assumption (to be tested) that firms in the different groups have 
different investment behaviors. The main benefit of this approach is that it controls for 
multiple variables that jointly determine the group in which a firm is likely to belong without 
the need for splitting the sample based on a priori classification. The switching regression 
model thus allows us to empirically classify the sample into two different groups without 
making any a priori classification.   
 
When applying the switching regression model, I assumed that there would be two different 
investment regimes, regime 1 and regime 2. The point of structural change is not 
unobservable and was estimated together with the investment equation for both regimes. A 
firm may operate in one of the two unobservable investment regimes depending on the extent 
of financial constraint. To estimate the model, I construct the following system of equations:  
 
                       (4.2) 
  (4.3)       
.                (4.4)     
 
The structural equations that describe the investment behaviour of the firms in both regimes 
are presented in equations (4.2) and (4.3). is the determinant of firm investment, and  
are the vectors of parameter, and  and  are residuals. Equation (4.4) is the selection 
equation that determines a firm’s propensity to be in one of the two-investment regime.   is 
the determinant of a firm’s likelihood of being in one or the other investment regime, while µ 
represents the residuals. The selection equation also allows us to estimate the statistical 








constraint. Moreover, it also incorporates more information into the estimation of separate 
investment regimes because it directly includes firm characteristics in the selection estimation 
(Hovakimian and Titman, 2006). 
 
The observed investment, , undertaken by firm I at time t, is defined as follows: 
        (4.5) 
      (4.6) 
 
Firms will not be fixed in one regime. A transfer between the regimes happens if  reaches 
a certain unobservable threshold value. A vector of error is also assumed in the investment 
and switching functions ( ,  and ) that are jointly distributed with the mean vector at 0 
and the covariance matrix as  . This zero mean and covariance matrix 
permit a nonzero correlation between the shock to firm characteristic and endogenous 
switching between the two investment regimes.  
 
The extent to which investment behavior differs across both regimes and the likelihood that 
firms are assigned to one of the regimes is simultaneously determined based on the chosen 
multiple indicators. Therefore, I am able to split the sample without the ex-ante a priori 
classification. I need to determine which regime is constrained and which one is 
unconstrained to fully define the switching regression model. The model is estimated by the 
method of maximum likelihoods (see Maddala and Nelson, 1994; Hovakimian and Titman, 
2006). The model allows for observing the probability in which each of the regimes occur, 









Probability of being in regime 1 is Pr                 (4.7) 
 Probability of being in regime 2 is Pr         (4.8) 
 
The likelihood function is as follows: 
    
                    (4.9) 
 
To estimate the model, the switchr package for STATA written by Zimmerman (1998) will 
be used for estimation as can be seen in equations 4.2–4.4. The investment variables 
functions as the dependent variable in both regimes (equation 4.2 and 4.3). Meanwhile, a 
classification variable will be used as the dependent variable in the selection equation 
(equation 4.3). To determine the estimation selection vector, an initial guess of the correct 
classification has to be provided for each observation. In this study, a dummy variable, 
leverage, is used to do this by assuming firms with relatively high leverage levels are more 
likely to have difficulty in obtaining additional external funds than those firms with low 
leverage. I define the leverage dummy as equal to 1 if the firm’s leverage is below the median 
and zero elsewhere. Therefore, an observation will be coded as 1 (unconstrained) if their 
leverage level is below the 50th percentile and 0 (constrained) otherwise. 
 
4.3.2 Ex-Ante Sample Separation Criteria 
For a robustness check, I also estimate the baseline regression (see equation 4.1) using four 
different a priori classification variables. Firms are classified into constrained and 
unconstrained firms based on size, age, firm risk, and SA index. Size is measured using firm 








financial constraints because they have more asymmetric information problems. It is 
particularly difficult for them to get external funding. 
 
The second sample separation criterion is the firm’s risk. The data for the firm’s risk is taken 
from the variables available from the QuiScores database. The QuiScores is calculated based 
on information about a firm’s the credit rating. The higher its QuiScores value, the less risky 
a firm is considered. 
 
Besides size and QuiScores, SA index by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) is used to perform a 
priori classification of the degree of financial constraint. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) argue 
that the variable that measures financial constraint should contain exogenous variables. The 
SA index can cope with time-varying changes. The SA index formula is as follows 
 
    (4.10) 
 
Where  is size of the firm I at time t, and  measures the firm’s age.  Size is defined as a 
natural logarithm of assets, or the natural logarithm of sales/turnover, while age is defined as 
the number of years since incorporation. The sample is divided into mutually exclusive 
groups with the use of tertiles in which the top of the sample is financially constrained and 
the bottom financially unconstrained. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) used a cut-off point at 95% 
for both variables. They argued that below the cut-off, the relationship between age and size 
is quadratic and non-monotonic, but when applying the cut-off, the relation between age and 









4.3.3 Model Specification 
Investment Equation 
According to neoclassical theory, investment can be defined as a process of optimal capital 
stock adjustment by having the cost of capital and technology as input and determinant of 
investment as output (Jorgensen, 1963; Hall and Jorgenson, 1967). Regarding the relationship 
between investment and cash flow, this theory also predicts that the current financial 
performance, proxied by cash flow, should have no influence on investment (Coad, 2010).  
 
As an alternative to the neoclassical theory, Q theory is also considered as one of the 
dominant theories of investment. The Q theory argues that the level of investment should be 
determined by future returns. Assuming that stock returns can be used as indicators of future 
returns, then the investment can be determined by the firm’s marginal Q (i.e., the market 
value/book value of an asset).  
 
In this chapter, I rely on the reduced-form investment model to identify the difference in 
investment behavior across groups of firms. Two different models in line with the existing 
literature will be estimated. The model 1, I include leverage and its interaction with cash flow 





   










Following the work of Almedia and Campello (2007), I also include tangibility and its 
interaction term with cash flow in Model 2 to check for consistency in patterns of investment 
(see Model 2). 
Model 2 
   
   
  
                   +                                                                                                     
 
To measure the impact of the financial crisis in late 2008 until 2009, I also add the dummy of 
a crisis year and an interaction term between the dummy crisis and some independent 







                                       
Definitions of Variables Used  
 
Investment: The dependent variable is measured as a ratio between fixed assets and the total 
value of capital stock (I/K). Addition to fixed assets is calculated as the difference between 
the book value of tangible of fixed assets at the end of year t and end of year t-1 plus 










perpetual inventory formula (Blundell et al., 1992). Tangible fixed assets are used as the 
historic value of capital stock. By assuming that the replacement cost and historic cost are the 
same in the first year for each firm, I apply the following formula: 
 
                                                                                                              
 
where  is the depreciation rate, which I assume to be constant at 5.5 % for all firms, and 
represents the price of investment goods, which I proxy with the implicit deflator for gross 
fixed capital formation.  
 
Cash Flow: Cash flow is used as standard proxy for a firm’s internal net worth. It is defined 
as the ratio of profit after tax plus depreciation to capital stock (CF/K). I may expect that the 
estimated coefficient of cash flow for constrained firms is higher than the coefficient for 
unconstrained firms.  
 
Sales: Sales are calculated as ratio of lagged sales to capital (Lagged S/K). As suggested by 
FHP (1988), a substantial part of investment cash flow study is to add investment opportunity 
variables to capture investment opportunities.   
 
Leverage: As suggested by Whited (1992), debt policies may play an important role as a 
proxy for market imperfection. The existing literature states that firms with relatively high 
leverage are expected to have more difficulty in obtaining external financing. This is 
calculated as ratio of total liabilities to total assets (total liabilities/total assets). An interaction 











Tangibility: This is calculated as the ratio of total tangible assets to total assets (Hovakimian, 
2009). An interaction term between tangibility and cash flow was also added to the 
investment equation.  
 
Dummy Crisis Year: A dummy variable was created to capture the effects of financial crisis 
on investment cash flow sensitivity for SMEs in the UK 
Selection Equation 
The likelihood of a firm being constrained is endogenously determined for each year. The 
selection equation contains multiple variables to determine the variable that proxies the 
severity of the informational and agency problem. I include variables that have already been 
described in section 4.2, such as firm size, age, sales growth, tangibility, and profit margin to 
indicate leverage. 
Selection Equation  
 
                                               
 
Variable Description 
Size: I calculate size as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets (Titman and Wessels, 
1988). According to the static trade-off theory, the cost of financial distress represents the 
probability of bankruptcy. It is assumed that large firms are less likely to default because 










Age: Age is calculated as the natural logarithm of number of years according to each firm’s 
incorporation date (Hall et al., 2004). As a firm survives and grows, the market assesses the 
firm’s capability and the firm may increase the use of leverage to support its growing 
business.  
 
Tangibility: This is calculated as the ratio of total tangible assets to total assets (Hovakimian, 
2009; Chittenden et al., 1996; Michaelas et al., 1999). An interaction term between tangibility 
and cash flow was also added to the investment equation. 
 
Sales Growth: Sales growth is calculated as the percentage increase of sales turnover (Hall et 
al., 2004). Current sales growth and lagged sales growth are included in the model to 
determine the opportunity for investment growth. 
 
Profit Margin: Profit margin is the ratio of profit after tax to sales turnover (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). According to pecking order theory, SMEs are more willing to use their 














4.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Balance sheets and income statements were extracted from the FAME dataset published for a 
large sample of UK SMEs over the period of 2003–2011. This dataset included information 
from unquoted and unlisted firms. According to the standard OECD definition, a small 
medium firm is as a firm with less than 250 full-time equivalent employees, total assets of 
less than €45,000,000, and a turnover of less than €50,000,000.  Based on 2007 SIC 
classifications, I excluded some firms from the financial sector.  
 
The final dataset consisted of 7,185 firms from the years 2003–2011 from a total of 35,136 
observed firms. Only active firms are considered in the empirical test to avoid possible 
survival bias.  Outliers were removed from the dataset by trimming the highest and lowest 
1% from the distribution of key variables. This is a standard procedure in the literature on 
financial constraints (Bond et al., 2003; Bhagat et al., 2005; Cummins et al., 2006).  
 
Table 4.1 reports the means and standard deviation of some key variables for all regression 
variables, while Table 4.2 presents the correlation matrix among key variables used in the 
estimation across the two firm groups—those with high leverage levels and those with low 
leverage levels. In general, low-levered firms have higher sales growth and profitability; 
however, low-levered firms also have lower levels of investment than high-levered firms. As 
expected, investment and cash flow have a positive correlation, while interestingly; size and 
investment had a negative correlation, which indicates that small firms had more investment 











Table 4.1 Summary statistics of key variables for low and high-levered firms 
 
This table displays summary statistics for the groups of low- and high-levered firms. Investment is 
calculated as the ratio of investment to capital. Cash flow is estimated as the ratio of cash flow to capital. 
Sales were calculated as the ratio of a firm’s turnover to capital. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt 
over total assets. The natural logarithm of total assets was used as a proxy for firm size. Tangibility is the 
ratio of tangible fixed assets over total assets; sales growth is the percentage increase/decrease in sales 
between the two periods; the profit margin is the ratio of profit after tax to total sales. 
 
Firm Classification Variable Number of 
Observations 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Low-Levered Firms 
(Unconstrained) 
Investment 12,612 0.7912 3.3203 
Cash Flow 12,612 2.2623 10.2564 
Sales 12,612 56.8038 251.9401 
Leverage 12,612 0.0632 0.0618 
Size 12,612 8.6388 0.9460 
Age 12,612 3.1008 0.6996 
Tangibility 12,612 0.2728 0.2217 
Sales Growth 12,612 0.4224 10.1196 




Investment 22,524 1.0047 3.6985 
Cash Flow 22,524 5.3157 17.9927 
Sales 22,524 108.2963 310.9499 
Leverage 22,524 0.7430 2.1247 
Size 22,524 8.3204 1.3625 
Age 22,524 3.0030 0.7181 
Tangibility 22,524 0.2067 0.2398 
Sales Growth 22,524 0.1845 8.7885 













Table 4.2 Correlation matrix of key variables 
 
No Variables Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Investment 1               
2 Cash Flow 0.7077 1             
3 Sales 0.6868 0.6556 1           
4 Leverage 0.0125 -0.0158 0.0003 1         
5 Size -0.0854 -0.0832 -0.0672 -0.1177 1       
6 Tangibility 0.0232 0.0045 0.0011 -0.0371 0.133 1     
7 Sales Growth 0.5224 -0.0049 -0.0052 -0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 1   
8 Profit 
Margin 
0.0046 0.0544 0.0049 -0.0502 0.0244 -0.0028 -0.0179 1 
 
The tangibility level had a negative relationship with leverage, which indicate that as a firm 
gets larger, it will invest less in tangible fixed assets. This may be because small firms 
commit to investing more in tangible fixed assets, and as the firms become larger, the level of 













4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 The Effects of Leverage on Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity 




Table 4.3a Selection Equations 
 Regimes Selection Variables Model 1 Model 2  
 
Coeff Std.err Coeff Std.err 
Size 0.3172*** 0.0024 0.3261*** 0.0024 
Age -0.1265*** 0.0038 -0.1494*** 0.0038 
Tangibility 2.2547*** 0.0108 2.7046*** 0.0108 
Sales Growth 0.2212*** 0.004 0.0751*** 0.0022 
Lagged Sales  Growth -0.0023*** 0.0003 0.0051*** 0.0003 
Profit Margin -0.0676*** 0.0043 -0.1375*** 0.006 
Constant -2.5109*** 0.079 -2.1779*** 0.0792 
     
Model P-Value (Likelihood Ratio Test) 0.000 0.000   
This table gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our two switching regression models (investment equations 
4.11 and 4.12 along with the selection equation 4.15). The selection equation determines a firm's likelihood of being in a 
constrained or unconstrained regime. The dependent variable in the selection equation is coded 1 for the unconstrained 
investment regime and 0 for the constrained one. A positive coefficient of any selection variable indicates that firms with 
higher values of that particular variable are more likely to be in the unconstrained regime and vice versa. P-values of the 
models reject the null hypothesis that a single investment regime is sufficient to describe the data. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively. 
 




Table 4.3 gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of the switching regression model.  
The selection model determines the likelihood of a firm being in a constrained or 
unconstrained regime. The dependent variable in the selection equation is coded 1 for the 
unconstrained investment regime and otherwise 0, as explained in the methodology section. 
The observed leverage ratios below the 50th percentile were coded 1 for unconstrained firms 
and 0 for constrained firms. This is relevant to the theory that the degree of financial 








A classification of dependent variables is needed to make the initial guess required by the 
switchr package. The package creates its own classification vector based on the selection 
variables in the Z vector equation. As can be found in the selection equation, a positive 
coefficient of any selection variables indicates that firms with a high value of that particular 
variable are more likely to be in financially unconstrained regimes.  
 
The results suggest that size has a significant and positive effect on leverage (H4.1 is 
supported). Outside investors often see size as a proxy to determine a firm’s debt capacity; 
therefore, large firms should have a greater debt capacity. Large firms also have less 
difficulty in obtaining external funding because large firms usually have lower transaction 
costs due to accuracy and transparency. However, age has a negative effect on leverage, 
which indicates that older firms use less leverage (H4.1 is not supported). The most plausible 
explanation is that because older firms usually already have stable business, they rely more 
on internal funds. 
 
Profitability and lagged sales growth have a negative and significant effect on leverage (H4.3 
and H4.5 are supported). High-growth firms and profitable firms tend to use their internal 
funds rather than look for external financing. The results also confirmed that pecking order 
theory may explain the capital structure choice of SMEs in the UK. Leverage and tangibility 
















Constrained Regime Unconstrained Regime 
Coefficient St. dev Coefficient St. dev 
Cash Flow 0.2555*** 0.0159 0.0277*** 0.0119 
Lagged Sales 0.0009*** 0.0004 0.0086*** 0.0006 
Leverage  -0.6863*** 0.2774      0.0145 0.0155 
Leverage x CashFlow      0.0744 0.0468      -0.0007 0.0029 
Two different estimation result for each regimes demonstrate how different the investment behaviour across the 
two regimes. Industrial dummy and year dummy are also included in the model.  ***, ** and * indicate 




Table 4.3b shows the estimation results of the main regression of the regime-specific 
investment equation that was derived simultaneously with the selection equation. The results 
show the investment behavior between constrained and unconstrained regimes. The 
coefficient of cash flow and lagged sales are positive in both regimes. As can be seen from 
the results, both regimes show positive and significant effects of cash flow on investment; 
however, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is larger in the constrained regime than 
in the unconstrained regime. This indicates that financially constrained firms are more 
sensitive to internal fund. The coefficient of lagged sales is positive in the two regimes 
because for firms to have better investment opportunities in the future, they are expected to 
invest more.  
 
Investment cash flow sensitivity for financially unconstrained firms was discovered to 
increase with the leverage level as opposed to decrease as it does in constrained firms. More 
interestingly, those unconstrained firms have no or little response to leverage levels. The 
results indicate that unconstrained firms may have more advantage in using debt than 








unconstrained firms as firms that have low leverage, this indicates that those unconstrained 
firms have not reach their maximum capacity. They are able to get more external financing 
because outside investors may perceive that these firms have less risk of bankruptcy. Higher 
leverage makes the agency conflict more severe and prevents managers from making optimal 
financing and investment decisions.  
 
When tangibility was added to the estimate (See Table 4.3c), it revealed a positive and 
significant effect on cash flow and investment for both unconstrained and constrained firms; 
however, the constrained firms were affected to greater degree. However, leverage for both 
regimes becomes negative and does not significantly affect investment. As expected, 
tangibility has a negative significance for constrained firms, which indicates the impact of 
tangibility on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow when a firm is severely financially 
constrained 
 
Table 4.3c Investment equations–model 2  
 
Model 1 
Constrained Regime Unconstrained Regime 
Coefficient St. dev Coefficient St. dev 
Cash Flow 0.2464*** 0.0181 0.0231*** 0.0107 
Lagged Sales 0.0024*** 0.0006 0.0066*** 0.0007 
Leverage  -0.4987* 0.3000    -0.0031 0.0087 
Leverage x Cash Flow -0.0525 0.034 -0.0054*** 0.0017 
Tangibility 4.2765*** 0.8477 0.1634*** 0.0632 
Tangibility x Cash Flow 1.1229*** 0.2937 0.2062*** 0.0354 
Two different estimation results for each regime demonstrate the different investment behavior across the two 
regimes. The industrial dummy and year dummy were also included in the model. ***, **, and * indicate 












4.5.2 Ex-Ante Standard Regression 
 
Table 4.4 Investment cash flow sensitivity and leverage: Ex-ante constraint selection 
 
Dependent Variable Independent Variables R2 N 
Investment Cash Flow Lagged Sales Leverage  Leverage x Cash Flow 
1. Firm Size       
 Constrained Firms 0.192*** 0.068*** 0.128 -0.0936*** 0.311 8,945 
  (0.004) (0.0002) (0.086) (0.0114)   
 Unconstrained Firms 0.0711** 0.00310*** 0.0407 -1.15e-06 0.182 7,475 
  (0.00289) (0.000154) (0.0272) (0.00142)   
        
2. Firm Age       
 Constrained Firms 0.149*** 0.000184*** 0.0353 -0.00263 0.286 8,698 
  (0.00318) (3.21e-05) (0.0472) (0.00237)   
 Unconstrained Firms 0.0587*** 0.000293*** 0.0467 -0.00376* 0.078 7,722 
  (0.00299) (6.09e-05) (0.0331) (0.00197)   
        
3. Firm Risk (Quiscore) 
 Constrained Firms 0.148*** 0.000118*** -0.215*** 0.0321*** 0.393 9,760 
  (0.00270) (3.30e-05) (0.0442) (0.00378)   
 Unconstrained Firms 0.0342*** 0.000159*** 0.0525** -0.00262** 0.038 6,660 
  (0.00323) (3.70e-05) (0.0244) (0.00116)   
        
4. SA Index       
 Constrained Firms 0.168*** 0.000122*** -0.0223 0.00554 0.350 6,738 
  (0.00367) (3.16e-05) (0.0584) (0.00591)   
 Unconstrained Firms 0.0753*** 0.000319*** 0.0600 -0.00292 0.110 9,682 
  (0.00275) (5.53e-05) (0.0274) (0.00135)   




Table 4.4 presents the estimation results using the a priori classification scheme. As in our 
previous estimation results, each of the regression results show that for unconstrained firms, 








flow has a positive and significant effect on investment; however, the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficient is larger in constrained regimes than in unconstrained regimes. The 
interaction between cash flow and leverage attracts a negative sign. The results are fully 
consistent with the statement that high leverage can increase a firm’s probability of default; it 
can also induce restricted access to external funds (Cleary, 2002). 
 
4.5.3 Financial Crisis and Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity 
Table 4.5 Investment cash flow sensitivity and leverage: Dummy crisis 
 
Table 4.5a Selection equation 
 
Coeff Std. Err 
Size 0.3702*** 0.0024 
Age -0.1985*** 0.0037 
Tangibility 2.5730*** 0.0106 
Sales Growth 0.0417*** 0.0017 
Lagged Sales Growth 0.0059*** 0.0003 
Profit Margin -0.3020*** 0.0070 
Constant -0.0492*** 0.0589 
Model P-Value (Likelihood Ratio Test)  0.0000 
This table gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our two switching regression models (investment equations 
4.13 along with the selection equation 4.15. The selection equation determines a firm's likelihood of being in a 
constrained or unconstrained regime. The dependent variable in the selection equation is coded 1 for the unconstrained 
investment regime and 0 for the constrained one. A positive coefficient of any selection variable indicates that firms with 
higher values of that particular variable are more likely to be in the unconstrained regime and vice versa. P-values of the 
models reject the null hypothesis that a single investment regime is sufficient to describe the data. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively. 
   To see the effects of crisis in the model, I add dummy increase variables into the estimation. 
As expected, investment cash flow sensitivity is larger for constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms. Tangibility shows little response to investment for unconstrained firms; 
however, the effect of tangibility on constrained firms is quite significant and has a large 
magnitude. Interestingly, the dummy crisis shows no effect on investment for both 
constrained and unconstrained groups. The results confirm that SMEs tend to survive during 











Table 4.5b Investment equation with dummy financial crisis 
 
  Model 1 
Constrained Regime Unconstrained Regime 
Coefficient St. Dev Coefficient St. Dev 
Cash Flow 0.1863*** 0.0231 0.0515*** 0.0098 
Lagged Sales 0.0049*** 0.0008 0.0021*** 0.0003 
Leverage  0.5380 0.9490 0.0314 0.0172 
Leverage x Cash Flow -0.0782** 0.0413 -0.0052*** 0.0018 
Tangibility -3.8978*** 1.3216 -0.1757*** 0.0538 
Tangibility x Cash Flow 0.9490 0.2285 0.2519*** 0.0328 
Dummy Crisis 1.2631 0.9648 -0.0035 0.0553 
Dummy Crisis * Cash Flow -0.0653*** 0.0227 0.0175 0.0173 
Dummy Crisis * Leverage 1.2860 2.6177 -0.0319*** 0.0147 
Dummy Crisis * Tangibility -4.0917*** 1.5987 0.0232 0.0812 
Two separate investment equations assessed how different firm investment behavior differed across the two regimes. The 
investment equations are estimated by sector and year dummies and clustering by company. ***, ** and, * to indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 4.6 Investment cash flow sensitivity and leverage: Before and after crisis 
 
 
Table 4.6a Selection equations 
 
 Regimes Selection 
Variables 
Before crisis After crisis 
 
Coeff Std.err Coeff Std.err 
Size 0.2850*** 0.0021 0.4584*** 0.0049 
Age 0.0660*** 0.0032 -0.1549*** 0.0083 
Tangibility 5.1838*** 0.0096 2.1150*** 0.0205 
Sales Growth 0.0108*** 0.0013 0.0396*** 0.0031 
Lagged Sales  Growth -0.1224*** 0.0006 0.0048*** 0.0005 
Profit Margin 0.6832*** 0.0036 0.2174*** 0.0101 
Constant -5.2522*** 0.0503 -4.2017*** 0.1250 
This table gives the maximum likelihood estimation results of our two switching regression models (investment equations 
4.11 along with the selection equation 4.15). The selection equation determines a firm's likelihood of being in a constrained 
or unconstrained regime. The dependent variable in the selection equation is coded 1 for the unconstrained investment 
regime and 0 for the constrained one. A positive coefficient of any selection variable indicates that firms with higher values 
of that particular variable are more likely to be in the unconstrained regime and vice versa. P-values of the models reject the 
null hypothesis that a single investment regime is sufficient to describe the data. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10%, level respectively 









As a robustness check, I provided separate regression results for before and after the crisis 
(Table 4.6). Table 4.6a presents the estimation results of the selection equation before and 
after the 2009 crisis in the UK. The only significant difference is the effect of age on a firm’s 
leverage. Younger firms tend to have more leverage after a crisis period, whereas older firms 
tend to have more leverage before the crisis. According to pecking order theory, as firms get 
older, they gain more leverage because of increased creditworthiness; however, a higher 
leverage level will also increase the agency problem between owners and the lenders. After a 
crisis period, younger firms tend to have more leverage, as can be seen from the negative and 
significant effects of age on leverage. Older firms tend to be more careful in getting external 
loans after a crisis period due to the higher possibility default. 
 
 




Constrained Regime Unconstrained Regime 
Coefficient St.Dev Coefficient St.Dev 
Cash Flow 0.3592 *** 0.0263  0.0361*** 0.0140  
Lagged Sales 0.0018***  0.0006  0.0062***  0.0009  
Leverage  -0.1967  0.1251  0.0434  0.0289  
Leverage x CashFlow 0.1280***  0.0358  -0.0008  0.0029  
Tangibility -0.1877  0.1415  0.5903***  0.1531  
Tangibility  X CashFlow -0.2656**  0.1361  0.1457***  0.0540  
 
After Crisis 
Constrained Regime Unconstrained Regime 
Coefficient St.Dev Coefficient St.Dev 
Cash Flow 0.2444*** 0.0154 0.0056 0.0177 
Lagged Sales 0.0013*** 0.0006 0.0076*** 0.0008 
Leverage  0.7303*** 0.1653 -0.0323 0.0252 
Leverage x CashFlow 0.0421 0.0591 -0.0151 0.0104 
Tangibility -3.7524*** 0.6649 0.2065*** 0.0894 
Tangibility  X CashFlow -0.1092*** 0.0647 -0.0555 0.1594 
Two separate investment equations assess how different the firm investment behaviour across the two regimes before and 
after crisis at year 2009. The investment equations are estimated with sector and year dummies and clustering by company. 










Table 4.6b above presents the main investment models before and after the crisis period. For 
any condition, cash flow has a positive effect on investment; however, the magnitude of the 
effect of cash flow on investment for constrained firms and unconstrained firms after the 
crisis is much smaller than the magnitude of the effect of this variable before the crisis period 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents a new perspective to the existing literature by suggesting a new 
approach to the impact of capital market imperfection on the investment behavior of SMEs in 
the UK. By using unbalanced panel data that consisted of 7,185 firms, I use the methods 
described in Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) and Almeida and Campello (2007) to estimate a 
model that incorporates the factors that reflect the severity of financial constraints in the main 
equation. In this chapter, I consider leverage to be the factor that reflects the severity of 
financial constraint. I assume that firms with a high level of leverage to be constrained firms. 
By using data from SMEs in the UK, I also present different findings because many studies 
on this subject have used large firms and quoted firms rather than SMEs. 
 
I employed not only the switching regression model, but also baseline regression by using a 
priori classification. The results show that financially constrained firms’ investment is more 
sensitive to measures of internal financing. Meanwhile, leverage has a more significant effect 
for constrained firms. Our results also suggest a non-monotonic effect of leverage on cash 
flow sensitivity, as can be seen by the decreasing level of leverage for constrained firms and 









The chapter provides important alternative solutions to the controversial issues about the role 
of cash flow in investment behavior. This study also provides an important resolution to 
highly debated issues in FHP (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997). By incorporating 
leverage into the main equation, I may conclude that higher investment cash flow sensitivity 
for financially constrained firms is not solely generated because of a measurement error 
issue; I can see that the magnitude of investment cash flow sensitivity decreases with a higher 
level of leverage. By applying the switching regression model, the results are free from ex-
ante classification bias, because the groups of constrained and unconstrained firms are 
endogenously classified by model. I can also state that investment cash flow sensitivity can 

































CHAPTER 5 INVESTMENT CASH FLOW SENSITIVITY (ICFS), CASH-CASH 
FLOW SENSITIVITY AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT: CROSS COUNTRY 
EVIDENCE 
5.1 Introduction 
The empirical measurement of financial constraint can be traced back to the seminal work by 
FHP (1988) that investigated the relationship between investment and cash flow by 
estimating the investment equations as a function of firm’s investment opportunity and cash 
flow.  FHP (1998) argued that in particular the investment decisions of firms that are more 
financially constrained are more sensitive to the availability of internal cash flows than firms 
that are less constrained.  Therefore, the financial constrained firms will display a positive 
and significant relationship between investment and cash flow, while unconstrained firms 
will not have a positive   propensity to use cash flow to fund the investment.  
 
Since then, many empirical and theoretical researches have been done to test and question the 
linkage between investment and cash flow. The most well known study by Kaplan and 
Zingales (hereafter KZ, 1997) provided some contradictory result. They find that least 
financially constraint firms also have greater investment cash flow sensitivity. They re-
examine the relationship between cash flows and investment by using the sample of low 
dividend firms and find that financially constrained firms have the lowest sensitivity 
compared to the other groups.   
 
Cleary (1999) also confirmed KZ’s finding that least financially constrained firms also 








investment and cash flow is still can be found even though a firm does not face a financing 
constraint condition. Another researches by Moyen (2004) even found a result that supports 
both FHP (1988) and KZ (1997) by using different criteria to classify firms into constrained 
group and unconstrained groups. By using data from cross-countries, Cleary (2006) found 
that constrained firms have lower investment cash flow sensitivity than unconstrained firms. 
As Alternative to the Investment cash flow sensitivity (ICFS), Almeida, Campello and 
Weisbach (2004) presented the cash-cash flow sensitity  (CCFS). According to CCFS, 
Financially constrained firms can be identified by the firm’s propensity to save cash. Those 
Financially constrained firms would save more cash to finance its future profitable 
investment. However, for the unconstrained firms, they will be able to raise external finance 
needed to finance the future investment.  
 
I use the data from Amadeus, A commercial database provided by Bureau Van Dijk over 
period 2004-2013.  The database has up to 10 years historical data across 38 European 
countries. I select the data from 14 European countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherland and Sweden. The final dataset consist of 7,341 firms over year 2004-2013, which 
covers 48,193 observations with 8,734 firms in 14 European countries. This chapter basically 
attempts to see the Investment cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) on cross-country level of analysis 
and the time-series variation, moreover I also would like to see the effect of financial 
development on this ICFS. As alternative, I also provide the estimation result using cash-cash 
flow sensitivity as alternative cash flow sensitivities as suggested by Almeida and Campello 









Accordance with the main objectives of the thesis, this chapter basically analyzes the degree 
of financial constraint by using indirect measurement by using cross-country data. The main 
novelty of this empirical research is by using the cross-country data and adds the financial 
development in each country that may have an impact on level of financial constraint, which 
is proxied by the ICFS or any othe4 indirect measurement.  
 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follow. Section 5.2 presents a brief literature review of 
financial constraint and investment, with specific emphasis on unlisted firms. Section 5.3 
presents the estimation framework and present empirical model to be tested in the paper. 
Section 5.4 describes the data used in this study and provides the descriptive statistics of the 
sample data. Section 5.5 provides some empirical result and section 5.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Hierarchy of Finance  
Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem stated that under the perfect and complete market as 
assumptions, a firm’s investment decisions are independent from the financing sources. 
However, later studies find that the market imperfections that was caused by agency cost, 
information asymmetry and transaction cost will make cost of capital from external sources, 
debt or equity, higher than the cost of capital from internal sources of financing (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Myers and Majluf, 1984).   
 
External financing will be more costly than internally generated funds, thus financially 
constrained firms will rely on their internal fund to invest in any profitable projects.  The 








expensive external finance. Firms will follow the “Pecking order hypothesis” when financing 
the new investment by using internal finance first and then followed by issuing debt and 
finally will use equity as the last sources of financing. Therefore, the internal finance could 
be an important determinant of firm’s investment.  
 
 
Figure 5.1 The hierarchy of finance without debt finance 
Source: Bond and Meghir (1994 
 
Bond & Meghir (1994) illustrated the condition when firm do not have access to debt 
financing and only rely on retained earnings and new shares as can be seen in figure 4.1. The 
required rate of return  represent the cost of internal funds, while  shows the cost of 
finance from issuing new shares. Assuming I have three different possible investment 
opportunities relating to the required rate of return as can be seen in the downward sloping 
line    and . 
 
The investment level  can be assumed as the point where the maximum level of investment 
can be financed by internal funds. When the investment level is lower than as can be 
illustrated in curve , then the firm will be able to finance its desired investment from the 








investment is not affected by the volatility of internal cash flow. If the firm has relatively 
large profitable investment opportunities (See  curve), then it would be sensible to use new 
share despite having the extra cost of issuing the external fund.  At this point, the level of 
firm’s investment is not affected by the changes in internal funds.  
 
The investment opportunity line  illustrates the condition where financial constraint affects 
the firm’s investment. The firm has quite profitable investment at ’, but the level of 
investment is bigger than the maximum level of investment at . Any point above the 
investment level   is not so attractive enough for issuing new shares. Therefore, the firm’s 
investment is constrained to the level   that can be financed by the internal fund.  When there 
is an increase in internal funds, the line would shift from  to ’ which indicating that there is 
a shifting of maximum investment that can be financed internally.  
 
According to pecking order theory, the firm prefers to use internal financing, but when the 
external financing is required, the firm will issue the safest external fund. That is, by issuing 
external debt before issuing new external equity as the last resort. Figure 4.2 illustrates the 
condition when I incorporate the debt finance into hierarchy of finance by assuming that the 
cost of borrowing will increase with the risk of default and the amount borrowed. The level 
of investment  still represent the maximum level of investment that can be financed by 
internal fund. For the firm with curve  and , the implications are remain the same. The 
firm with curve  may use debt as well as retained earnings, while the firm with curve  











Figure 5.2 The hierarchy of finance with debt finance 
Source: Bond and Meghir (1994) 
For the firm with curve  may increase the investment level to  by issuing new debt to the 
extent that the cost of fund is worth enough given the required rate of investment. When the 
investment shift from  to  that occur when there is a rise in internal finance, the 
investment level is still restricted by the availability of internal finance, even though the firm 
now have access to get external debt financing.  The debt finance would eliminate financial 
constraint in investment if only the firm has access to debt finance with the same required 
rate of return on using internal finance. In this case, the classic Modigliani-Miller (1958) 
holds when the firm financial structure does not affect the investment.  
 
5.2.2 Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theorem argued that under the perfect and complete market, a 
firm’s investment decisions are independent of its financial structure. The model assumes that 
there is symmetric information, no agency or transaction costs associated with the debt-equity 
mix. However, later studies dropped this assumption and argued that the market 
imperfections caused by agency costs, information asymmetry and transaction cost will make 








internal sources of financing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984).  External financing, incorporating such costs, will be more expensive than 
internally generated funds. Thus financially constrained firms will rely on internal funds to 
invest in profitable projects. Additionally, firms that have high asymmetric information will 
also be more sensitive to internal funds, other things equal. Therefore, it is important to 
include a measure of internal funds in a model of the firm’s investment in the presence of 
financial market imperfections.   
 
Many studies have been conducted to test whether the availability of internal funds may 
affect the firm’s investment behaviour. However, despite extensive research, the explanation 
of investment behaviour has not been settled yet. Thus, researchers have started to improve 
and try various empirical model specifications by modifying the fundamental underlying 
assumption. Later studies also try to investigate whether the presence of market imperfections 
also implies that the investment decisions of the firms are also influenced by the existence of 
financial constraints.  
 
FHP (1988) first adopted an empirical methodology to study the link between investment, 
cash flows and financial constraint by using sample from US manufacturing firms. The study 
suggests that the investment decisions of firms that are more financially constrained are more 
sensitive to the availability of internal cash flows. The methodology involves splitting the 
sample into sub-samples, according to suitable theoretical priors that characterize constrained 
and unconstrained firms (i.e., criteria that serve as proxies for capital market imperfections 









Several reasons why cash flows can be a good predictor of firm’s investment may be because 
of firm cannot predict the future and prefer to base their investment based on current-period 
indicator and firm become carefully depend on external financing (Coad, 2010), or maybe 
because managers are reluctant to distribute dividend and spend cash flow on investment 
(Jensen, 1986).  However, FHP gave interpretation that any sensitivity of investment to cash 
flows is due to financial constraint.  
 
One limitation of FHP study is the choice of sample. Their final sample consist of listed large 
firms in US stock market and found that smaller firms should be the subject to a financial 
constraint. They stated that “only the largest and most mature firms are likely to face a 
smoothly increasing loan interest rate...during period of tight credit, small medium sized 
borrowers are often denied loans in favour of good quality borrower” (FHP 1988, p.153). The 
policy implication of FHP findings that can be established to increase the investment 
opportunities for financially constrained firms is by offering assistance to those financially 
constrained firms.  In later years, many studies are conducted by referring to FHP study 
(Whited, 2006), some of them support the FHP findings (Bond and Meghir, 1994; Gilchrist 
and Himmelberg, 1995)  but there are also some studies contradicts their findings ( Kaplan 
and Zingales, 1997, Cleary, 1999). 
 
One of the extensive critics for FHP model was provided Kaplan and Zingales (1997).  This 
study uses a formal framework that accounts for firm type (by using an exogenously 
determined indicator for the cost of internal capital) and argue that an investment-cash flow 
sensitivity measure of financing constraints may be flawed. Moreover, the findings show that 
when firms are split according to size and earnings retention policy, investment in firms that 








constrained firms. KZ suggest that, if the relationship between investment and internal 
finance is not presence, then the observed sensitivity may be due to non-optimizing 
management behavior or excessive managerial conservatism. In general, a firm is defined to 
be financially constraint if a windfall increase in the supply of internal funds results in a 
higher level of investment spending. KZ also present the theoretical model to show that any 
sensitivity of investment to cash flows should not be interpreted as evidence of financial 
constraints. 
 
In order to empirically test financial constraint and investment behavior, it is crucial 
important to accurately measure firm’s investment opportunities. I need to fully control the 
investment opportunities, so that the significance of cash flow is not reflecting future 
profitability but the effect of information problems. Moreover, I also need have challenge to 
measure financial constraint in order to split sample into financially constrained firms and not 
financially constrained firms. Selecting a proper proxy that reflecting the level of information 
asymmetry faced by firms is not an easy task. Empirical evidence show that size, age, 
dividend policy and affiliation to industry groups are some good proxies, however the 
usefulness of these proxies is not robust and they tend to present different findings across 
datasets and countries. The existing literature of investment cash flow sensitivity identifies 
three empirical models of investment: The Q model, Euler model and the error correction 
model. The detail explanation of both models will be discussed in the next section.  
5.2.2.1 Empirical Model of ICFS 
One of the first empirical models in investment is the accelerator model (as used by Hobdari 
et al., 2010), which explains investment using current and lag changes of sales growth. 








dynamic investment model, which is developed by introducing the convex adjustment cost of 
capital into neoclassical investment model.  According to the Q theory, no other variables 
including financial variables such as cash flow should be a significant determinant of 
investment. If the cash flow is statistically significant, I then may interpret it as evidence for 
financial constraint.  It is very important to use sample splitting criteria then I would expect 
that firms that are classified as financially constrained firms to have a positive and significant 
cash flow coefficient and the non-financially constrained firms will have no significant cash 
flow coefficient.  
 
Early research on investment cash flow sensitivity use the Q-model to test the hypothesis of 
the financial constraint. This model uses some proxies for investment opportunities that have 
been proposed in the literature, the model try to test whether the remaining cash flow effect 
after controlling for the investment opportunities can be considered as an adequate proxy 
measure the existence of financial constraint. However, the widely knows investment 
opportunities proxies, such as Tobin’s Q and fundamental Q cannot be used for unlisted firms 
because the market values are not commonly available, therefore I need to identify different 
proxies for investment opportunities that can be used to test Investment cash flow sensitivity 




























                                                                                      (5.1)
 
         
 
Where tiI ,  is the level of investment of firm i at time t, whereas tiK , is the value of invested 








tiCF , represent firm i’s cash flows at time t.  is expected to be positive and significant to 
reflect that a rise in future profitability should be followed by an increase in investment.  is 
also expected to be positive and significant, then I may conclude that there is investment cash 
flow sensitivity. 
 
The main advantage of the Q model is that result is more informative because it is uses some 
information from the capital market. However, when using the Q model to analyse the 
investment cash flow sensitivity for unlisted firms, I need to find another proxies that 
represent the expected value of future profitability.  Some existing researches on unlisted and 
small firms use sales to capital ratio or sales growth as proxies for future profitability.  
 
Bond and Meghir (1994) presented the Euler equation model as an alternative methodology 
to assess the investment cash flow sensitivity. The Euler equation model is derived under the 
idea that the error tern in the Euler equation reflects expectation error and should be 
orthogonal to available information.  Some studies prefer the Euler model since it does not 
rely on firm’s market value to measure expected profitability, therefore it can be used for 
unlisted firms which information problem is likely to be particularly severe. (Alti, 2003; 

















































































































where tiS , is the sales level of firm i at time t and tiD ,  total debt of firm i at the end of time t. 
Assuming there are capital market imperfections and the external supply of capital is upward 
sloping, 3 should be positive and statistically significant.  
 
As alternative to the Q model and Euler model, the error-correction model was introduced by 
Bean (1981). Basically the model tries to look for a long run or target capital stocks and it 
also allows the flexible specification of the dynamic adjustment. When I assume that the   
that the adjustment cost is not exist, the firm’s desired capital stock will follow this form: 
                                                       (5.3 ) 
 
 represents the logarithm of firm’s capital stock, represents the cost of capital and   
is the natural logarithm of sales .  is a firm-specific effect.  
 
When the adjustment costs is not absence, the firm will not be able to immediately adjust the 
capital stock to the desired target level. In this case, I may need to have a dynamic adjustment 
mechanism between the firm’s capita stock and firm’s sales (  and ) as an autoregressive 
distributed model with lags. So that equation (5.3) will be nested as a long run equilibrium 
model.  
 
Empirical studies from Bond et al (2003) and Guariglia (2008) used the Error correction 
model.  Basically, when I attempt to empirically test the financial constraint, I need to 
augment the basic empirical specification of error-correction model with the cash flow to 
capital ratio. Moreover, to see the differential effect of the cash flow on different type of firm, 
I also need to add some dummy variable that capture the degree of financial constraint 








variable. For unconstrained firms, the coefficient of cash flow variable is expected to be small 
and insignificant, while I expect the significant coefficient for constrained firms.  
 
5.2.2.2 Financial Development and ICFS 
King and Levine (1993), using data on 80 countries for the period of 1960-1989, examined 
whether higher levels of financial development are positively associated with economic 
growth by using four indicators of financial development to measure the services provided by 
financial intermediaries. The results indicated that higher levels of financial development are 
positively related with faster rates of economic growth, physical capital accumulation and 
economic efficiency.   
Meanwhile, the work carried out by Love (2003) investigated the effect and the role of 
financial development on investment decisions considering its effects on the degree of 
financial constraint. Using data from 40 countries for the period of 1988 to 1998, She found 
that the level of financial constraints lessens with higher financial development and small 
firms are at a disadvantage when compared to larger ones in economies with lower financial 
development.  
Khurana, Martin and Pereira (2006) investigated the role of financial development on firms‘ 
financial constraints. Using firm-level data for 35 countries and with information about 
12,782 firms for the period of 1994-2002, they examined the influence of financial 
development on the demand of firms for liquidity through an analysis on how financial 
development affects the sensitivity of cash holdings to firms‘ cash flows. The findings 
showed that financial development is related to firm‘s financial constraints because the 
sensitivity of firms‘ cash holdings to their cash flows decreases with financial markets 








development may relaxes the connection between internal resources and firm investment, by 
using firm level data from 38 European countries, they found that there is a positive and 
significant coefficient of cash flow on investment. They also found that the cash flow 
sensitivity of investment is lower in a country with better finance, which may suggest that 
investment is more likely to be constrained in countries with worse financial system.   
Although studies as mentioned above show that obstacles in credit markets are correlated 
with a country‘s financial development, there have been only few firm-level studies that 
investigate both the effect of financial development and financial structure on the level of 
firms‘ financial constraints, as pointed out by Baum, Schäfer and Talavera (2009). To 
overcome this issue Baum, Schäfer and Talavera (2009), using a sample of 80,000 firm-years 
from 1989 to 2006, tested how the financial system‘s structure and the development of 
financial markets influence firms‘ financial constraints. The authors estimated the firms‘ cash 
flow sensitivity of cash and found that a country‘s financial system, measured both by its 
financial structure and financial development, influences the cash flow sensitivity of cash of 
financially constrained firms but do not affect unconstrained ones. The findings also 
suggested that bank-based financial systems provide easier access to external financing for 
financially constrained firms and that both the structure of the financial system and its level 
of development play a crucial role in reducing firms‘ financial constraints.  
Therefore, given the scarce international literature about financial development and 
investment decisions under financial constraints, this chapter try to contribute to the literature 
by analyzing using cross-country data. Another issue arises when taking into account the 
financial system variable into investment cash flow sensitivity is about selecting the best 
financial development indicator that represent the condition of financial system in some 








condition are the ratio of domestic credit provided by the financial sector over GDP (%), the 
ratio of domestic credit to private sector over GDP (%) and the ratio of domestic credit to 
private sector by banks over GDP level of the countries (%).  
5.3 Model Specification 
5.3.1 Baseline Equation 
Most of studies of investment cash flow sensitivity is based in panels of listed firms. A very 
small number of studies focus on small business (Guagrilia, 2008; Becchetti et al., 2009).  
SMEs have unique characteristics because they are subject to more severe asymmetric 
information problems than large firms, particularly large quoted companies. This results in 
greater difficulties in getting external financing. Moreover SMEs also have lower borrowing 
capacity because of poor track record system and (being more frequently in the service 
industries) also have lower collateral value.  
 
However, focus on SMEs to assess the investment cash flow sensitivity could be challenging 
in a way I should find a suitable control variable for firm’s investment opportunities. Since 
market information is not available this makes it impossible to compute traditional proxies of 
investment opportunities. I estimate the investment cash flows sensitivity by using the 
Accelerator model as alternative to the Q model. I include the ratio of lagged sales to 
replacement value of capital stock as an independent variable in the investment equation.  It 





















































Where tiI ,  is the level of investment of firm i at time t, whereas tiK , is the value of invested 
asset for firm i at the end of time t , tiCF , represent firm i’s cash flows at time t and 1, tiS  is the 
value of sales of firm i at time t-1. The ratio of lagged sales to capital stock is designed to 
reflect the sales accelerator theory of investment and has been used as a determinant for 
investment in Hoshi et al (1991), Kadapakkam et al (1998) and Guariglia (2008).  I expect 
that 
2 >=0 to indicate that higher cash flows (internal funds) are a significant determinant of 
higher investment. The also expect 3 >=0 because an increase in firm’s sales should lead to 
an increase in firm’s investment.  
 
5.3.2 The Cash Cash-Flow Sensitivity  
By using the a perspective from demand for liquidity, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 
(2004) presented that financially constrained firms can be identified by the firm’s propensity 
to save cash.  If a firm were categorized as financially constrained firm, then this firm would 
save more cash to finance its future profitable investment. However, for the unconstrained 
firms, they will be able to raise external finance needed to finance the future investment. 
Therefore, I should expect the positive relationship between cash stock and cash-flow for 
constrained firm, hence I may conclude that the cash cash-flow sensitivity (hereafter CCFS) 
can be considered as alternative measure of financing constraint. (Almeida et al, 2004; 
Khurana et al, 2006; Baum et al, 2011).  Following Almeida et al (2004), the basic model of 
CCFS is as follow: 
 









Where  denotes the change in firm’s stock of cash over total asset,   represent 
cash flow divided by the total asset,  is the Tobin’s q and  contain control variables 
including size, source, demand and substitute of firm’s cash stock.  
 
The main advantages of this model is it is very easy to estimate and data is can be easily 
taken from the firm’s financial statement. However, the problem may arise when using a 
priori classification when classify firm into constrained and unconstrained groups, such as the 
endogeneity problem and estimation biases. When applying the model for unlisted firm, I 
also have to select carefully the proxy that represents the future opportunity investment.  
Some empirical papers have empirically test the validity of this measure.  For example, Pal 
and Ferrando (2010) found that all firms show positive and significant CCFS, meanwhile Lin 




















5.4 Data and Descriptive statistics 
Balance sheets and income statement for EU countries were taken from Amadeus, A 
commercial database provided by Bureau Van Dijk over period 2004-2013.  The database has 
up to 10 years historical data across 38 European countries. According to the standard OECD 
definition, a SME is defined as a firm with less than 250 full time equivalent employees, total 
asset less than €45,000,000 and turn over less than €50,000,000. Amadeus contains financial 
information on about 2.6 million private and publicly owned firms across euro area countries. 
Collecting standardized data received from vendors of each European country creates data. I 
select the data from EU zone, however I exclude a country with less than 100 observation. 
Finally, I only use data from 14 European countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherland and Sweden. The sample composition per country can be found in appendix E.  
 
Based on major industry classification, I exclude some firms from the financial sectors and 
service sectors. The list of major industry classification can be found in appendix C. The final 
dataset consist of 8,687 firms over year 2004-2013, which covers 48, 193 observations in 14 
European countries. Outliers were removed from the dataset by trimming the highest and 
lowest 1% of the distribution of the key variables. This is a standard procedure in the 













Table 5.1 Summary statistics of key variables 
 
This table displays summary statistics for all firms in 14 European countries. IK is calculated as investment to capital. CFK 
is estimated as cash flow to capital. S1K is calculated as ratio of firms’ lagged turn over capital. Leverage is measured as 
total debt over total asset. Natural logarithm of total asset is used as proxy for firm’s size. Log of employee can also be used 
as another alternative for size of the firm. Cash holding is calculated as cash over total asset, while coefficient of variation is 
used to measure cash volatility.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
        
IK 48,193 1.055 15.800 
CFK 46,518 3.961 66.703 
S1K 39,830 102.824 708.432 
Leverage 48,092 0.291 0.332 
Log of total asset 48,193 9.017 0.820 
Log of employee 46,721 3.833 1.022 
Cash holding 46,786 0.129 0.156 
Cash volatility 47,926 0.905 0.549 
 
 
I calculate investment (Iit:) as the change in the real tangible fixed assets plus depreciation. 
Cash flow (CFit ) is calculated as the sum of profit after tax plus depreciation. I measure the 
replacement value of capital stock (Kit) is proxy by real tangible fixed assets.  Sales. (Sit:) is 
the total real sales turnover of the firm.. I defined Size lnTA as logarithm natural of firm’s 
total asset. Age is logarithm natural of firm age since incorporation date.. Leverage ratio 
(Lev) is calculated as the book value of total long-term liabilities divided by firm’s fixed 
asset.  Change in cash holding is defined as the cash holding by the firm in each period.  IK is 
defined as ratio of investment over replacement value of capital stock. S1K is measured as 








the main variables used in the analysis.  The detail descriptive statistics of main variables per 
country can be found in appendix F. 
 
5.5 Empirical Result 
5.5.1 All sample Estimation 
Table 5.2 Estimation result of investment cash flow sensitivity for the whole sample 
 
This table gives the estimation result for the all sample (See equation 5.4). The dependent variable is IK, which is defined as 
investment over capital. All regression includes dummy variables for country, year and industry. I use FE regression to 
estimate the model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 







Industry dummy yes 
Year dummy yes 
Country dummy Yes 
Observations 38,565 
R-squared 0.176 
Number of id 8,093 
 
I do not classify the sample into two different groups, constrained and unconstrained firms, 
because the main objective of this study is to see the magnitude of investment cash flow 
sensitivity across countries.  As can be seen from Table 5.2, there is a positive and significant 
effect of cash flow on investment after controlling for the industry-year and country 
dummies. It indicates that firms tend to invest more on average when they have higher cash 
flow and I may say that there is some kind of financial constraint for the firm in 14 European 










Table 5.3 Estimation result of investment cash flow sensitivity for manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing firms 
 
This table gives the estimation result for the manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms in the sample (See equation 
5.4). The dependent variable is IK, which is defined as investment over capital. All regression includes dummy 
variables for country, year and industry. I use FE regression to estimate the model. ***, ** and * indicate 







CFK 0.251*** 0.084*** 
 
-0.004 -0.001 
S1K -0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
Industry dummy yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes 
Country dummy yes yes 
Observations 10,501 28,064 
R-squared 0.254 0.239 
 
To see the different effect of cash flow on investment between manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing firms, I estimate the main baseline equation for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms. As expected, the manufacturing firms have higher magnitude of cash 
flow on investment, whereas non-manufacturing firms has a slight lower magnitude. 
 
Table 5.4 shows the baseline regression with additional variable as proxy for financial 
development. I use three different proxy of financial development, namely DCFS, DCPS and 
DCPS. DCFS is the ratio of domestic credit provided by the financial sector over GDP (%), 
DCPS is the ratio of domestic credit to private sector over GDP (%) and DCPSB is the rati of 
domestic credit to private sector by banks over GDP level of the countries (%)12.  The law, 
                                                        








finance and economic growth literature have mentioned that the ability of a firm to raise 
external capital is strongly affected by the legal and economic environment. 
 
Domestic credit provided by the financial sector (DCFS) includes all credit to various sectors 
on a gross basis. The financial sector here is defines as monetary authorities and deposit 
money banks, as well as other financial corporations (such as: finance and leasing companies, 
money lenders, insurance corporations, and pension funds) that provide money to the 
creditors. Domestic credit to private sector (DCPS) means all financial resources provided to 
the private sector by financial corporations, while Domestic credit to private sector by banks 
(DCPSB) refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by other depository 
corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks).  The estimation suggests that 
the magnitude of cash flow to investment is lower by adding the financial development 
proxies into main baseline equation. By using the whole sample, the coefficient of cash flow 
is 0.0324, while when adding interaction variables of CFK with DCFS, DCPS and DCPSB, I 
see that the coefficient of cash flow is at 0.0160, 0, 0199 and 0, 0200.  However, the 
interaction variables between CFK and financial development are positive and significant, 
which indicates that higher financial development does not reduce the cash–flow sensitivity 














Table 5.4 Estimation result for investment and cash Flow: The effect of financial 
development 
 
This table gives the estimation result for the whole sample by adding the financial development proxies. DCFS is the ratio of 
domestic credit provided by the financial sector over GDP (%), DCPS is the ratio of domestic credit to private sector over 
GDP (%) and DCPSB is the ratio of domestic credit to private sector by banks over GDP level of the countries (%). I use FE 
regression to estimate the model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% . 
Variable DCFS DCPS DCPSB 
CFK 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 
-0.004 -0.003 -0.00385 
S1K 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 













   
-0.003 
Industry dummy yes yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes yes 
Country dummy yes yes yes 
Observations 28,539 28,539 28,539 






























5.5.2 Cross Country variation 
Table 5.5 Estimation result of investment cash flow sensitivity per-countries 
This table gives the estimation result for each country (See equation 5.4). The dependent variable is IK, which is defined as 
investment over capital. All regression includes dummy variables for year and industry. I use FE regression to estimate the 
model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Spain 
CFK 0.367*** 0.104*** 0.686*** 0.011*** 1.003*** 
 
-0.024 -0.002 -0.0138 -0.004 -0.030 
S1K 0.009*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.001** 0.019*** 
 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes 
Country dummy No No No No No 
Observations 272 3,130 1,248 677 910 
R-squared 0.570 0.405 0.843 0.031 0.635 
Number of id 67 535 245 259 170 
Variable Finlandia France Great Britain Greece Hungaria 
CFK -0.298*** 0.075*** 0.024*** 0.0868*** 0.266*** 
 
-0.015 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.034 
S1K 0.027*** -0.001*** 0.005*** -0.001** 0.002 
 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes yes yes yes 
Country dummy No No No No No 
Observations 1,708 3,740 11,601 338 225 
R-squared 0.34 0.148 0.084 0.464 0.425 
Number of id 305 585 3,089 62 47 
Variable Ireland Italy Netherlands Sweden 
CFK 0.031*** 0.001** 0.181*** 0.035*** 
 
-0.004 -0.001 -0.034 -0.0017 
S1K 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.027*** 0.012*** 
 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
Industry dummy yes yes yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes yes yes 
Country dummy No No No No 
Observations 173 4,236 184 9,752 
R-squared 0.442 0.124 0.671 0.423 










Our sample covers 14 European countries with different characteristic. In Table 5.5, I present 
the country wise result for the baseline investment equation per country. Finland is the only 
country that exhibits the negative relationship between investments and cash flow, which 
interestingly Finland has the lowest percentage of DCPS. (See table 5.6) While the other 14 
countries have a positive and significant sign of cash flow on investment. Spain has the 
highest magnitude of cash flow on investment, while Italy has the lowest one. As also can be 
seen from table 5.6, the high income countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, 
United Kingdom and Spain has high percentage of DCPS which indicating that those 
countries are considered as country with high degree of financial development. For example, 
Denmark with the highest DCPS during 2004-2013 also exhibits a small coefficient of  cash 
flow to investment. This means that the degree of financial development indeed has an effect 
to the magnitude of ICFS. 
 
 
Table 5.6 Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
 
Countries Year  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Austria 105.97 115.63 116.37 115.44 120.29 126.00 122.82 120.35 118.45 115.48 
Belgium 71.19 73.76 82.03 90.89 93.90 97.49 94.49 92.75 92.26 92.33 
Germany 112.93 112.59 109.60 105.25 108.61 113.42 106.98 103.81 101.09 95.58 
Denmark 158.16 171.78 185.68 202.50 216.32 223.87 215.96 208.38 205.19 202.80 
Spain 124.86 145.65 166.98 187.89 202.84 212.35 215.06 209.24 192.54 176.37 
Finland 67.60 75.05 78.80 81.52 85.98 93.89 95.71 97.04 99.32 102.14 
France 90.61 92.67 98.43 105.58 108.76 111.55 114.21 115.90 115.96 114.26 
United Kingdom 149.53 156.80 168.10 184.29 208.37 210.28 199.87 184.29 176.78 165.18 
Greece 70.79 79.59 85.24 93.91 97.41 94.28 118.65 121.88 120.96 122.85 
Hungary 45.94 51.25 55.60 62.57 69.80 69.51 69.37 66.21 56.75 52.10 
Ireland 133.52 160.05 181.20 199.17 219.96 232.10 212.18 199.73 185.73 179.04 
Italy 84.83 88.99 94.47 100.57 104.75 110.97 123.21 122.59 124.73 121.45 
Netherlands 157.83 165.04 167.19 188.06 193.16 214.15 200.01 199.33 199.76 189.86 









5.5.3 Time series variation 
 
Table 5.7 investment cash flow sensitivity before and after crisis year 2008 
 
This table gives the estimation result for whole sample that is divided into two different main periods (See equation 5.4). The 
dependent variable is IK, which is defined as investment over capital. All regression includes dummy variables for year and 
industry. I use FE regression to estimate the model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Variable Period 2004-2008 Period 2009-2013 P-value 
CFK 0.006*** 0.123*** 0.000*** 
 
-0.002 -0.002 




 Industry dummy yes yes 
 Year dummy yes yes 
 Country dummy yes yes 
 Observations 14,178 24,387   
R-squared 0.063 0.236 
 Number of id 5,366 7,626   
 
Table 5.7 presents the main investment models before and after the crisis period in order to 
see the time series variation of ICFS. For any condition, cash flow has a positive effect on 
investment; however, the magnitude of the effect of cash flow on investment after the crisis is 
much bigger than the magnitude of the effect of this variable before the crisis period.  I see 
that the investment cash flow sensitivity has increased and not disappeared, especially after 
the crisis period. The result do not support the study from Chen and Chen (2012) that found a 
decline in ICFS in the US and the decline is not explained by factors such as measurement 









5.5.4 Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
As alternative to the ICFS model, I also provide the CCFS estimation result in Table 5.8 for 
the whole sample. As I see the positive sign between cash holding and firm’s cash flow, I 
may argue that there is some kind of financial constraint in the market and I may conclude 
that the cash cash-flow sensitivity (hereafter CCFS) can be considered as alternative measure 
of financing constraint. (Almeida et al, 2004; Khurana et al,2006; Baum et al, 2011).   
 
 
Table 5.8 Cash-cash flow sensitivity estimation result 
  
This table gives the estimation result for cash –cash flow sensitivity a (See equation 5.5). The dependent variable is cash 
holding which is defined as cash holding over total asset. In column 2, I also include cash flow volatility as proxy for 
expected future cash flow. All regression include dummy variables for year and industry. I use FE regression to estimate the 
model. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% . 
Variables 1 2 
      
CFK 0.003 *** 0.003*** 
 
-1.08E-05 -1.08E-05 
S1K 0.002** 0.001*** 
 
-9.52E-07 -9.45E-07 
Leverage -0.062*** -0.060*** 
 
-0.002 -0.002 








Industry dummy yes yes 
Year dummy yes yes 
Country dummy yes yes 
Observations 37,459 37,434 








Following Almeida et al (2004). Leverage has negative and significant effect on cash holding 
that indicating firms having access to external finance not feel essential to hold more cash.  
By adding the cash flow volatility, this study also argues that the demand for external finance 
does not only depend on current cash flow, but also on expected future cash flow.  I use the 
cash flow volatility as the variable represent a cash flow shock and expected future cash flow. 
The results suggest that that cash flow stock has negative and significant effect on cash 
holding. This means that firms will hold fewer amounts of cash if they expect that there is 
shock in cash flow. Despite holding cash, the firms may prefer to hold other asset with higher 
level of return. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the investment cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) for 14 European countries. 
Not only to see the magnitude of cash flow on investment on the basis of countries and time 
variation, but also I attempt to see whether of financial development has an effect on 
investment cash flow sensitivity. As alternative, I also provide the estimation result using 
cash-cash flow sensitivity as alternative measurement of financial constraint in EU area. 
 
I use the data from Amadeus, a commercial database provided by Bureau Van Dijk over 
period 2004-2013. I select the data from 14 European countries with 48193 firm year 
observations. The result suggest that here is a positive and significant effect of cash flow on 
investment after controlling for the industry-year and country dummies which indicating that 
there is some friction in the financial market in EU area. When I observe the investment cash 
flow sensitivity across 14 countries, the result may vary in terms of magnitude and 
significance level, however majority of the countries have a positive and significant effect on 








model of cash-cash flow sensitivity and the result find that there is positive and significance 
relationship between cash holding and cash flow.  
 
The decreasing trend of the effect of cash flow on investment cannot be found then I may 
suggest that investment cash flow sensitivity still can be used as a measure of financial 
constraint. However, it is strongly suggested to use longer data period in order to make a 
conclusion that there is possibility that investment cash flow sensitivity has disappeared in 
recent year.  Future works can be done to see why investment cash flow sensitivity does exist 




































CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to study the impact of financial market imperfections on 
SMEs by employing different empirical strategies and econometric techniques into four 
empirical papers in order to answer and fulfill the three objectives that have been mentioned 
in chapter 1.  The first objective is to measure the degree financial constraints faced by SMEs 
using direct and indirect measurement. Secondly, it aims to find out the effect of financial 
constraint, firm-specific and human capital factors on SMEs Performance and lastly, it has an 
objective to identify the factors that may in turn alleviate the financing constraints for SMEs  
 
I present four empirical papers with three different dataset. For the first two chapters, I use 
the data from a survey of 9,417 French start-up firms by the French National Institute of 
Statistical and Economic studies. For the third empirical chapter, I use the switching 
regression approach to estimate the investment cash flow sensitivity of SMEs in the UK.  The 
last empirical paper basically discuss the investment cash flow sensitivity in the EU area and 
the final chapter summarizes the major findings from four empirical chapters of the thesis and 
also presents their plausible limitations.  
 
6.1 Summary and Limitation 
In the first empirical chapter, I develop and estimate a model of SMEs survival under credit 
rationing. Debt rationing is identified in a novel, two-stage procedure: firstly the causes of 
start-up loan refusal are identified and related to rationing via bank lending practices 
(collateral) and project quality (human capital of the entrepreneur. At the second stage, I use 
the rationing variable in estimating the hazard of survival. Following Evans and Jovanovic 








and the determinant of credit rationing is very complex. However, as this result finds, I can 
say that asset and human capital based credit-rationing does exists, but the probability of loan 
refusal will mitigate by having greater assets, having more pledged collateral and better 
human capital.  
 
SMEs often fail to grow due to a lack of the supporting environment that is needed to grow. 
Improving management skill can be done through human development and increase access to 
finance, whereas improving the business environment can be done by improving the 
investment climate, for example, by ensuring that there will be a full support for SMEs. 
Providing support to the SMEs owner including the programme to develop human capital 
may lead to endogenous growth and greater innovation.  
 
I am also aware of some possible limitations from this study. Even the use of some 
explanatory variables for the determinant of loan refusal and firm survival in the model could 
explain the determinant for the loan refusal and firm’s survival, a different set of variables, 
maybe more detailed variables, could provide further insight about the determinant of loan 
refusal and survival. I need the longitudinal dataset to study the issue in firm dynamic area, 
however this kind of dataset is very rare. Using more recent data may also give further insight 
to the area of study. 
 
In the second empirical chapter, by using the dataset from chapter 2, this chapter estimates 
two different models to measure the disequilibrium loan market for short-term and long-term 
bank loans for panel data set consisting of 9417 French start-up SMEs. The novelty of this 
study is I am not only including the firm-specific variable but also human capital indicator 








have effect on demand and supply of bank debt, thus collateral and good human capital 




In the third and fourth empirical chapter, I use the indirect approach to measure the financial 
constraint for SMEs.  In the third empirical chapter, I use switching regression approach to 
classify the sample into constrained and unconstrained groups. The results shows that 
financially constrained firms’ investment is more sensitive to measures of internal financing. 
Meanwhile, leverage has a more significant effect for constrained firms. As robustness check, 
I also use a priori classification in the baseline regression. The results shows that financially 
constrained firms’ investment is more sensitive to measures of internal financing.  
 
The chapter provides important alternative solutions to the controversial issues about the role 
of cash flow in investment behavior and by applying the switching regression model, the 
results are free from ex-ante classification bias. By using switching regression model, the 
group of constrained and unconstrained firms is endogenously classified by model. Based on 
the finding, I can also state that investment cash flow sensitivity can still be used to capture 
the effect of capital market friction on a firm’s investment behaviour. The results also suggest 
that the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds is not solely driven by 
measurement error in investment opportunity, I am not claiming that sales to capital ratio as 
our proxy for investment opportunity is free from measurement error. An instrumental 
variable technique or error correction models are suggested for tackling these problems, but 
none of those could be incorporated within the switching regression approach. I also have not 








But I feel confident that the benefit of using the switching regression approach will offset the 
disadvantages of using it. 
 
The last empirical chapter presents the investment cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) and cash-cash 
flow sensitivity (CCFS) estimation for 14 European countries.  I try to provide the analysis of 
ICFS and CCFS using international dataset. The result suggest that there is a positive and 
significant effect of cash flow on investment after controlling for the industry-year and 
country dummies which indicating that there is some friction in the financial market in EU 
area. I also find that that there is positive and significance relationship between cash holding 
and cash flow. The decreasing trend of the effect of cash flow on investment cannot be found 
then I may suggest that investment cash flow sensitivity still can be used as a measure of 
financial constraint.  I do not use a priory classification because the main objective of this 
study to see the magnitude of cash flows on investment. As alternative to ICFS, CCFS as the 
indirect measure of financial constraint also suggest that there is positive and significant 
relationship between cash holding and cash flow.  
6.2 Implication for Future Work 
To study the ex-ante characteristic and post-entry performance of firm, I need a longitudinal 
dataset that contained not only the owner characteristic variables but also the firm’s 
condition. The first and second empirical paper use the longitudinal from new-born SMEs in 
France for period 1994-2004, however using more recent dataset will also give further 
explanation to the issue in this area. In order to avoid the selection biases, it is also suggested 
to use the Heckman selection model in the analysis. It is also can be more beneficial to 
analyze another aspect of post-entry performance of firms, such as growth of the firm in 









Our sample consists of only the SMEs and unquoted firms, therefore it is very difficult to find 
best alternative proxies for the investment opportunities variables. Followed the work form  
Hobdari et al. (2009), I use the accelerator model of investment capture the differential 
effects of cash flow on investment., however it will be an worthy venture to use another 
model, for example Euler model. In this study I have focused on investment cash flow 
sensitivity and cash- cash flow sensitivity of investment to determine the impact of financial 
constraints arising from market imperfections.   
 
Following the work from Carpenter & Brown (2002) and Oliveira & Fortunato (2006), 
financing constraint can be measured by estimating the sensitivity of firm growth to cash 
flow (GCFS).  Firm growth can be measured as growth of total asset (e.g. Carpenter and 
Brown, 2002), employment growth (e.g. Oliveira & Fortunato, 2006) and growth of total 
sales (e.g. Fagiolo & Luzzi, 2006). Carpenter & Petersen (2002) test whether the growth of 
small firm is constrained by by the availability of internal finance.  However, when inferring 
that positive relationship between growth and internal finance merely represent the financing 
constraint is too straight forward and the result is inconsistent, due to the fact that a positive 
and significant coefficient for cash flow only show that the growth of the firm is positively 
affected by the availability of internal finance. Therefore, I can follow any of these in 
specifying our equations based on our dataset. Moreover, those three sensitivities to measure 
the effect of financial constraints on firms’ financial policies can be used   to capture not only 









This implication for further research can give us an indication about the wideness of the field 
of our selected research area. Despite having some limitations, this thesis, which takes the 
form of four empirical papers, presents an analysis of the ‘financial market imperfections and 
financial constraints for SMEs Can possibly fill up some gaps in the existing literature, in 
particular for the research in this domain which focus on unquoted and small firms. At the 
end, I may expect that this thesis, which takes the form of four empirical papers, presents an 
analysis of the ‘financial market imperfections and financial constraints for SMEs will help 
us to better understand how market imperfections led financial constraint problems may 
affect firm performance and to get better understanding how human capital and firm-specific 
factors may contribute to reduce the problem. 
 
6.3 Practical Implication for Small Business Owner, Bank and Policy Makers 
The findings of all four empirical papers certainly have a practical implication for small 
business owner, bank managers and policy makers. Small business owners can identify that 
not only financial indicator but also human capital indicator can be used to alleviate the 
financial constraint problem by the small business. The small business owner should be 
motivated to enhance their knowledge and expertise, therefore it can seen as the positive 
signal from the fund supplier. By having greater human capital, it also can reduce the chance 
of failure. Since the credit rationing effect are persistent, it is strongly suggested that the 
business owner also look for another alternative source of financing in the market, for 
example by getting fund from the crowd-funding (especially for IT and creative industry 









For the bank managers, since small business, especially the start-up businesses, has low 
tangible asset, it is strongly suggested that bank has a mechanism to value non-tangible asset. 
Many businesses with the good prospect cannot be able to get bank financing because of this 
collateral issue. However, bank manager also need to develop a good monitoring scheme in 
order to reduce the moral hazard and adverse selection. Rigorous assessment of bank loan 
applicant is certainly needed to conduct properly.  
 
Finally, the government as the policy makers can use the findings of this thesis to create a 
financial and non-financial assistance to help the small business owner to reduce the financial 
constraint problem. Financial assistance can be in form f lending scheme, national guarantee 
scheme and any other alternative financing scheme. While the non-financial assistance can be 
in form of certification, mentoring, coaching, training and development program, peer value 











APPENDIX A TABLE OF FINDINGS 
1. Financial Constraint and SMEs 
Authors Date of publication Dataset Theoretical model Test  Debt/equity 
constraints 
Qualifications % firms 
constrained 
/rationed 




interest rates.  Fall 
in interest rates 
would reduce 
rationing. 
Yes Assumes positive 
correlation of risk 
and return amongst 
projects 
NA 
De Meza & Webb 1987 NA Authors’ own 
model 
Equilibrium credit 







None: Surplus of 
funds 
Fazzari, Hubbard & 
Petersen (FHP) 













general (debt &/or 




(cash flow a proxy 
for demand 
changes) resolved 
in later studies. 
NA 









and probability of  
 
switching 





























Berger and Udell 1992 US  loan data. 
Period: 1977-1988 
N=1.1m loans 
SW model Commitment (vs 
non-commitment 
lending) should 
increase in tight 
credit markets. It 
didn’t. 
Credit constraints 
not a significant 
phenomenon. 
NA NA 
Holtz-Eakin, et al 1994 US tax returns on 
individuals 
considering SE and 
conditional on SE, 






EJ model  Credit   Typical firm 
constrained  
Murray and Lott 1995 UK VCs 
Period: 1991  
N=40 VCs 
 
Postal survey Rigorousness of 












lower for high 
tech. 
 NA 



















1997 Swedish SMEs 
Period: 1993 
N=550 firms 
Survey approach Attitudes to 
outside equity 
No, primarily 
demand side issue 
(control aversion) 


















Annual Reports of 
companies are a 
better test of 









































switching into SE 
as wealth increases 
Not tested, but 








Informal model Failure to learn 
rather than lack of 
finance increases 
chances of failure 





Toivanen & Cressy 
 






NA NA Moral hazard and 




share of contract 












(variant of EJ). 
Positive 
correlation of 

























(Same results for 
SE people). 
Informal model. 
Fits probit for 
business 
ownership on 








changes in wealth 
of individuals and 
their subsequent 
propensity to start 
a business. 
Only in the 95th 
percentile of the 
wealth distribution. 
Recent inheritance 
proxies for more 
than liquidity. 
Changes in wealth 
(e.g. savings or 
housing equity 
growth) just prior 
to SE have no 
impact on business 
entry. High wealth 
individuals are also 
less risk averse. 
 At most 5% of 
the potential 
entrepreneurs. 
Astebro & Bernhardt 
 
2005 US Census data on 
white males. 
Period 1987.  
N=1,194 
Theoretical model  Two stage 
estimation. 
 




human capital in 
wage and SE 
NA 
Beck et al  2006 Cross country  NA NA NA SMEs are more 
financially 
constrained than 




2009 Panel of UK SMEs 
Period: 1996-7 
N=2,500 





followed by bank 
debt and then 
outside equity.  
 NA 
Cosh, Hughes, 
Bullock and Milner 
2009 N=855 SMEs  in 




Survey Evidence of 
constraints on 





















measured by   % of 
requests accepted 










  Flight to quality by 
banks as recession 
bites. 
Upper bound of 
6% in 2004 
rising to  
19% in 2008 







constraints with an 
impact on 
performance. 










By using both 
logic and ordered 
logit model, 
several dimensions 
of firm perception 
general financing  
Firm with such as 
high interest rates 
or high collateral 
requirements, 
access to long-term 
and short-term 






2. Financial Constraint, Investment and Cash Flows Sensitivity : Measurement  
Author Theoretical Approach Basic Regression Equation Notes 










   
Investment should be entirely 
explained by q 




























Strong relationship between 
cash flows and investment 



















































































Theory predict that 1β,β 21   
and 3β >0, 4β   0. If the Euler 
regressions perform poorly, one 
explanation could be that firms 
are financially constrained 
Beck et al., (2008) Priory classification of Constrained 
firms and Unconstrained firms 
NA NA 






























Sales growth should be 
associated with operating 
margin according to the 
principle of “growth of the 
fitter” 
 
Hashi and Toci (2010) Priory classification of Constrained 






3. Credit Rationing and Collateral : Collateral  as remedy for informational asymmetries between borrower and lender and collateral as a tool to 
increase the supply of bank debt 
 
No Study Sample Methods Key Variable Main Findings 
1 Leeth and Scott (1989) National Federations 
and Independent 
Business Survey 1980 
and 1982 
Probit regression with 
the collateralization 
decision as dependent 
variable 
Firm, loan 
characteristic and legal 
environment 
Age of the firm has impact on pledge 
collateral. The pledging collateral is 
higher for an older firms and for the 
firms who were obtaining a smaller 
amount of loans or shorter maturity 
loans 
2 Berger and Udell  
(1995) 
NSSBF 1988 Logit regression with 





Larger firms pledge more collateral , 










3 Harhoff and Korting 
(1998) 
Survey data from 
German SMEs on their 
lines of credit (1997) 
Probity Regression with 
the collateralization 





Relationship lending give benefit for 
SMEs and will reduced the size of 
pledging collateral 
4 Cowling (1999) 1991 survey data from 
SMEs in UK 
Logit regression with 
the collateralization 
decision as dependent 
variable 
Bank, firm relationship 
and loan characteristic 
Loan size and loan duration has 
effect of probability of loan 
collaterallization 
5 Cressy and Toivanen 
(2001) 
Individual loans form a 
large UK bank over 
period 1987-1990 
2SLS estimation to 
estimate a system of 
equations consisting  of 
three equations with the 
pledging of collateral, 
interest rate and loan 
amount as dependent 
variable 
Interest loan, loan 
amount, collateral 
requirement, risk 
degree and duration of 
project 
There is no relationship between risk 
and collateral pledging. Only loan 
duration have positive impact on 
probability of pledging collateral 
6 Hanley (2002) Credit files of UK retail 
bank over the period 
1998-2000 
Logistic and Tobit 
regression with 
collateralization and 
amount of pledging 
collateral as dependent 
variables 
Loan, owner 
characteristic and risk 
Existing business often have to 
pledge more collateral than the start-
up business  
7 Atanasova and Wilson 
(2004) 
Corporate bank lending 
is estimated using panel 
data of 639 UK firms, 
provided by Dun and 
Bradstreet International 




The demand for bank 
loans as a function of 
the level of firm 
activity, firm’s size, the 
availability of funds 
that are substitutes to 
bank loans and the bank 
loan 
premium. The supply of 
bank loans is modelled 
as a function of the 
Collateral can be considered as a 
determinant of the supply function 
for bank debt. A higher availability 
of collateral is expected to increase 
the supply of bank debt since 
collateral can mitigate the 
informational asymmetric between 








value of firm’s 
collateral, the risk 
perceived by the bank 
and the tightness of 
monetary policy 
8 Hanley and Crook 
(2005) 
Credit application from 
business start ups to a 
major UK bank over 
period 1998-1999 
 Logistic regresion The increase of available collateral 
increase the likelihood of loans are 
being granted 
9 Menkhoff et al. (2006) Credit files of Thai 
Bank over the Period 
1992-1996 
 Probit and Tobit 
Regression with the 
incidence and amount 
of collateral pledged as 
dependent variables 
Collateral is used to reduce the 
higher credit risks of small and 
young firms 
10 Hernandez-Canovas 
and Martinez Solano 
(2006) 
Survey data from 
Spanish SMEs in the 
period 1999-2000 
Probit regression with 
the decision to pledge 
personal guarantees as a 
dependent variables 
Relationship lending, 
risk and firm 
characteristic 
Older and larger firms incur a lower 
probability of having to provide 
personal guarantees. Relationship 
lending does matters. 
11 Voordeckers and 
Steijvers (2006) 
Credit files of a large 
Belgian bank over the 
period 2000-2003 
Ordered probit and 
continuation ratio logit 
estimation with the 
collateralization 
decision and the type of 
collateral as dependent 
variables 
Relationship, loan and 
lender characteristic 
Find the determinants of 
collateralization decision and the 
type of collateral. Larger and older 
firms often have to pledge more 
collateral 
12 Brick and Palia (2007) NSSBF 1993 Simultaneous equation 
estimation (2SLS) 
consisting of three 
equations with loan rate 
premium, business and 
personal collateral as 
dependent variables 
Loan and firm 
characteristics 
Collateral has a significant impact on 
loan interest rate suggesting a 
jointness in debt terms. There is a 
positive relationship  between 












APPENDIX B DISEQULIBRIUM MODEL ESTIMATION (ROBUSTNESS CHECK) 
Table B1. Disequilibrium model estimation with human capital variables in demand equation 











































  1997 -0.0316*** Industry dummy 
 
 















(0.0061) Transport 0.00584 
Industry dummy   
 
(0.0082) 






















  Catering 0.0655*** 









Table B2. Disequilibrium model estimation with human capital variables in demand equation 




Desired demand for 
long term bank debt 
Independent variables 
supply for long term 
bank debt 
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Industry dummy   Catering 0.0334*** 





















  Catering 0.0658*** 








APPENDIX C QUISCORES DEFINITION 
 
QuiScores Definition 
The QuiScore is a measure of the likelihood of company failure in the twelve months 
following the date of calculation.  
The QuiScore is given as a number in the range 0 to 100. For ease of interpretation, that 
range may be considered as comprising five distinct bands: 
 81-100 The Secure Band 
Companies in this sector tend to be large and successful public companies . Failure is 
very unusual and normally occurs only as a result of exceptional changes within the 
company or its market 
 61-80 The Stable Band 
Here again, company failure is a rare occurrence and will only come about if there are 
major company or marketplace changes 
 41-60 The Normal Band 
This sector contains many companies that do not fail, but some that do. 
 21-40 The Unstable Band 
there is a significant risk of company failure; in fact, companies in this band are, on 
average, four times more likely to fail than those in the Normal Band. 
 00-20 The High Band 
 
Percentage likelihood of failure 
This indicates the predicted likelihood that the company will fail during the 12 months 
following the calculation, based on a range of QuiScores as follows: 









































APPENDIX D INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION  
 
Industry classification based on major industries 




5. Transportation, Communication, Electric gas, and Sanitary Services 
6. Wholesale trade 
7. Retail Trade 
8. Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
9. Services 




























APPENDIX E SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY COUNTRY 
No Country Number of observation (N) Number of observation (%) 
1 Austria 330 0.69% 
2 Belgium 3,651 7.63% 
3 Germany 1,460 3.05% 
4 Denmark 878 1.83% 
5 Spain 1,102 2.30% 
6 Finlandia 1,994 4.17% 
7 France 4,192 8.76% 
8 Great britain 16,588 34.65% 
9 Greece 410 0.86% 
10 Hungaria 276 0.58% 
11 Ireland 225 0.47% 
12 Italy 4,667 9.75% 
13 Lithuania 124 0.26% 
14 Netherlands 260 0.54% 
15 Sweden 11,716 24.47% 







































IK CFK S1K 
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
1 Austria 1.1277 0.5843 3.7623 1.3641 60.7289 15.6753 
2 Belgium 0.9779 0.2447 3.4939 0.9832 63.3381 7.8271 
3 Germany 1.6231 0.6331 3.2643 0.8366 96.9691 22.9528 
4 Denmark 0.3850 0.0621 1.4949 0.4863 50.0749 7.7085 
5 Spain 3.1534 1.1844 4.8199 1.4244 77.5434 13.4308 
6 Finlandia 0.5362 0.1173 2.5480 0.5597 49.9826 6.4409 
7 France 0.6934 0.1874 4.0578 1.7957 61.8926 6.6269 
8 Great britain 1.0831 0.1280 5.1935 0.4997 140.8702 8.6504 
9 Greece 0.4237 0.0699 3.7491 0.7399 113.4386 19.0246 
10 Hungaria 0.5187 0.1095 1.9321 0.2712 46.8069 5.9322 
11 Ireland 0.6599 0.1501 25.8450 8.2747 302.9376 96.1454 
12 Italy 0.6302 0.0560 1.3865 0.9479 92.0754 9.7236 
13 Lithuania 2.1600 0.4757 2.9797 1.6791 243.3604 67.0270 
14 Netherlands 6.7586 3.8884 5.8174 6.9673 354.7595 179.4296 
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